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PARAMETERS

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Parameters is a journal of ideas and issues, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

From the Editor

In This Issue . . .

Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey define and examine the nuanced missions to which the Army and the other services are adapting in support of the policy of enlargement. They demonstrate how the Army is integrating new concepts into its doctrine, planning, training, and they define risks inherent in post-Cold War operations. Among the challenges of peace that they describe is the fact that national defense is a shared responsibility.

David Jablonsky provides a sweeping assessment of change and continuity in Army doctrine following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the lessons of the 1991-92 Gulf War. He considers increased lethality of the battlefield, advances in communications and other technology, and new Army missions in validating the utility of the classical concepts of tactics, operations, and strategy in operations other than war. His discussion of nuanced warfare provides the outline of a definition of the much-discussed "revolution in military affairs."

Frank J. Stech delves into a contentious aspect of policymaking and military operations, showing how much more complicated government-media relations have become in the era of CNN war. He provides technical as well as policy and procedural insights into a world in which instant communications from the opponent's capital not only bypass policymaking bureaucracies, but can allow national leaders to deal with opposing surrogates through commercial satellite links. Nuanced warfare, indeed.

Michael G. Roskin scrutinizes the situation in the Balkans and describes a likely next phase of the war in the former Yugoslavia. Far from being over, even if the brokered peace is accepted by all combatants, the present conflict has some distance to go before either equilibrium is reached or exhaustion sets in. In the meantime, Roskin describes policy alternatives which have yet to make their way into the op-ed columns of local newspapers.

Russell W. Ramsey presents a well-rounded appraisal of strategy options for our relations with Latin America. His concept for revitalizing US involvement in the region integrates all the elements of national power, supports enlargement, and provides the basis for a coherent US policy.

Victor Gray examines the "eternal German question" in light of reunification. He suggests that historical concerns—relations with Russia and the security vacuum in Central Europe—will increasingly preoccupy German leaders. As a consequence, he looks at the implications of such a shift for NATO and for US policy toward Germany and the rest of Europe.

Jim Courter, L. Steve Davis, and Loren B. Thompson develop an aspect of the recent (Summer 1994) feature on the defense industrial base that is sometimes taken for granted in strategic assessments: sustainability of the force. In this challenge of peace, the authors examine the effects of the ongoing defense

drawdown on ammunition production. Using the example of the Korean conflict to identify policy and procedural lapses, the authors survey the current ammunition stockpile and suggest modifications to ammunition procurement policy and to current and planned investment in ammunition production capacity.

Wayne Silkett recounts the plan for the invasion of Japan in an appreciation of what did not occur in 1945. His discussion serves as a reminder of how far we have come in improving our concepts for joint doctrine and joint operations and how far we have to go to see the effects of those changes.

Commentary and Reply features an exchange between Douglas O. Fleck and John F. Hillen on alternatives to the use of soldiers in peace support operations; replies by Donn A. Starry and Howard Barnard to Wesley J. Taylor's inquiry about their recent reviews of books on low-intensity conflict; and observations on the role of the Foreign Area Officer program by Daniel Pike and Kent Butts.

Book Reviews include Daniel Simpson's assessments of two books on presidential involvement in the Vietnam War; Richard Trefry on presidential leadership in modern wars, and William F. Burns' evaluation of three different perspectives on arms control. Review essays will appear again in the Winter 1993-94 issue.

A Values-Based Institution . . .

The Army has recently released a new version of Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, which provides an encompassing statement of the historical, constitutional, and ethical foundations on which the Army rests. Intended as a basic reference for understanding the values and tenets of the Army as an institution, the document is one with which all serving military and civilian employees should be familiar. Those no longer on active duty, and others unfamiliar with the Army, can find in it an affirmation of the values and standards to which American soldiers aspire.

Other Business . . .

Our review of the journal's distribution database is under way, with the first group of subscribers—principally institutional recipients—responding to the nearly 1900 inquiries we sent out. We appreciate the rapid responses of those who have already returned their cards, and ask recipients who have not yet done so to please complete and return them.

Graduates of the USAWC generally are eligible to receive the journal at no charge only until they retire. If you have retired and are still receiving the journal gratis, we will likely remove your name from the list of recipients. We will keep readers informed as this work progresses. In the meantime, if you think you may be among those who will lose eligibility, please take advantage of the form on page 152 of this issue to continue your subscription for a modest fee through the Superintendent of Documents; that office presently has about 1100 *Parameters* subscribers on its rolls. Subscription forms will be available in each of the next several issues. — JJM

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Autumn 1994

The Challenges of Peace

GORDON R. SULLIVAN and ANDREW B. TWOMEY

Americans are at a crossroads in history similar to the one we faced in the middle of this century. The Allied victory in World War II transformed the international system, and leaders recognized that there could be no return to traditional policies. Economic devastation and political instability in Europe, conflict in China, the advent of nuclear weapons—all posed immediate and long-term threats to the well-being of the United States and her allies. President Truman recognized the nature of the changes in his 1949 inaugural address: “Each period of our national history has its special challenges. Those that confront us now are as momentous as any in the past. Today marks the beginning of a period that will be eventful, perhaps decisive, for us and the world.”¹

President Truman and others created a national strategy of containment. However, it is the process of defining and carrying out a successful strategy, rather than the strategy itself, that is instructive. For while we now look back on containment as an obvious choice, nothing was guaranteed: not the strategy itself, not the instruments through which it was carried out, and certainly not its success.

The military requirements to execute containment were, in the simplest terms, large standing military forces, nuclear and conventional. By the end of the Cold War, the Army had more than four divisions based in Europe, 11 more in the continental United States ready to reinforce rapidly, and a large reserve establishment. But that snapshot from the end of the Cold War is far different from what we understood the requirements to be at its beginning. The need for a large, well-trained, standing Army was driven home by North Korea's attack in 1950; until then many were uncertain that we still needed such forces. Our commitment to NATO began as a temporary measure, eventually evolving into a robust defensive capability. And while preventing Soviet domination of Europe was the predominant Cold War focus, between 1945 and 1989 the Army added 29 battle streamers to its flag—none of them for action in Europe.

Throughout the Cold War, as our ability to counter the Soviet threat evolved, the nation and the Army met a variety of other threats—wars in Korea and Vietnam, and other missions of strategic importance but of lesser magnitude. If we learn anything from our Cold War experience it is that the Army must be able to fight and win a conventional war while remaining supple enough to adapt to other challenges. In the years to come, as in the past, we undoubtedly will be called upon to protect national interests in other places than those we now anticipate.

The uncertainty of the international environment makes the Army's task doubly difficult. Containment has given way to a national strategy of "enlargement," aimed at promoting the ideals of democracy and free-market economies. Military forces to support that strategy must be prepared to conduct a wide range of missions. Enlargement requires having an Army ready to fight and win major regional conflicts, as well as preparing and providing forces for a variety of operations other than war. The headlines told the story of our soldiers in Somalia, but there have been many more stories less commonly known. Skopje, Macedonia: 500 soldiers are helping to enforce the embargo against Serbia. The Sinai: 1000 soldiers stand watch as part of the Multinational Force and Observers. Incirlik, Turkey: Operation Provide Comfort II continues to deliver aid to Kurdish refugees. Throughout 1993, on an average day 20,000 US Army soldiers were deployed on operational missions in more than 60 countries. That number is in addition to the 125,000 soldiers stationed forward in Europe, Korea, Panama, and elsewhere.

The national strategy of enlargement requires a different kind of Army from the one we built for containment. It is a smaller Army to be sure—more than 30 percent smaller by the end of 1994—and it is an Army structured and trained to perform under a new set of conditions. The Army is shedding its Cold

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War overhead; we seek to understand and adapt to the post-Cold War world. We understand the difficulties of ethnic conflict and peace operations. We understand as well the need to be ready to fight and win two major regional conflicts. Most important, we understand that we cannot meet either of these challenges at the expense of our ability to respond to the other. We cannot consume our equipment or human capital in operations today and ignore investments that prepare us for future contingencies. We cannot optimize the force for peace operations at the expense of our ability to fight and win a war. We must raise and sustain a force capable of success at both missions. We must meet the challenges of peace.

Ethnic Conflict

One need not be a constant observer of foreign affairs to realize that a salient aspect of the post-Cold War era has been the rise of ethnic conflict.² Ethnic conflict is certainly not a new phenomenon. But the end of superpower confrontation, combined with the increased integration of the international system in both communications and commerce, has increased the significance of geographically limited conflicts between narrowly defined groups. For nearly two years, conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia have held the attention of citizens and diplomats alike as the United States supports United Nations initiatives in both regions.

The increased importance of ethnic conflict poses special conditions for strategists and for the use of military force. The origins of each dispute and the motivation of the combatants give each of these conflicts a special, if not unique, character. One school of thought identifies opposing cultures as a significant cause of such conflicts. Professor Samuel Huntington proposed that the paradigm to replace the Cold War would be a "clash of civilizations," a view that identifies conflict as a product of divergent religious, cultural, and ethnic interests. Huntington suggests that incompatible views, combined with the increased contact between differing civilizations in the modern age, will be the source of conflict in the coming decades.³

Other writers and analysts also view culture as a significant factor in group mobilization for conflict. In *Balkan Ghosts*, Robert Kaplan gives a vivid description of the centuries-old animosities that underlie the modern conflict in Bosnia.⁴ A study of the political mobilization of the Shi'a in Lebanon argues that their development as a political and military force was culturally based.⁵ A variety of observers of the Shining Path guerrillas stress that group's roots in the Indian culture of Peru.⁶

Still others argue that these same conflicts are better understood as rational responses to disintegrating state structures and related social and economic conditions. They suggest that problems arising from the disintegration of the Soviet empire or nations in Africa should be understood in terms of the basic economic needs of the populations.⁷ In this view, current conflicts in Bosnia and

***"The increased importance of ethnic conflict
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in various African nations, and potential problems within and among nations of the former Soviet Union, are the result of economic disruption and the uncertain security of the new state structures. These relatively rational concerns have little to do with ethnicity or culture. The root of conflict is the desire for security and economic well-being, not historic animosities or cultural differences.

Soldiers should understand this debate, but need not take sides in it. Each perspective provides valuable insights to the problems that the Army could face in such conflicts; each case presents comparable conditions that we must prepare to confront.

First, we can expect these conflicts to be localized in nature and to have unique contextual features. Whether the conflict is a "clash of civilizations" or cultural groups competing for territorial or economic advantage, the result is the same. The leaders of the competing groups will be pursuing relatively well-defined aims within a specific, often small geographic area. As the conflict continues, the groups play to cultural themes unique to those groups and regions. Peru, Somalia, Lebanon, Bosnia—each case is geographically limited, and each case has a different cultural context.

Second, the nature and scope of each conflict and the motives of the combatants indicate that decisions on the use of force in these conflicts will have significant political dimensions. Destruction of an opposing army generally will not resolve them. And if these disputes are not to be settled through mass migration, we can expect long-term solutions to be found primarily through political, not military, means. Military means may well be required to assist in the resolution of these conflicts, but we should expect the use of force to be tightly linked and coordinated with other forms of national power.

Finally, these conflicts will likely be attended to by a number of external actors. If Huntington is correct, local struggles will likely receive political and material support from members of the relevant "civilization" around the world. Even if we are not witnessing a clash of civilizations, it is clear from the examples of Bosnia and Somalia that localized conflicts engage an array of governmental and nongovernmental actors; a variety of nations, international organizations, and religious and ethnic groups have become significantly involved in both. The Cold War tended to produce a bifurcation

of interests with respect to localized conflicts; the current international system permits many interests to surface simultaneously, all of which will affect how our soldiers, if committed, will carry out their missions.

Issues for the United States

Conflicts with these characteristics are significantly different from wars between nation-states. Our friends and foes may not be immediately apparent, and moral interests in the resolution of a conflict may be more important than defeating a clearly defined enemy force.

The expressions of surprise from some quarters that we would use military force in support of humanitarian goals ignore our history.⁸ The debate between our faithful adherence to moral principles and the pragmatic pursuit of national interests is hardly a new one. The dilemma, articulated so clearly in the Federalist Papers, precedes the founding of the Republic. The central question is how to reconcile a concern for moral principles with the imperatives of national power in order to create a meaningful policy that is understood and supported by the American people.

The tension between the moral and the practical is evident today. Citizens of the United States and many other nations are shocked by starvation, murder, and mayhem in various parts of the world. There is not an easy solution to be found, but the US Army accepts the linkage of moral and practical interests as a given. We cannot ignore the potential to deploy the Army to achieve humanitarian goals, but we also cannot ignore the reality that such a use of force may not be peaceful in the sense that we would like it to be. Support of humanitarian goals is part of our past, our present, and undoubtedly our future. The prospect for the future is that we will continue to be presented with hard choices, since we cannot do it all.

These matters point out the need for thoughtful examination of ways to respond to a policy of enlargement of democracy. New democracies are generally challenged to develop democratic institutions within their own cultural and historical contexts, to develop the role of their army in a democracy, and to define the rights of minorities. While some predominantly homogeneous nations exist—Japan and Korea come to mind—by and large the world is not geographically divided into exclusive, self-governing ethnic, cultural, religious, or economic blocs. And unless the international community is willing to accept forced migrations and ethnic cleansings, it cannot use ethnic homogeneity as an organizing principle—minorities will exist and governing structures must account for them.

It took six years for us to get from Lexington to Yorktown, and then six more to forge the set of political compromises embodied in our Constitution. More than half a century later, we fought a bitter internal war. We should not expect other nations to find it appreciably easier to devise accommodating political structures, nor should we expect the solutions embodied in our

version of democracy to be applicable in different cultural contexts. The political task at hand is to foster democratic governing structures that permit ethnically heterogeneous states to function. Our solution is federalism; we need to learn and understand what relationships will work in other cultures.

The Army should not take the lead in organizing or supporting the formation of democratic institutions in other nations. But the Army does have unique capabilities that have been used through the years to support their development. The military obviously can provide security; it reflects our purpose for existing. But our fighting forces also can provide medical treatment; build roads, buildings, and ports; and deliver a variety of supplies, to name but a few tasks. Perhaps most important is the Army's ability to deploy a command, control, and communications structure to support civilian agencies more directly involved with the local national government. Nation-building is not an Army issue, but the Army is prepared to support those agencies of the government which are directly concerned with that task.

Issues for the Army

As we learn about ethnic conflict we should keep in mind that this phenomenon is not a new one for the United States or the Army. We have taken a number of different approaches to ethnic conflict in the past that help us understand what the Army might be called upon to do in the future. None of the three types of military responses that have been tried is universally applicable and all such responses have to be adapted to the task at hand.

First, we can send observers, or a lightly armed interposition contingent. This type of response works only if all parties to the dispute agree to stop fighting. In the Sinai, our Multinational Force and Observer battalion task force, in concert with similar units from Fiji and Colombia, stands between Egypt and Israel. There the concept has worked well. A similar United Nations mission in Lebanon to separate Israel and Syria has not worked well at all—same part of the world, similar antagonists, but different outcomes. Interposing light forces between antagonists is an effective confidence-building measure that can permit a peace process to move forward. It is not a technique that can impose peace on unwilling antagonists.

Second, we can deploy forces to contain conflict. Some call this the forest-fire approach: try to curb the spread of the conflagration and let it burn out. This method has been tried with some success on the fringes of the former Yugoslavia. We have about 500 American soldiers in Skopje, Macedonia, carrying out this kind of mission today. Containment is useful and serves a specific purpose, but it is a passive, defensive activity. Containment of this sort may be sufficient to protect US interests in some cases, but it will not resolve a conflict, nor does it help alleviate the human suffering inherent in conflict.

Third, we can deploy forces to impose peace through the forceful disarming of a hostile movement. We adopted this approach in December 1989

in Panama, with the support of the Panamanian population. When the Israelis tried it in 1982 in Lebanon, the local Arabs and Druze refused to be disarmed, and, indeed, spread their guerrilla resistance into Israel itself. Our own history reminds us that it is no easy task to defeat and disarm an aroused people.

Meeting the challenge of ethnic conflict requires more than a list of types of military operations. Both leaders and soldiers in these environments must be experts at their traditional skills but also must be adept at anticipating, reading, and reacting to the complex environment. Soldiers must be able to read the nuances of these situations. They must understand the nuances of changing military, political, economic, and cultural dimensions and have the agility to alter our military actions quickly in a dynamic environment. Meeting the challenge requires not necessarily new operations, but rather a new understanding of the specific conditions and environment of these conflicts.

For example, the concept of *the objective* is a traditional principle of war; given the nuances of ethnic conflict, our objective may well be defined in nontraditional ways. Destruction of the enemy army may or may not lead to success; there might not even be an army as we understand the term. Our military objective might well be defined in terms entirely different from a place on the ground or an enemy force. Skopje is not a key terrain objective in the narrow military sense of that term, but it is now one of many places where we find US forces. The military mission of those soldiers is to control their sector of the border, but their influence extends far beyond that mission or their presence in a particular geographic location.

Officers learning to prepare operations orders in the classrooms of our professional schools at Ft. Benning, Ft. Knox, or Ft. Leavenworth used to find the listing of friendly and enemy forces a fairly straightforward task. During the Cold War, the list was almost always composed of military units. But the antagonists in ethnic conflicts are not all in uniform, and the identification of probable opponents now is much more complicated. A few years ago, most soldiers would have had no idea what a nongovernmental organization was. Now squad and team leaders in the 10th Mountain Division regularly talk about "NGOs."⁹ In fact, NGOs and newscasters have trained with us in our Combat Training Centers.

Understanding the nuances also means understanding the full significance of our actions. Destruction of the bridge at Mostar in Bosnia sent a message to all, but particularly to Muslims, whether engaged in the struggle or elsewhere in the world. US forces need to understand the import of their actions in the context of a specific environment—we need to understand what the bridges, or the monuments, or the buildings mean to the contending parties. We had very specific rules of engagement in Panama to protect certain structures. This detailed level of understanding will be the norm in future ethnic conflicts.

"Soldiers must understand the nuances of changing military, political, economic, and cultural dimensions and have the agility to alter our military actions quickly."

Most important, we must recognize that the use of force in ethnic conflicts is a policy decision that is subject to constant reassessment. This aspect of ethnic conflict is a reality that we must accommodate in our doctrine and training. In a simplistic view, decisions to use force follow a sequential relationship between the political and the military. First, national leaders decide the political objective, then we decide our military objective, and then the military commander applies force to achieve it. That model does not capture the reality of this type of conflict.

We must recognize that the application of force under these conditions may produce reactions that are not necessarily military in nature. Leaders of ethnic conflicts consciously appeal to the emotions of their followers and the rest of the world. Political objectives in such an environment can be as volatile as the emotions behind them. The local government and its leaders will react to those changes by repeatedly assessing political objectives and the military means appropriate to achieve them. Our own policymakers and military planners will do likewise. In situations where the actions of an infantry squad can have strategic importance, it is not unreasonable to assume that the use of the military will be modulated by policy considerations; our political decisionmaking processes and Army command structures must be able to establish and maintain tight policy control for as long as the operation is underway.

The Army is meeting new operational challenges by adjusting both its doctrine and its training. The June 1993 publication of our keystone doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, was a significant step in the Army's adjustment to the post-Cold War environment. Our doctrine now includes substantive considerations of nuanced operations, including operations other than war, such as peace support, humanitarian assistance, and support to domestic civil authorities; it addresses the challenges of force projection; and it further develops the structure and planning considerations for joint and combined (multinational) operations.

We are putting theory into practice at our training centers. November 1993 saw the first exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center specifically

designed to train units in a scenario akin to ethnic conflict. In keeping with its intent to master peace support operations, the Army did not conduct this exercise alone. The simulated conflict area was dotted with soldiers, civilians, and representatives from the same nongovernmental organizations that we have seen in Somalia and Bosnia. Representatives from the International Red Cross, Save the Children, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, a United Nations Disaster Assistance Relief Team, CARE, World Vision, media representatives, and others all went to Ft. Polk, Louisiana. They went there to work with us, to simulate their roles in these kinds of operations, and to learn with us how we all can accomplish our missions as part of a team.

Major Regional Conflicts

The Army exists to fight and win the nation's wars. That is a simple statement, but it is a task made particularly difficult by the inherent uncertainty of the future. While there are historical cases where nations and armies stand accused of total unpreparedness, the charge more often leveled is that the army prepared for the "wrong" war or the "last" war.

Historian Michael Howard predicts that we will almost certainly "get it wrong." He said:

I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives . . . [It] is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.¹⁰

Howard's point is not that it is hopeless to prepare doctrine for a future war. Rather it is a recognition of the fact that the predictive certainty associated with the physical sciences is not a feature of the art of war. We cannot know with precision the character of our future enemy, the weapons he will possess, or the tactics he will employ; but that does not relieve us of the responsibility to prepare carefully for the future. That preparation cannot be for a single, predetermined threat, for our prediction of the character of that threat will, as Howard notes, certainly be at least partly wrong. Thus, we cannot optimize the force for a single threat. We must instead build a force with the capability to win in the most important contingencies, while retaining the versatility, flexibility, and residual force to win across the range of uncertainty inherent in our forecasts of the future.

The civilian and military leadership of the nation have been working hard to ensure that we do not get it too badly wrong. An important part of that effort is reflected in the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), whose illustrative scenario is certainly incorrect—as will be any attempt to predict future conflict and war. But the scenario of the BUR is sufficient to provide an intellectual foundation for planning a force structure that will help us to get it right when we must.

"The Army exists to fight and win the nation's wars — a task made particularly difficult by the inherent uncertainty of the future."

Through the process of the BUR, the Administration decided that "the United States must field forces sufficient to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."¹ We all hope, of course, that those conflicts never occur, but we cannot plan for national security on the basis of hope. Maintaining a force structure to fight and win those notional conflicts is strategically prudent. For the Army, being able to fight and win translates to a force of approximately one million soldiers, active, National Guard, and Army Reserve. It means maintaining a force capable of projecting power to any corner of the globe in a relatively short time. Intellectual and physical changes continue, with the goal of ensuring that the concept of a power projection Army becomes reality. This vision is producing an Army that is fundamentally different from the one with which we won the Cold War.

One measure of the magnitude of change the Army has undergone is the positioning of our forces. In 1989, 32 percent of the active Army was stationed in Europe; by the end of 1994 the number will be less than 16 percent, and by 1999 it will be under 14 percent. While the percentage of our soldiers permanently stationed forward has been decreasing, the number of soldiers deployed overseas on temporary operational missions has grown: we have seen a 300-percent increase in such missions since 1990. The Army is no longer forward-based, waiting near its battle positions for the outbreak of war—it is deploying forward and carrying out its missions every day.

The difference can be illustrated by comparing the life of a battalion commander in Europe in 1989 with the life of a battalion commander today. In 1989 that officer—and usually the rest of his division—was trained to defeat a single threat, an attack by Warsaw Pact forces that were located a few kilometers to the east. He had a plan with specific battle positions that he and his soldiers rehearsed at least monthly. To get to the fight, he planned to drive out the front gate of his garrison. His ammunition supply was permanently loaded on his vehicles, and he planned to resupply himself from specific points in Germany identified in his battle plan. That world began to change in November 1990 when the battalion commander found himself headed for Saudi Arabia.

A battalion commander today, wherever stationed, must be ready for a wide array of missions. In November 1993, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) simultaneously had battalions at the National Training Center in California, in Egypt on MFO duty, and in Somalia operating under the UN. That situation—a division simultaneously deploying units to a variety of locations—is common throughout the Army. The battalion commander and his peers in every Army division must train to fight and win, to succeed in many different situations. He or she must be ready to lead soldiers to success in any part of the world.

We cannot expect to have US forces present in any region at the start of a conflict; power projection, not forward basing, will be the model for future war. Historians may well point to Operation Just Cause in Panama as the moment when 20th-century, industrial-age warfare assumed the forms of warfare in the 21st century. Success in that operation required all the elements that will be essential to success in the future, elements that the armed forces are continuing to develop.

In Operation Just Cause, most units were deployed directly from the United States to military objectives in Panama. The operation was not preceded by a massive buildup of forces and logistical infrastructure in theater, as has been the case in most wars in our history.¹² (Operation Desert Storm was marked by six months of preparation prior to combat.) In Just Cause, we moved forces directly to combat from the United States, and in about seven hours after our first action, we had secured 27 objectives. We were successful because we had the ability to deploy and employ decisive force rapidly.

Success also was a function of the simultaneous application of power by all the services throughout the area of operations. Coordinating the complementary capabilities of the Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force was not an easy task—it required specialized equipment and first-rate training to employ more than 300 aircraft in the skies of Panama in a six-hour period. Assets from all the services, from reconnaissance helicopters through stealth fighters, were employed essentially simultaneously to dominate the battlefield.

Finally, Just Cause was characterized by a combination of both traditional military missions—defeat of opposing armed organizations and seizure of specific objectives—and what might be considered nontraditional missions—establishing control of a population. Seizing the airfield at Rio Hato, assaulting the Commandancia building, securing Renacer prison—we had envisioned all of these tasks in generic terms and had trained for them. But success in Panama required more than effective application of force against specific units or physical objectives. Our six-hour assault took down an entire nation, and with it all of the associated governmental structures. It was not enough to seize our initial objectives; we had to establish control and maintain order until a civil government could be reconstituted.¹³ Imposing

order en route to a political settlement may well be a significant feature of nuanced operations in a regional conflict. The most significant nontraditional aspect of Just Cause was the ability of soldiers to react effectively to the very features of such missions for which they could not train specifically. They applied broad principles in unique circumstances and never failed to complete the mission.

The kind of major regional conflict envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review requires a force that can be projected directly from the United States, and it requires a force that can use to advantage the complementary capabilities of all the services through simultaneous employment. The force must be able to establish control over terrain and populations with equal facility; the purposes for which the United States employs force in the future will seldom be the task of pure destruction of an armed opponent or set of targets. Victory in a regional conflict will require us to dominate or control the land and the population, but only to support national strategic objectives and to sustain a political settlement in the region.

Our ability to meet these more familiar warfighting challenges requires sustained investment in specific equipment and arduous, realistic training. Acquisition of the C-17 transport aircraft, the construction or conversion of 19 cargo ships, and the establishment of a prepositioned Army armored brigade afloat all contribute to solving the strategic mobility problem that has plagued us. We continue to improve our ability to operate jointly, through improved command and control systems and through increased participation in joint training exercises. And we continue to be an Army trained and ready to be employed, not just to accomplish the missions we know of, but agile enough to get it right, quickly, when we find something new.

The Challenges of Peace

The challenge of balancing current and anticipated requirements is not a new one. We have been here before, and sometimes we made the wrong decisions. In 1885, we began a \$127-million program to improve our coastal defenses against attack by Great Britain or Germany. At the same time, soldiers in our western frontier forts were still equipped with single-shot rifles when the magazine-fed repeating rifle was the dominant technology. In 1950, the readiness to cope with a major war had been sacrificed through unwise or deferred investment decisions. We must seek a balance between the pressing concerns we know and the prospects that we—and others—can only estimate.

To accomplish both tasks, and prevent either from destabilizing the other, we must recognize and reconcile the costs associated with meeting the challenges. We must acknowledge the number of soldiers required to maintain the current pace of operations. That number has been great—much greater than expected when the Berlin Wall came down. We are now conducting more

military operations than at any time since 1945, except during the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf wars. The requirement for forces deployed on operations is up 300 percent—from an average of 6000 soldiers a day in the spring of 1990 to more than 20,000 soldiers a day in mid-1994.

While the planned force structure can support that level of commitment, it does so at some risk. Forces committed to peace support or other kinds of operations are not immediately available for a regional conflict for two reasons. First, forces engaged in peace support operations generally cannot be withdrawn immediately or unilaterally. Those forces would presumably be preventing a conflict that could resume upon their withdrawal. Second, forces engaged in peace operations or operations other than war for extended periods may in fact require additional training prior to commitment to war; their equipment will almost certainly need maintenance. Modern war and modern weapons require high levels of training, advanced skills, and sustainment. Training is, to varying degrees, perishable and must be reinforced through practice. Such training and practice do not necessarily occur during the conduct of peace support operations.

When we commit forces to an operational mission overseas, we have not just committed that one battalion, brigade, or division. To sustain the pace of operations and maintain the quality and capabilities of the deployed force, we must establish a rotational base to allow units to recover from deployments, to retrain, and to prepare for the specific requirements of subsequent missions. For each force we commit to peace operations, we must count at least one in the pipeline getting ready and one, having just completed the mission, undergoing retraining.¹⁴ Both the time to prepare for and the time to recover from an operational mission may vary, but in general we have found that we must commit two additional units for each unit deployed.¹⁵ And depending on the intensity or duration of the mission, the ratio of units committed to units deployed could be more than that. The size of the force for a given operation is not measured simply by the number of soldiers on the ground in the mission area at any given time; it is that number plus those required to sustain the operation for its duration.

Deploying forces also costs money. The United States has tended to pay for current missions by diverting dollars from research and development, procurement of modern equipment, leader development, training exercises, and maintenance of facilities. In doing so, we sacrifice readiness. The principal success of the Army, and all of the services, has been to maintain our most important investments in the future while performing our day-to-day missions. But we are clearly on the margin of our ability to do so. The cost of deploying Army units to Somalia in FY 1993 was \$321 million. That money was not programmed in the original budget. The Army executed the mission and paid the bills associated with the mission, but those bills were paid with

money taken from planned investments in readiness: soldier training and replacement parts for their equipment. We cannot continue to pay for today's missions with tomorrow's money without eventually degrading our ability to get it right when we must.

In the long run, quality is at the heart of the issue. The technical skill, the discipline, the initiative that we need from soldiers does not come accidentally or inexpensively. A high-quality force is not simply the result of recruiting the best young people, although that is obviously part of it. It is also the result of investing in programs to train them, to provide them with the best equipment, and to sustain them and their families. It is only through such investment that our soldiers will be able to meet the demands that this not-so-peaceful world is placing daily on the United States and its military services.

NOTES

1. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1956), II, 226.
2. The term "ethnic conflict" has become common but is still imprecise. The internal conflict in Somalia, for example, is not between rival ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the term's common usage captures the idea of regional, limited conflicts with specific cultural contexts.
3. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (Summer 1993), 22-49; "If Not Civilizations, What?" *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (November-December 1993), 187-94.
4. Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
5. Augustus Richard Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1987).
6. David Scott Palmer, ed., *The Shining Path of Peru* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). See, for example, Ton de Wit and Vera Gianotten, pp. 48-49, where they argue that the success of the Shining Path was due to its alignment with long-standing cultural conflicts.
7. Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post Soviet State," *Survival*, 35 (Spring 1993), 5-26. See also Susan Woodward, "The Tyranny of Time," *Brookings Review*, 10 (Winter 1992), 6-13.
8. The US Army has participated in more than 100 operations other than war since 1775. While some of these had a strictly military objective, many had a significant humanitarian component. This number does not include the pure disaster relief operations to which the Army has regularly contributed. See John M. Collins, *America's Small Wars* (McLean, Va.: Brassey's, 1991).
9. The 10th Mountain Division (Light) provided the majority of the soldiers deployed to Somalia.
10. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, 119 (March 1974), 3-9.
11. *The Bottom Up Review: Forces for a New Era* (Washington: Department of Defense, 1 September 1993), p. 10.
12. Some US forces, particularly US Southern Command, were in-country prior to the start of the operation, but the vast majority of the combat power was deployed from the United States.
13. See for example the description of "stability operations" performed by an infantry company in Panama following Just Cause in Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 354-55.
14. For a discussion of the strains that extended operational deployments place on soldiers and their families, see David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993).
15. This is the rotational scheme used for the US Army battalion as part of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. It takes slightly less than six months to prepare for the mission; the unit is deployed for six months; and upon return it undergoes retraining. The British army also has found a rotational scheme to be necessary for its deployments to Northern Ireland.

US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs

DAVID JABLONSKY

Change resonates for the American military today as it seeks to come to grips with what the Soviet Union once called the Military Technological Revolution (MTR) and what is now considered a broader Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). "We are in the midst of a dramatic change in the relationship between technology and the nature of warfare," General William Odom has pointed out in this regard while concluding that no one fully understands that relationship. "Strategists must think about it, however, and try to uncover its inchoate ramifications . . . if they are to design an effective military doctrine and appropriate military capabilities for the coming decades."¹ That, of course, is easier said than done. Throughout history, the interaction of technology and war has been as much the result of the arbitrary and the accidental as the inevitable and the necessary.

What can help in all this is the knowledge that with change, there is usually continuity due to what Robert Heilbroner calls the "inertia of history." Inertia in this sense does not just mean resistance to change, but also what Heilbroner refers to as the "viscosity" of history—the tendency of people to repeat and continue their way of doing things as long as possible. Thus, despite the fact that the "normal" condition of man has been sufficient to warrant revolution, such occurrences are remarkable in history not for their frequency, but for their rarity.²

Nevertheless, "revolution" has been the key word in the wake of the Gulf War as a host of officials and analysts have attempted to explain the victorious outcome of that conflict. The war, former Secretary of Defense Cheney concluded in the official after-action report, "demonstrated dramatically the new possibilities of what has been called the 'military-technological revolution in warfare.'"³ This was matched by a study of the war conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which contained

a chapter entitled "The Revolution in Warfare" that was almost rhapsodic as it contemplated a future of sophisticated battle management systems, space stations, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

In sum, the nature of warfare is changing. Although the revolution in warfare is still underway, its outlines have become clear. The effects of technology—in precision guided weapons, in stealthy delivery systems, in advanced sensor and targeting systems, in battle management platforms—is transforming and in fact already has demonstrably transformed the way in which armed forces conduct their operations.⁴

In 1993, the CSIS devoted an entire report to the revolution, "a *fundamental advance in technology, doctrine or organization that renders existing methods of conducting warfare obsolete.*"⁵

The most enthusiastic response to the revolutionary aspects of the Gulf conflict has come from Alvin and Heidi Toffler, who see it as ushering in what they term Third Wave warfare. The First or agrarian wave was launched by the agriculture revolution 10,000 years ago; the Second or industrial wave, in the last 300 years by a combination of the Newtonian and industrial revolutions. The Third or post-industrial wave coexists with the other two waves, creating a trisected world, in which the First Wave sector supplies agricultural and mineral resources and the Second Wave cheap labor for mass production, while the Third Wave rises rapidly to dominance based on the creation and exploitation of knowledge.⁶

In this milieu, the Tofflers see the addition of a Third Wave war form as increasing the potential for heterogeneity in the wars the United States must prevent or fight. In other words, older warfare forms don't entirely disappear when newer ones arise, just as Second Wave mass production has not disappeared with the advent of customized Third Wave products. As a consequence, there are today approximately 20 countries with regionally significant Second Wave armies. And some of these as well as a few First Wave countries are attempting to gain Third Wave technology. The result is a wide range of military operations. At one end are the small, essentially First Wave civil wars and violent conflicts in poor or low-tech countries accompanied by sporadic terrorism and

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drug wars. At the other end is the Third Wave warfare presaged, in part, by the Gulf War. Somewhere in between and lapping at the successive wave, as it did in Kuwait, is the very strong residue of the large-scale Second Wave warfare.⁷

It is this combination of change and continuity that holds the key for the US military as it deals with the current revolution in military affairs. The major force for change in that revolution is technology. The major reason why the US military, and particularly the US Army, is prepared to deal with this force is the mix of continuity and change in the current doctrinal framework that will carry it well and effectively into the vortex of the RMA.

Doctrinal Change and Continuity

Clausewitz defined strategy as the use of engagements to achieve policy objectives—a definition that can be depicted as a vertical continuum of war (Figure 1). The Prussian philosopher's observations were based on Napoleon's revolutionary use of time and space which, nonetheless, still focused on the intra-battle maneuver of classical strategy. In the American Civil War, however, the dimensions of these two variables were stretched and rendered more complex by the interaction of technology with the elements of what Clausewitz had referred to as the "remarkable trinity": the military, the government, and the people.

That interaction, as Grant illustrated in his use of operationally durable armies scattered throughout the eastern United States in 1864-65, could result in inter-battle maneuvers and thus in decisive operations and campaigns distributed in extended time and space. The result was something that went beyond the adjustment of activities to one another, which is the essence of coordination. It was in fact a process in which pressure in one area might result in simultaneous or successive results elsewhere. Over a century later it would be described as synchronization, a concept that could involve activities far removed from each other in time or space, or both, "if their combined *consequences* are felt at the decisive time and place."⁸ That process was captured in a letter to Grant in 1864. "I think our campaign of the last month," Sherman wrote from Savannah, "as well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as though we were operating within the sound of his artillery."⁹ The larger lesson of the century, however, was captured by Paul Kennedy:

All these wars—whether fought in the Tennessee Valley or the Bohemian plain, in the Crimean Peninsula or the field of Lorraine—pointed to one general




Figure 1.

conclusion: the powers which were defeated were those that had failed to adapt to the 'military revolution' of the mid-nineteenth century, the acquisition of new weapons, the mobilizing and equipping of large armies, the use of improved communications offered by the railway, the steamship and the telegraph, and a productive industrial base to sustain the armed forces.¹⁰

These doctrinal lessons were lost in subsequent years; and World War I would reveal the inadequacies of classical strategy to deal with the intricacies of modern warfare. It was that complexity, augmented by the lack of decisiveness at the tactical level, that after 1914 impeded the vertical continuum of war outlined in Clausewitz's definition of strategy. Only when the continuum was enlarged, as the Great War demonstrated, was it possible to restore warfighting coherence to modern combat. And that, in turn, required the classical concept of strategy to be positioned at a midpoint, an operational level, designed to integrate individual tactical engagements and battles in order to achieve strategic results (Figure 2). A military strategic level was added as another way station on the vertical road to the fulfillment of policy objectives. This left the concept of strategy, as it had been understood since the time of Clausewitz, transformed into:




Figure 2.

the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives. . . . Activities at this level link tactics and strategy. . . . These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.¹¹

The Return to Basics

In the wake of Vietnam, the US Army returned to its traditional focus on Europe. During the previous decade, the Warsaw Pact had added impressive qualitative improvements to its already crushing numerical preponderance—a trend only magnified by new analytical and gaming techniques which emphasized the quantifiable components of combat power. Added to this was the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the violence and lethality of which came as a shock to an officer corps conditioned by years of low-intensity warfare in Southeast Asia. At the same time, an already demoralized army found itself without a peacetime draft and on the receiving end of a decade-long deficit in equipment modernization as well as a large manpower reduction. The result was "Active Defense," promulgated in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, *Opera-*

tions—a doctrine that made a tactical virtue of what was perceived as a strategic necessity by translating NATO's politically driven requirement of forward defense into operational method.¹²

The criticism of Active Defense began even before the final result was published. The doctrine was attacked for a lack of offensive spirit and the loss of all the tactical imponderables like initiative and morale that accompanied such a spirit; for what was perceived as an overemphasis on firepower to the detriment of maneuver; and for the submergence of tactical creativity in a wave of attrition calculations. But the most telling criticism was that there was no operational content in the new doctrine, which promised at best, its critics charged, to defer defeat without any possibility of operational success. "In seeking to fulfill its doctrinal commitment to winning the first battle," Richard Sinnreich has pointed out, "the Army was accused of becoming so preoccupied with fighting the first battle that it forgot all about winning the last. For an Army traumatized by ten years of tactical success culminating in operational failure, no critique could have been more devastating."¹³

At the same time, there was renewed focus on Soviet doctrine, particularly the use of follow-on forces which were tailored-made, critics pointed out, against an Active Defense that was dependent on lateral reinforcement from less threatened areas in lieu of retaining major reserves. This impetus to extend the battlefield, however, required technology that could only be provided by the Air Force—an operative imperative that meant that a battle extended in time and space would have to be an AirLand Battle (ALB). The result was the promulgation of ALB doctrine in the 1982 FM 100-5, which brought the Army full circle back to the three levels of war as a doctrinal framework for "securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to defeat the enemy."¹⁴ As a consequence, there was nothing new in the motivation for creating combat coherence throughout the vertical continuum of war in that framework. It was simply the age-old combination of technology and doctrine as a means to return to basics—a return to the business of winning by an Army that was unwilling, in Sinnreich's words, "to stomach indefinitely a . . . doctrine which appeared to enshrine the draw as the objective of military operations."¹⁵

The 1986 FM 100-5 continued the focus of 1982, adding operational art as the method for working the operational level of war while continuing to emphasize the absolute dominance of the strategic level in the vertical continuum. It is an emphasis that has been renewed in the current manual:

Since wars are fought for strategic purposes, the doctrine addresses the strategic context of the application of force. Since battle is translated into strategic objectives by operational art, a major portion of the manual addresses the operational level of war. And since all operations must be based on sound tactics, a major portion of the text covers tactics.¹⁶

The other armed forces have followed the Army lead in terms of using the vertical levels of war as a basic doctrinal framework—so much so that the current JCS basic doctrinal publication bears more than a little resemblance to the 1986 Army manual.

The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, and execution of campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. *It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations.* Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.¹⁷

The new Army doctrine has other strong ties to the past, retaining, for example, the orientation on offensive actions and the familiar tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. To this, in response to the changing international environment, has been added “versatility,” which “denotes the ability to perform in many roles and environments during war and operations other than war.”¹⁸ Operations other than war, or OOTW, can involve combat missions ranging from strikes and raids to peace enforcement as well as non-combat missions that could include disaster relief and civil support both at home and abroad. Force projections in such an environment might include entirely different successive missions for a unit, involving non-combat operations in wartime or actual combat in OOTW. The flexibility involved goes far beyond agility, which emphasizes faster physical and mental reaction than the enemy. That tenet, the manual concludes, applies to a boxer; versatility describes the decathlete. The US Army, like the decathlete, is capable of rapid realignment and refocus on widely divergent missions because of discipline and training.¹⁹

In all this, the vertical continuum of war remains as the doctrinal construct. The manual draws upon the 1986 contention that the levels in that continuum are not concerned so much with the level of command or the size of the unit as with the planned outcome. “The intended purpose,” the current manual points out, “determines whether an Army unit functions at the operational level.”²⁰ From this position, the expansiveness of missions under “full dimensional operations” poses no doctrinal problems for the underlying framework. “The levels of war apply not only to war but also to operations other than war.”²¹

The Altered Framework

The framework provided by the vertical continuum of war is changing. The Gulf War demonstrated the coalition’s ability to use new technology to strike simultaneously at all three levels of war with what were normally

considered strategic capabilities. For Iraq, these attacks across the entire nation paralyzed its military effort, with Iraqi forces compelled to operate throughout the country as if they were within visual range of the coalition military, without any of the normal distinctions between rear, deep, and close operations. "All of this means," one analysis concludes, "that in future conflict the three levels of war, as separate and distinct loci of command and functional responsibilities, will be spaced and timed out of existence."²² The CSIS report on the revolution in military affairs agrees that the revolution "early holds the potential to blur or permanently erase the distinction between tactical, theater, and strategic war."²³ But the JCS *Doctrine for Joint Operations* is more cautious, preferring a balance of change and continuity.

Advances in technology, information-age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels.²⁴

Figure 3 is the familiar depiction of the vertical continuum of war, with the darkened center area representing the operational art required to ensure that the tactical events in area 1 form the military conditions at the operational level that will achieve strategic objectives in area 2. Figure 4 depicts the more balanced approach to the future reflected in the JCS description. The expansion and overlap represent a trend that began earlier this century with the advent of mechanization, the radio, and air forces. The checkered area demonstrates the future blurring of all three levels of war—the zone of integration and simultaneity. Finally, the darkened section is the traditional area of operational art focused




Figure 3.




Figure 4.




Figure 5.

on conducting events in area 1 to achieve the objectives of area 2. The increased sizes of areas 1 and 2 represent the larger operational interaction with both strategy and tactics made possible by technological advances. But at the same time, the diminishment of the darkened section's size also represents the technologically compressed decision cycle of the operational commander working at magnified tempo in extended space. That commander will be faced with a much more complex job: recognizing those simultaneous strategic and tactical events that directly influence strategy, and integrating them at the operational level into the full synchronization calculation that traditionally determined what tactical battles and engagements to join or forego.

The problems of the operational commander notwithstanding, the compression of the three levels has the potential to increase decisiveness in the vertical military continuum from the tactical to the national military strategic level, certainly against a technologically inferior opponent. But that decisiveness can be affected, as the JCS description also implies, by the communication-information revolution that has gathered speed in recent decades. The technology that has streamlined and compressed the vertical continuum also has added a horizontal dimension (Figure 5) that provides the potential for the military at any level of war to influence national strategy

directly. In the age of CNN, future wars and OOTW will occur in real time for both the American people and their policymakers. That this development can have positive results against an enemy was illustrated by the Gulf War. But the more pernicious results in terms of less favorable events up and down that continuum has a long history, whether it be the dismissal of Churchill from the Asquith government after the operational defeat at Gallipoli, the decision of LBJ not to run for reelection as a result of Tet, or the effects of the tactical loss of US Army Rangers in Somalia on the tenure of former Secretary of Defense Aspin.

All this means a growing complexity with shorter decision time for the operational commander. At the same time, the mid- and high-intensity war of the future will help to empty the battlefield even as that field expands in spatial and intellectual terms. At the tactical level, the individual soldier will be able to have a greater effect on events in this expanded battle space because of increased weapons lethality and an increased ability to direct accurately long-range precision fires. This, in turn, will offer more opportunities for the operational commander by increasing the connection between the tactical battle space and the operational area, whether it be the theater of war or the theater of operations. The result is a new JCS-approved approach to deep operations with a focus on functions, not forces.²⁵ Previously, air theorists tended to limit land attack to the area of actual combat between committed forces, with anything beyond the range of organic Army weapons belonging to the air commander. Now that tactical commanders may pursue battle objectives by using either deep or close combat operations as the main effort, battles and engagements far beyond the forward line of friendly forces can decide major operations and campaigns.

There is, of course, nothing new in the role that technology will play in terms of communications up and down the compressed continuum of war. "From Plato to NATO," Martin van Creveld has pointed out in this regard, "the history of command in war consists essentially of an endless quest for certainty."²⁶ But that certainty is not necessarily enhanced by the quantum leap in technology which may now inflict Clausewitz's "fog of war" on the compressed continuum. Shorter decision times occasioned by that compression and electronically gathered information mean less time to discover ambiguities or to analyze those ambiguities that are already apparent. Already in the Gulf War, the flood of new information from the battlefield caused air commanders to switch one-fifth of all missions in the time between the printing of centralized air tasking orders and actual aircraft takeoff. Moreover, there is also the danger that the military in the future will become overly dependent on the type of detailed and accurate information provided in training that just may not be possible in the melee of war. With the verisimilitude of computer simulators and war games increasing, the paradox is that

***"All this means a growing complexity with
shorter decision time for the
operational commander."***

soldiers in the future may find themselves all the more at a loss when reality differs sharply from a familiar cyberworld.²⁷

Such communication trends in the vertical continuum also have implications for the national military strategy of US-based force projection. If, for example, US forces in the future require theater ballistic missile support in Southwest Asia, why send such missiles when ICBMs with conventional warheads that will soon approach accuracies of near zero circular error probable can do the job without tying up strategic lift? Moreover, if theater-based intelligence assets, command centers, and battle management platforms become vulnerable to opponents, one solution may be the establishment of such assets in the United States with real-time linkages to theater forces.²⁸ Such linkages were already in evidence in the Gulf War where communications technology subverted hierarchies up and down the continuum, even between the theater and the United States. That such developments could be inevitable as well as desirable was demonstrated by the NORAD staff in Colorado which relayed warnings of Scud launchings to both Riyadh and Tel Aviv. And in the same conflict, thanks to instant communications, much of the basis for CENTAF targeting came from the Air Force staff in the Pentagon, which kept up a flow of targeting information and proposals to the theater. This arrangement worked well for the undermanned and overworked air staff working for the CINC in Riyadh.²⁹

All of this suggests even broader implications not only for such time-honored military principles as unity of command and delegation of authority, but for the shibboleth of jointness as well. It would not be the first technological influence on jointness. In ancient times, for example, the galley ship operating in sight of land in the Mediterranean was a joint extension of land operations that ended with the development of sails and other concomitant ocean-going capabilities. And the increasing overlap of functions among the services on the extended battlefield of the compressed continuum of war has an antecedent in the invention of the stirrup, which allowed the mounted warrior to use weapons and wear equipment heretofore associated exclusively with the foot soldier.³⁰ On a more modern note the image of service staffs providing input directly to a CINC's staff does subvert the intent of the 1986

Goldwater-Nichols Act to make the warfighting theater CINCs semiautonomous, guided by only the broadest direction from the national military strategic level. On the other hand, as Eliot Cohen has observed, there should be some room in the future within the altered levels of war for the operational commander to deal directly with the individual services, "each of which can pool a great deal of operational expertise along with a common world view and an esprit de corps difficult to find among a mélange of officers."³¹

The instantaneous flow of information up the vertical continuum also means that flag officers at the theater strategic and even the national military strategic levels may have access to the same information, or even more, as the forward-deployed operational and tactical commanders. The temptation to move down that continuum will grow dramatically, particularly if augmented by the pressure of policymakers, already feeling the force of much of that information on the horizontal axis (Figure 5) exerted through the public. Direct political involvement in military affairs at all levels of war, of course, is not new. Clausewitz even advocated such involvement, pointing out that political leaders in the cabinet must become more knowledgeable concerning technical military affairs. And both Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler regularly descended to the operational and tactical levels in World War II. Finally, there was the insistence of the White House during the Vietnam conflict on reviewing, often choosing, and approving air strikes on a daily basis.³²

At the same time, as the Army Chief of Staff has pointed out, the integrative technology on the post-industrial battlefield will increase the tempo of action-reaction-counteraction and thus continue the necessity for initiative at lower command levels and for the concomitant decentralization of decisionmaking.³³ Many studies agree, foreseeing that combat units will become, if anything, more autonomous and self-sustaining, and that in the Third Wave military, like the Third Wave corporation, "decisional authority is being pushed to the lowest level possible."³⁴ If so, the picture of the small unit leader operating independently under a commander's intent in the nirvana of pure *Auftragstaktik* still will not be easy to create. Other images intrude: General Guderian ceasing to transmit by radio during the 1940 invasion of France in order to forestall interference by higher headquarters; helicopters containing battalion, brigade, and even division commanders and their staffs stacked in the air above a company-level fire-fight in Vietnam. All in all, as General Odom has observed, enhanced communication throughout the compressed levels of war is "an advantage that can just as easily introduce confusion and become a liability."³⁵

Warfighting vs. OOTW

The technological compression of the three vertical levels applies to OOTW as well as war, the former primarily due to the types of missions and

advances in communications, the latter to advances in weapons and equipment as well as in communications. Thus, a former high-level UN official could point out that in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, "you require political direction every time you move a sentry post."³⁶ It is this strategic dominance that allows the vertical framework to work as a doctrinal basis in both arenas. Actions at the operational level of war, James McDonough concludes in this regard, "are more likely these days to occur across the spectrum of peace, crisis, and war. Their commonality and their place in operational art is fixed by their focused pursuit of strategic objectives."³⁷

The US military is currently producing a host of doctrinal manuals dealing with all categories of OOTW. This focus on OOTW is a direct result of the end of the Cold War—the long twilight conflict that kept attention on the core relationship between the superpowers and only occasionally on the periphery in the so-called Third World, a categorization of nation-states that even owed its origins to the bipolar nature of the international system. In that world, the absence of superpower war was not synonymous with global peace; nor was the absence of system transformation through war translated into global stability. Instead, recurrent violence in an unstable "peripheral" system occurred alongside a stable "central" system, with an estimated 127 wars and 21 million war-related deaths occurring in the developing world during the Cold War. Now, the United States and other Western industrialized democracies, comprising less than 13 percent of the global population, have turned their attention to that developing world, substantial parts of which are likely to be chaotic for the foreseeable future. As a result, the principal post-Cold War preoccupation of the United States in terms of OOTW has been peace operations despite the many other types of operations included in the OOTW category by current US military doctrine.³⁸

Peace operations in that doctrine encompass three types of activities: diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.³⁹ Classical peacekeeping was a Cold War expedient that overcame some of the disabling aspects of the bipolar rivalry by relying on a token UN presence and the consent of opposing parties rather than on military effectiveness. This traditional capability was firmly grounded in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which focused on pacific settlements of disputes. Where such settlements failed, the enforcement mechanisms under Chapter VII were designed to marshal the use of collective force among the global powers—all reminiscent of World War II. But the Security Council could not agree during the Cold War on any aspect of collective enforcement; peacekeeping thus evolved as an expedient, less powerful instrument which could be used within the zero-sum environment of the superpowers. This meant in turn that peacekeeping had limitations that proscribed its wider use—that forces acting under its charter, unlike combat units, could very seldom create the conditions for their own success. Those

limitations, evolving from practical experience in the Cold War and now enshrined in current US military doctrine, include the use of force only in self-defense and, most important, the consent of all local belligerents. Peacekeeping forces, one analysis concluded, are like a referee whose success is dependent "on the consent of the players and their understanding of the rules of the game but never on the pugilistic skills of the referee himself."⁴⁰

Since the end of the Cold War, a "second generation" of UN military operations has emerged under a rejuvenated category of peace enforcement which can include the protection of humanitarian assistance, the guarantee of sanctions, and the forcible separation of belligerents. In this environment, consent is not likely and there is an increasing need for more military power, effectiveness, and capability to exercise a wide range of military responses. Unfortunately, peacekeeping during the Cold War elicited a price for the United Nations' institutional competence in this regard. Consent in that era meant that there were no enemies, and with no enemies there was little pressure on the UN to be militarily effective. And with the stalemate in the Security Council, there was no incentive on the part of the member states to improve military competence. As a result, the Military Staff Committee was stillborn, and ad-hocracy in the absence of "lessons learned" became the order of the day for UN operations.⁴¹

For the US military, the goal is to modify and create technologies and force structures within the overarching doctrinal framework that add to warfighting effectiveness, while enhancing, or at the very least not diminishing, OOTW capabilities. Certainly in the conventional sense, for example, there is much to be learned in terms of strategic mobility and organizational effectiveness from humanitarian operations such as Provide Comfort in northern Iraq or Sea Angel in Bangladesh. The crossover becomes more explicit as the potential level of violence rises. "Since operations other than war do not necessarily exclude combat," the TRADOC commander has pointed out, "how to think about planning and executing those operations builds on the skills, toughness, and teamwork gained from the primary focus of our doctrine—warfighting."⁴²

The value of this overarching framework was evident in the Somalia operation. At the tactical level, the American forces primarily dealt with their mission-essential and battle tasks, which included operations ranging from air assaults, patrolling, cordon and searches, and security operations, to those oriented on infrastructure repairs, civil affairs, and PSYOP. The operations were "synchronized," in the US division commander's description, at an operational level which "tended to be complex, with numerous players (joint, combined, political, and NGOs) involved and great uncertainty as to who the 'good guys' were."⁴³ That notwithstanding, he remained sanguine about the crossover ability within the doctrinal framework: "Well-trained, combat-

ready, disciplined soldiers can easily adapt to peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Train them for war; they adapt quickly and easily to Somalia-type operations."⁴⁴

In such operations, technologies from the RMA will certainly play a role. Those contributing to information dominance will be particularly important, since a major challenge in many forms of OOTW is to identify the enemy. Some technologies may emerge in the areas of arms control verification and space-based communications; others may range from sensors to non-lethal and robotic weapons. The total effect of such potential trends suggests to the Tofflers "that the new, Third Wave war form may in time prove to be just as powerful against guerrillas and small-scale opponents waging First Wave war as against Iraq-style Second Wave armies."⁴⁵

Technology, however, cannot completely bridge the gap between warfighting and OOTW in a period of declining resources. Stripping a division of major units to participate in a Somali-type operation is bound to have serious readiness repercussions. Even the long-standing Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) requirement in the Sinai requires extensive preparation for the mission and retraining upon completion. Moreover, there are still the questions concerning the psychological effects of prolonged peacekeeping operations on the warfighter's determination to kill and to win.⁴⁶ In the end, the rationale returns full circle to the tenet of "versatility" and the doctrinal priority based upon the primary national military strategic focus on regional conflict. "A professional, highly trained military with the human and industrial capital needed to remain ready for regional wars will be better able to gear up for a larger conflict than a military designed to fight lower-intensity wars."⁴⁷

In all this, US military doctrine has attempted to accommodate change. For the Army, the "versatile" decathlete of FM 100-5, the major problem is not to harm agility in one event by overtraining in another. In the decathlon, this is avoided by judicious scheduling of events: the shot put, for instance, would not immediately precede or follow the javelin throw. No such scheduling is possible for the Army in the current environment, in which warfighting and myriad forms of OOTW can often make simultaneous demands across a blurred continuum of peace, crisis, and war. Still, it is a situation that, in varied form, the US military and in fact most militaries have faced in their histories. "We have to make war as we must," Lord Kitchener once commented, "and not as we should like to."⁴⁸

The Way Ahead

When thinking in time, the key for the future is to recognize in the present those departures from the past—those changes—which divert or have the potential to divert familiar flows from accustomed channels. The pace of technological change is, of course, a departure from the past that has such a

"In this Revolution in Military Affairs, the US military must be versatile and flexible in dealing as much with political and social change as with that occasioned by technology."

potential for warfare. For the military, which has little room for any illusions about the stakes, this is particularly important. "If you have lost a battle," G. K. Chesterton once noted, "you cannot believe you have won it."⁴⁹ There is thus a need for a constant comparison between the present and past coupled with a sensitivity to prospective breaks in the continuity that will allow change to be expedited or limited, countered or accepted—at the very least guided. That comparison indicates that military doctrine and its organizational concomitant will play a key role in such an effort concerning technological change. This is the essence of what has come to be called the Revolution in Military Affairs.

In this revolution, the US military must be versatile and flexible in dealing as much with political and social change as with that occasioned by technology. This adaptability will prevent the development of a hunkering-down mentality as defender of the status quo. But it requires facing the issues of change and continuity head-on. In a similar period of complexity, medieval chivalry transformed itself into the disciplined professional cavalry that played a key role in European wars for 200 years. And the army of Frederick the Great reemerged at the hands of the great Prussian reformers from the disastrous encounters with Napoleon's revolutionary army to become one of the greatest war machines in military history. The efforts of the US military in the wake of the Vietnam conflict were no less momentous.

The 1993 FM 100-5 clearly evokes this theme of renewal in change and continuity, the essence of doctrine which "captures the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war and conflict in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and technological developments that will bring victory now and in the future."⁵⁰ This interaction provides, in turn, a dynamic environment—"a context," the Chief of Staff of the Army points out, "within which the debate over evolving doctrine can continue."⁵¹ The framework for that debate is the vertical continuum of war, a dynamic entity that "must be reflective of constantly changing strategic and tactical environments, and the operational art, whose job is to connect the two, must be responsive to all

changes."⁵² The debate will help ensure in the future against the doctrinal equivalent of what has been called "the dead hand of Napoleon," a reference to the persistence of Napoleonic tactics and strategy long after they were rendered obsolete by changes in weapons technology.⁵³ The debate will also keep the strands of change and continuity in balance as the Army prepares for missions in peace and crises as well as war.

The key to the Army approach is the retention of the three-level vertical framework of war, spawned as the result of an earlier revolution in military affairs that emptied the battlefield while it expanded the concepts of time and space. This doctrinal continuity maintains the focus on the primacy of the strategic level—all the more important because of the sociopolitical as well as technological changes that will accompany the RMA. In addition, there is a great deal of flexibility provided by the divorce of the framework from any particular size force and by its recognition that all power elements can play a role in the complex process of operational synchronization. It is a framework, in short, that accommodates OOTW as well as warfighting. And in fact, the increasingly compressed nature of the vertical continuum for warfighting is the normal state for many OOTW missions, in which it is almost a cliché that the actions of a soldier on point can have strategic and political results.

The flexibility in the doctrinal framework also provides room to examine the constantly shifting organizational tensions between coherence and dissonance, jointness and independence, and centralization and decentralization—particularly as they apply to the current Goldwater-Nichols structure, a rational organization designed for immediate response to a well-defined threat. Equally important, this flexibility allows for innovative give-and-take in the relationship of technology and doctrine. Too rigid a doctrine, as the French demonstrated prior to World War I, can impede an appreciation of military-technological changes. It is also important, however, that technology focused on immediate or near-term potential threats not hold back long-term operational concepts or R&D concerning technology focused further in the future. In the interwar years, for instance, the US armed forces developed new concepts of operation that were to prove successful against future peer competitors, despite the fact that national policy and sentiment rejected such efforts because there were no obvious threats to vital interests. For the Navy, the result was innovative doctrine on carrier task force operations and amphibious landings. Equally significant, all this took place at the Naval War College in an environment free from the tyranny of the "in box," and at a time when Japan was not a US enemy, when the budget for all the services together comprised less than one percent of GNP, and when the force structure for such concepts was nonexistent.⁵⁴

Within the doctrinal framework, technology will cause warfare to become more, not less, Clausewitzian. To begin with, any society or group,

whether trinitarian or non-trinitarian, has identifiable pressure points that a trinitarian state can reach and target without resorting to a First Wave response. Moreover, these Second or even Third Wave responses are normally applied as part of the larger employment of all elements of power, defined in terms of the trinitarian national state.

It is in this state-centric world that the technologically induced compression of the vertical doctrinal framework only shortens, and thereby strengthens the link of war to policy. With time compressed over extended space and with that immense space rendered comprehensible by a technological *coup d'oeil*, an entire theater can become a simultaneous battlefield where events, as in the days of Napoleon, may determine national destinies. In addition, the horizontal, real-time communication link to the vertical continuum of war only reinforces the interaction of the people with the other two thirds of the Clausewitzian trinity.

In the end, this horizontal aspect combines with the flexibility of the vertical doctrinal framework to complement, reinforce, and balance the political-military relationship at the highest level of the US government with the demands of American societal values. It is this relationship that has mitigated the natural tendency of the military to preserve its institutional values solely in terms of warfighting. Without that balance, the leavening influence of the public would not affect the process. And without the structure of the vertical continuum of war leading ultimately to the highest and most dominant political level of strategy, there could be no overarching doctrinal coherence.

How serious the adverse synergism of deficits in balance and the vertical continuum can be was illustrated by the Nazi Wehrmacht, which perceived that without swift decisive victory, other non-military factors would intrude, threatening the position of war as the autonomous domain of the military elite. This was the ultimate rationale for *Blitzkrieg*, which in fact was the opposite of doctrine, since success rather than design determined the priority of actions. That type of opportunism caused impromptu operations based on the belief that technology (Guderian) or superior war-fighting command capabilities (von Manstein) would make the ultimate difference in conflict. But cut off from the public and deprived of anything approaching a coherent strategic level of war, there could be no sense of operational purposefulness for the military other than to pursue its institutional goals almost exclusively. "We still failed to find any satisfaction in their achievements," von Manstein wrote of German tactical victories in 1941, "for no one was clear any longer . . . [about] what higher purpose all these battles were supposed to serve."⁵⁵

NOTES

1. William E. Odom, *America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War* (Washington: American Univ. Press, 1993), p. 47. "I believe we are in a revolution in methods of commanding

soldiers and units in battle similar to the one that took place in the 1920s with the wireless radio and track-laying technology." Frederick M. Franks, "Full Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine For an Era of Change," *Military Review*, 73 (December 1993), 6.

2. Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Future as History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 193-97.

3. Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War*, Final Report to Congress (Washington: GPO, April 1992), p. 164.

4. James Blackwell, Michael J. Mazarr, and Don M. Snider, *The Gulf War: Military Lessons Learned* (Washington: CSIS, July 1991), p. 21.

5. Original emphasis. Michael Mazarr, et al., *The Military Technical Revolution. A Structural Framework* (Washington: CSIS, March 1993), p. 16.

6. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1993), p. 22.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

8. Original emphasis. FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: GPO, 5 May 1986), p. 2-11.

9. Bruce Catton, *This Hallowed Ground* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 362.

10. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 181-82.

11. JCS Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: GPO, 1 December 1989), p. 264.

12. FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: GPO, 14 June 1993), p. v. See also Paul H. Herbert, "Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations," *Leavenworth Papers*, No. 16 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988).

13. Richard Hart Sinnreich, "Strategic Implications of Doctrinal Change: A Case Analysis," in *Military Strategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980s*, ed. Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1983), p. 46. See also Alex Roland, "Technology, Ground Warfare, and Strategy: The Paradox of American Experience," *The Journal of Military History*, 55 (October 1991), 462-63.

14. FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: GPO, 20 August 1982), p. 2-1.

15. Sinnreich, p. 49.

16. FM 100-5, 1993, p. v.

17. Emphasis added. Joint Pub. 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington: GPO, September 1993), p. II-3.

18. FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-9.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 2-9. See Figure 2-1, *ibid.*, p. 2-1. "Versatility is a prerequisite for a strategic Army, one that can move anywhere on short notice, whose units can pick up a mission previously absent from their mission-essential task list, as well as one they have trained for and perfected their abilities in over time, and bring home a victory." James McDonough, "Versatility: The Fifth Tenet," *Military Review*, 73 (December 1993), 14.

20. FM 100-5, 1993, p. 6-2. "The operational level is the vital link between nation—and theater—strategic arms and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield." *Ibid.* See also *ibid.*, p. 6-1.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 1-3; see also JCS Pub. 3-0, p. II-2: "The levels of war . . . apply to war and to operations other than war."

22. Douglas A. MacGregor, "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War," *Parameters*, 22 (Winter 1992-93), 42. See also *ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

23. Mazarr, p. 27. See also *ibid.*, pp. 19, 26.

24. Joint Pub. 3-0, p. II-2.

25. L. D. Holder, "Offensive Tactical Operations," *Military Review*, 73 (December 1993), 52.

26. Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), p. 264.

27. Elliot Cohen, "The Mystique of Air Power," *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (January-February 1994), 115.

28. Odom, pp. 51, 53; and Mazarr, p. 27.

29. Cohen, pp. 117-18.

30. John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 286.

31. Cohen, p. 118.

32. Gordon A. Craig, "The Political Leader as a Strategist," in *Makers of Modern Strategy, from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 481-509.

33. Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, *Land Warfare in the 21st Century* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), p. 19. See also Cohen, p. 115.

34. Toffler, p. 78. See also Alvin H. Bernstein, Director, *Project 2025* (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 6 November 1991), p. 75.

35. Odom, p. 48. See also van Creveld, pp. 255-56.

36. Major General Inderjit Rikhye lecture to the USAWC Advanced Course on Collective Security and Peacekeeping, 4 February 1994.
37. James McDonough, "The Operational Art: Quo Vadis?" in *Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology*, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994), p. 106.
38. Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989* (Washington: World Priorities, 1989). See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Explaining Great-Power Peace: The Sources of Prolonged Postwar Stability," *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections*, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), p. 8; Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "International Crisis and Global Instability: The Myth of the 'Long Peace,'" *ibid.*; and Eliot Cohen, "Distant Battles: Modern War in the Third World," *International Security*, 10 (Spring 1986), 186.
39. Draft FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, Version #6, January 1994, p. 1-1.
40. John MacKinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *The Washington Quarterly*, 15 (Summer 1992), pp. 114-15. See also FM 100-23, 1993, p. 1-2. For the original criteria, see Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the Sheriffs Posse," *Survival*, 32 (May-June 1990), 198.
41. MacKinlay and Chopra, p. 116, see a continuum between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The draft military doctrine on peace operations does not. "Because both are part of peace operations, it is often incorrectly assumed that they are part of operations. They take place under vastly different circumstances involving consent and force. Commanders must recognize these differences and develop different planning approaches for each of these operations." Draft FM 100-23, p. 1-3.
42. Franks, p. 10.
43. S. L. Arnold, "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War," *Military Review*, 73 (December 1993), 31-32.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
45. Toffler, p. 181. Mazarr, p. 53. But see *ibid.*, p. 54: "The MTR can make only a limited contribution to irregular operations"; p. 10: "Clearly more work is needed on how to make MTR capabilities more relevant to irregular operations"; and pp. 54-55: "This study has argued that technologies, doctrines, and organizations designed to fight a high-intensity MTR war will have only limited application to most kinds of irregular operations." See also Joseph F. Pilat and Paul C. White, "Technology and Strategy in a Changing World," *The Washington Quarterly*, 13 (Spring 1990), 84.
46. Rikhye lecture, 4 February 1994, and Charles C. Moskos, *Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976). On the MFO, Lieutenant Colonel(P) William Martinez, USAWC 1994, and Lieutenant Colonel(P) Craig Pearson, USAWC, 1994, 2 March 1994.
47. Mazarr, p. 9.
48. Michael Glover, *The Velvet Glove: The Decline and Fall of Moderation in War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1982), p. 43.
49. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 255-56.
50. FM 100-5, 1993, p. v. "There are some major departures from the previous doctrine, but great continuity as well." Franks, p. 7.
51. Gordon R. Sullivan, "From the Editor," Introduction to *Military Review*, 73 (December 1993), 1. "History, after all, has proved that learning organizations are winning organizations." *Ibid.*
52. McDonough, "Operational Art," p. 109.
53. James J. Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art," *Theoretical Paper No. 4* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: SAMS, 16 June 1991), p. 22.
54. Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," *The Washington Quarterly*, 16 (Autumn 1993), 172.
55. Erich von Manstein, *Lost Victories* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 202. See also A. J. Bacevich, "New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism," *Parameters*, 20 (December 1990), 16-17; Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 528-81, 585; Dennis E. Showalter, "A Dubious Heritage: The Military Legacy of the Russo-German War," *Air University Review*, 36 (March-April 1985), 7, who concludes that in response to this strategic-operational disconnect, Hitler's field commanders responded "like short-money players in a table stakes poker game, concentrating on winning battlefield victories to demonstrate their *virtu* and avert the end as long as possible"; and Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984), whose thesis is that military organizations will attempt to keep maximum independence from civilian leaders by structuring doctrine in such a way as to make it immune from political interference.

Winning CNN Wars

FRANK J. STECH

On the night the Gulf War air attack began, a senior officer in the Pentagon Command Center, watching the TV transmissions from Baghdad, checked his watch and consulted those planning the air attack on the Iraqi central telecommunications tower: "If the cruise missile is on target . . . the reporter will go off the air right about . . . (he counts down the seconds) . . . Now!"¹ ABC and NBC network reports from Baghdad, routed through the Iraqi communications network, went dead. CNN reports continued, carried over a dedicated telephone circuit to Jordan installed before the air attacks.

For more than two weeks CNN provided the only American reporting from Iraq. CNN's coverage of the Gulf War was unique and completely redefined live satellite television news.² The Gulf War opened the possibility that new forms of war and diplomacy were being born. "Television imagery transmitted by satellite," wrote one observer, "is irrevocably altering the ways governments deal with each other, just as it makes traditional diplomacy all but obsolete in times of crisis. . . . Instant access from the battlefield to the conference table and back again has enormous political implications both good and bad."³ The TV coverage of the Gulf War created a phenomenon that has come to be termed "CNN war."⁴

The unique experience of real-time feedback at war's outbreak from the opponent's national capital offers a useful place to start thinking about conflict in the global TV age. Radio, invented near the turn of the 19th century, led to new arsenals of electronic weaponry that radically changed military operations three decades later. Radio technology spawned new approaches to strategy (propaganda, strategic bombing), operations (navigation, electronic warfare), and tactics (mobile communications and improved command and control).⁵ Television, invented in the 1920s, began a similar cycle of innovation and adaptation in military operations in the 1970s, leading to the weaponry of the 1990s and beyond. TV and video are poised to change warfare as extensively and dramatically in the 21st century as radio changed conflict in this century, for policymakers as well as for combatants. To think

of video as exclusively the province of the media would be as shortsighted today as thinking in 1930 that radio was merely for news broadcasts. The effects of TV, video, and global communications on conflict management in the 21st century will extend far beyond the relationships of TV news and the military. CNN war provides the first and clearest signs, however, of the implications of global TV for national policymaking and military operations.⁶

Real-time video on the battlefield and images of conflict transmitted by satellite to TVs around the world already have altered government decisionmaking and military operations in several ways. TV news carries information directly and immediately to top leaders, bypassing the entire apparatus of intelligence, diplomacy, and national security. "I learn more from CNN than I do from the CIA," President Bush told other world leaders; his press secretary observed, "In most of these kinds of international crises now, we virtually cut out the State Department and the desk officers. . . . Their reports are still important, but they don't get here in time for the basic decisions to be made."⁷ Images of Patriot missiles intercepting Scuds in the night skies of Tel Aviv helped dissuade the Israeli government from attacking Iraq and fracturing the Gulf War coalition. Wrote one observer, "Patriot was given center stage on television for a significant part of the Gulf War, having a magical effect on the public's perception of events."⁸

TV viewers, including leaders, react emotionally and forcefully to images, and public pressure forces policymakers to respond quickly; President Clinton's advisor George Stephanopoulos has noted, "In the White House . . . we have 24-hour news cycles. . . . CNN assures that you are forced to react at any time, and that's going to happen throughout the time of the Clinton presidency."⁹ Everything speeds up, and emotion competes with reason: "There's really no time to digest this information," observed one senior advisor, "so the reaction tends to be from the gut, just like the reaction of the man on the street. . . . High-level people are being forced essentially to act or to formulate responses or policy positions on the basis of information that is of very uncertain reliability."¹⁰ The image of a single American helicopter pilot being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu almost immediately caused the Clinton Administration to announce the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia. Leaders communicate directly to each other through CNN and shape events through a dialogue of

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images: "You end up hearing statements for the first time," President Bush said, "not in diplomatic notes, but because you see a foreign minister on the screen. I really mean CNN. It has turned out to be a very important information source."¹¹ The House Foreign Affairs Committee recently held hearings on whether media coverage influences foreign policy and forces hasty judgments and decisions.

The concerns are many. CNN war leads publics and leaders to define political events in terms of the video clips and sound bites that compose TV news images. Conflicts that fail to generate good video fail to be politically real: "What I'm concerned about is what happens in the non-CNN wars," observed UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, mentioning crises in Angola, Sudan, Mozambique, and Ngorno-Karabakh — "Those are not on CNN. The question is how the international community deals with that."¹² Through CNN "everyone is seeing the same thing": publics see events when leaders and elites see them, as they happen, and "for the first time in history, the rich and poor, literate and illiterate, city worker and peasant farmer are linked together by shared images of global life," joined through "a hot line from self to self."¹³ Spectators become participants while participants in televised events become spectators: soldiers in the Gulf War, watching TV, saw the folks back home watching the soldiers, watching the folks, watching. . . .

In January 1994 Yassar Arafat addressed, via CNN, crowds of Palestinian demonstrators, who in turn conversed, through the on-scene reporter, with Arafat, both sides watching themselves in dialogue. TV images become directly tied to political mobilization because "satellites have no respect for political boundaries, they cannot be stopped by Berlin Walls, by tanks in Tiananmen Square, or by dictators in Baghdad," and watching becomes participation.¹⁴ Political groups "capture" images that serve their purposes and reuse them, creating new events to be televised. News media compete to broadcast dramatic events, which are repeated and echoed from one news channel to others, until supplanted by newer images. Consequently, the media emphasize event coverage, exclusiveness, and distribution of images rather than the quality, nuance, substance, and interpretation of news content.¹⁵

Given these concerns and the characteristics of real-time video, globally broadcast live from the battlefield, what can policymakers and military leaders do to adapt their policies, strategies, campaign plans, and tactics to support their goals in a CNN war? The remainder of this article examines the persuasiveness of video images, how leaders have employed images to gain support for their goals, and recent perspectives on CNN war and Pentagon-media relations. It concludes by suggesting ways to win CNN wars.

The Psychology and Sociology of Visual Persuasion

Modern scientific studies of persuasion began around the time of World War II, motivated in part by the widespread use of propaganda by warring nations, subsequently reinforced by fears of "brainwashing," communist and

"CNN war leads publics and leaders to define political events in terms of video clips and sound bites."

otherwise. These early studies focused on context: message and channel characteristics (for example, whether the message used emotional appeals, or stressed one side or two sides of an issue) and the characteristics of the communicator and the audience (expertise of the communicator, attitudes of the audience, similarity of the communicator to the audience).¹⁶ More recent studies of persuasion examine the interpersonal dynamics of the communication relationship: reciprocity, commitment, deference, liking, scarcity.¹⁷

Images and interactive dialogues, key elements of CNN war, have not been the focal points for the sociological and psychological analysis of persuasion. Scientists cannot inform us how to dominate every political debate, make every TV program a hit, or sell refrigerators to every Eskimo. They have no touchstone tactics for winning every CNN war. The analysis of persuasion nevertheless provides some useful suggestions for our involvement in future CNN wars. Some psychological guidelines for persuasive communication:¹⁸

- Two-sided messages are better than one-sided messages for persuading neutral or opposed audiences.
- The rhetorical structure of persuasive messages affects their persuasiveness.
- Vivid messages (e.g., video) are more convincing when the communicator has high credibility and the message is simple.
- Case studies or examples are more persuasive than statistical facts.
- Communicators are perceived as credible if they seem *safe* (kind, friendly, and just), *qualified* (trained, experienced, and informed), and *dynamic* (bold, active, and energetic).
- Film (or video) messages are markedly effective (and preferred to less vivid media) in teaching factual knowledge, are accepted as accurate, and are not perceived as propaganda.
- Emotional (fear-inducing) appeals are persuasive when they are truly frightful, suggest effective actions to reduce the fear-arousing threat, and the recipients believe that they are able to perform the suggested action.

Great leaders often have advised that compelling speeches generate vivid, emotion-laden images.¹⁹ Churchill's "iron curtain" image galvanized

America's response to the Soviet threat the British statesman pronounced in 1946.²⁰ Communicators who depart from a prepared text and speak "from the heart" are perceived as more committed and persuasive, and extemporaneous speech is often recommended by orators for rhetorical effect.²¹ Coretta Scott King described how her husband, Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered his famous *I Have a Dream* speech in 1963 on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial:

Abandoning his written speech, forgetting time, he spoke from his heart, his voice soaring magnificently out over that great crowd and to all the world. It seemed to all of us there that day that his words flowed from some higher place, through Martin, to the weary people before him.²²

People like pictures, and the believability of video makes pictures more convincing than words: moving pictures "seem utterly real" wrote Walter Lippmann in 1922.²³ People tend to believe what they see on video as positive proof. To make pictures more appealing, advertisers instruct, use familiar scenes with likable people showing favorable associations, and avoid anything challenging strong moral conventions. The viewer should not feel a need to change much in the picture. The viewer should perceive in the picture a promise that his or her desires will be fulfilled. The picture should contain, wrote advertiser Stephen Baker, "a desirable model for the viewer to be."²⁴ Alexis de Tocqueville never imagined television, but his comments offer provocative ideas on crafting persuasive video images. He wrote that American cultural products "substitute the representation of motion and sensation for that of sentiment and thought. . . . [The] style will frequently be fantastic, incorrect, overburdened, and loose, almost always vehement and bold."²⁵

Sociologists advise that compelling video messages must be crafted into the framework of the television news media.²⁶ The credible news frame defines the characteristics of believable news stories: reports must have subframes that are personalized, dramatized, fragmented, and normalized.²⁷ News media focus on a *personalized actor* subframe—individual leaders, spokespersons, exemplars of the political actions.²⁸ Media images convey a *dramatized story* subframe: beginnings, action style, plot lines and sub-plots, settings and scenery, rising and falling action, major and minor actors with major and minor motives, climax and anti-climax, and endings that close with a chorus (journalists, politicians, experts, the public, or all four) interpreting the moral lessons of the drama.²⁹ News images are episodic, isolated in time and space from each other, and unable to represent all aspects and all periods of events, falling inside a *fragmented, latest development* subframe.³⁰ Images and events speak for themselves in isolation, without context, absent trends or progressions, often without causes to explain effects, lacking any reflection of connectivities and interdependencies.³¹ The credible, objective news frame dictates a *normalized, official sources* subframe to provide the last, authoritative word on interpretation of events.³²

When leaders are unable to sort out these subframes and fit political events and images into credible news frames (e.g., the chaos of Marines intervening in Lebanon, the Islamic revolution in Iran, racial politics in South Africa), media coverage loses its coherent story line, misidentifies actors, and scrambles the latest developments into perplexing, pointless mysteries. The resulting media images show the darker sides of CNN war (a destroyed Marine barracks, American diplomats taken hostage, race riots and terrorism), and reflect the bafflement of official sources lacking coherent frameworks for their actions and policies. In time of war, the official sources subframe becomes even more dominant. Media deviation from official sources might compromise security, provide aid and comfort to the enemy, divulge military secrets, or simply get the story wrong. Because the military and the government are also jealous of their images and the justness of their cause, war shifts the credible news frame much more toward the official sources subframe and generates persistent friction in the media-military relationship.

The credible news frame and subframes describe in workable terms the circumstances that create believable content in political news images. The requirements for creating or influencing media images, thus mediating political realities, become fairly clear. No matter how logical the calculus that led to a policy, without a clear and coherent story frame for that policy, there is little hope of building public understanding or support. "If an administration has thought its own foreign policy through and is prepared and able to argue the merits and defend the consequences of that policy, television and all its new technologies can be dealt with," one TV anchor advised the House Foreign Affairs Committee.³³ Psychological guidelines and sociological frames offer some tactical foundations for supporting policies in future CNN wars. Tactics are important, as recent events show.

Somalia and CNN War Image Exploitation

Foreign policy experts were harsh in their assessments of President Clinton's quick shift of US Somalia policy after the broadcast of images from the Rangers' fight in Mogadishu. Clinton's willingness to negotiate, rather than continue efforts to capture the warlord Aidid, was criticized as weakness, sending the wrong signals. "We have no interest in denying anybody access to playing a role in Somalia's political future," the President was quoted the week after the attack on the Rangers. That shift was exactly wrong, commented former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who argued that failing to strike back virtually guaranteed that the wrong lesson would be learned. The world's other mischief-makers will have no fear, Kissinger warned, unless the United States reduces Aidid's "power base so that it's apparent that when you tackle the US in the brutal way in which it has been done there is a penalty."³⁴ Kissinger offered a *realpolitik* perspective on the tactics of "mischief-makers." Futurist Chuck de Caro offered a media-oriented per-

spective—the Somalia crisis, amplified through global TV imagery, enabled other “mischief-makers” to create TV news images for their own purposes:

A tenth-rate tin-pot Haitian dictator using global TV as a C³I mechanism judges the likely reaction of the United States in the wake of . . . the video of Rangers being killed and mutilated in Somalia. He optimizes his mil-pol moves to retard US intervention by having a handful of rabble go to a dock [and] mug-angrily-on-cue for global TV. He thus turns away a US warship (albeit on a UN mission) with nothing more than the video of an alleged angry mob that generates the perception of imminent bloodshed that is projected and amplified by TV. Matters are made worse by the perception of the US LST retreating from the scene.³⁵

US policymakers and military leaders failed to convey to the public the reasons for shifting US goals and missions in Somalia, or the possible consequences of the changing relations with the UN and with the warlords. There had been insufficient warnings to foreshadow the growing Somali hostility to the UN, or the buildup to events of this magnitude.³⁶ Media stories failed to link the complexities of US-UN disagreements, Somali warlord politics, tensions between military peacekeepers and non-governmental aid organizations (many vigorously pacifist), and shifting US missions. The Administration offered no credible news frames for the secret operations of the Rangers, offered no immediate public eulogies to redeem their losses, and failed to link the hunt for Aidid to the larger relief and stability operations.³⁷ When the Rangers’ mission turned into open, bloody conflict with Aidid’s Mogadishu militia, there was no public opinion foundation for what happened or why. Rather than representing the gun battle as the climax of a policy that had gone astray, but was now being put back on track, the Administration was left without a coherent explanation of the catastrophe and seemed to have no clear policy goals in Somalia. The horror and seeming pointlessness of the Rangers’ deaths challenged the US Somali presence in the public’s mind.³⁸

If the Clinton Administration was unprepared for the images of the debacle in Mogadishu’s streets, it quickly used them to restore some stability.³⁹ “Penalties” and “reducing power bases,” Kissinger’s *realpolitik* levers of power, become less significant than perceptions of these things. The critics of the Administration’s response to the Somali CNN war were right about its negative effects on US reactions. When events went bad, the Clinton Administration lacked credible news frames for the images and perceptions. Faced with the darker side of CNN war, it was unready to defend policies and events which formed no coherent story. The outcome of the Rangers’ fight was militarily insignificant; the TV images and lack of a media plan to explain Administration policies made the losses politically overwhelming.

Yet planning explanations of policies and actions using the guidelines for persuasive and credible news frames is not enough. Events in CNN war do not unfold as monologues, but in dialogues, with allies, neutrals, and

opponents. Preparing for CNN wars requires a readiness to hear and respond to the voices and images of others, shaping messages into cogent harmony with perceptions of these dialogues. Just as greatness in battle requires an instinctive eye for the interplay of terrain and opposing forces, campaigns in CNN war require a *coup d'oeil* for the *images juste*, an instinctive ability to incorporate compelling images in support of political and military goals. History and recent events offer suggestive examples of such operational art.

Signs, Symbols, and Presidential Semiotics

Leaders seek compelling signs and engaging symbols to tell the public the stories behind their policies and actions; they practice the "semi-otic" creation of reality.⁴⁰ Signs are composed of sounds and images, and the concepts these images represent. Images of things (e.g., a carefree Mickey Mouse) become the signs of something else (life in free societies), and serve as "combat graphics" on the campaign maps of CNN war.

Presidents have long used audience involvement, cultural symbols, and images to their advantage in telling their stories. During World War II President Roosevelt communicated the course of the fighting to the nation over the national radio networks during his "fireside chats." He suggested that listeners buy maps in order to follow along with him the paths of the advancing Allied forces, and he referred them to the images in newsreels, *Life*, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Time*, and the other media of the day. Besides stoking the already voracious appetites for news of the war, his suggestions generated a national flurry of map-buying, a significant increase in the geographic sophistication of the nation, and a personal feeling of involvement in the course of the war.⁴¹ Roosevelt was adept at weaving semiographic signs from mass culture into his persuasive political *Weltanschauung*. For example, when Colonel Jimmy Doolittle flew Army bombers off Navy aircraft carriers against Tokyo, Roosevelt whimsically preserved security and added to the propaganda effect by identifying the aviators' base as "Shangri-La," referring to the mythical locale in a popular novel and movie.⁴² Roosevelt also capitalized on the timely appearance of the film *Casablanca* to reinforce his policies toward Vichy France and the Free French, celebrate the North African landings as a victory, anchor public commitment to the war, and boost his own stature.⁴³

The Gulf War duel between Saddam Hussein's Scud ballistic missiles and President Bush's Patriot missiles created an interactive dialogue of images, which fitted precisely the credible news frame. First the dramatic initial panic: did the Scuds carry chemical warheads?⁴⁴ Then the diplomatic crisis: would Israel retaliate and split Bush's fragile, carefully crafted Gulf coalition?⁴⁵ "Saddam . . . had started a war of imagery: the gas masks, the rubble, the frantic reporters," a history of the war summarized, and "the coalition countered with its own captivating imagery: the Patriot in action."⁴⁶

The world watched the TV debut of the "bullet that hits a bullet."⁴⁷ One after another of Iraq's vaunted Scuds were visibly destroyed by the spectacular Patriot interceptors: coalition high-tech dominating Saddam's crude terror weapon. President Bush, televised at the Raytheon Patriot factory, claimed 41 out of 42 Patriots hit their targets. The Patriots helped keep the Israeli war machine out of the Gulf War, and thus the coalition held together. Only a handful of Arab nations expressed any support for Iraq's Scud campaign; most condemned Saddam's attacks on his Saudi brothers. Saddam lost the dialogue of images.⁴⁸ The political and psychological consequences of images of Patriot and Scud dueling in the desert night skies provide a classic example of presidential semiotics and operational art in CNN war.⁴⁹

The use of images, cultural symbols, even fantasies (for example, myths about the founding fathers, or films about historic events) to create or reinforce the realities that they signify has strong psychological roots as well as significant political efficacy.⁵⁰ These shorthand signifiers help us understand and conceptualize what might otherwise seem chaotic. French President Mitterrand, filmed walking through the rubble of besieged Sarajevo, helped his countrymen understand why France supplied most of Bosnia's UN peacekeepers. The heavily watched 1994 Winter Olympics TV coverage contrasted scenes of Olympic-village-pristine Sarajevo in 1984 with contemporary scenes of war-ravaged Sarejevo's mangled bodies and buildings; viewers saw Sarejevo's weary civilians watching themselves watching the televised contrasts. These compelling images reinforced the shock effect of scenes of the marketplace casualties of a Serbian mortar attack; they could have helped coalesce US support for tougher NATO and UN policies toward the Bosnian Serbs.

In the era of CNN wars, leaders and the public play out political fantasies on a stage of televised realities. Late-breaking video news sustains our involvement and opportunities to interact with the images (if only vicariously) and thus maintains our participation. We decide our loyalties and commitments against image backdrops of ongoing events: testimony of Iraqi soldiers stealing incubators and leaving Kuwaiti babies to die, Patriot missiles destroying Scuds, Yeltsin atop a Soviet tank, dead Ranger heroes being desecrated. We can fancy ourselves in our own TV versions of *Casablanca*, living amidst wars, coups, and revolutions, and we decide to support (or not) real heroes, causes, and sides. To use the dialogue of images in the operations of future CNN wars, then, is to lead with image-filled stories, shaped around the TV scenes we all see—to provide compelling pictures formed with persuasive signs and symbols.

Perspectives on CNN War

Military analysts have foreshadowed many of the issues of CNN war.⁵¹ The implications and requirements of the information age increasingly influence national military policy planning. The 1991 Bush Administration's *National Security Strategy of the United States* noted:

Recent history has shown how much ideas count. The Cold War was, in its decisive aspect, a war of ideas. But ideas count only when knowledge spreads. . . . In the face of the global explosion of information . . . ideas and information will take on larger significance. . . . A truly global community is being formed.⁵²

The final *National Security Strategy* produced by that Administration carried the point further: "Our influence will increasingly be defined more by the quality of our ideas, values, and leadership . . . than by the predominance of our military capabilities."⁵³ Clinton-era defense planning embodies the demands of CNN war in its assumptions:

In this era of almost instant communication, the demands on US military forces seem almost endless, as the pictures of human misery from around the globe compete for air-time. . . . America must pursue political, economic, and military engagement internationally. . . . Around the world, America's power, authority, and example provide unparalleled opportunities to lead.⁵⁴

The need for new ways to conduct military operations in the age of video and information has begun to appear in think-tank studies. The authors of *The Military Technical Revolution* call on US military forces to be prepared to "fight a CNN war." They write of this requirement:

US forces must be capable of responding to media demands for instantaneous information, and of using the rapid transmission of data to its advantage. *This magnifies the importance of tending to image considerations.* . . . But it also suggests the need for greater information dominance and for some thought about how modern, real-time news reporting can be used to US advantage in future military operations.⁵⁵

Despite the attentions of the White House, the assumptions of the Pentagon, and the insights of the think-tanks, military theorists seem remarkably slow in addressing the implications of CNN war for military operations. Although the service war colleges have launched research programs and symposia on the subject of "the media and the military," the focus is largely on the relationships between these institutions, rather than the challenge to explore ways in which "image considerations" and "real-time news reporting" might be used to advantage in future military operations. The war college analyses seem to reflect a "glass half-empty" view of media effects on military operations; at best the media represent a necessary evil for commanders to deal with, rather than an opportunity to gain military advantages.⁵⁶ Even those analysts who recognize the potential interplay of video news reporting and military psychological operations seem to favor a coercive rather than a cooperative approach.⁵⁷ It is also remarkable that so few lessons in the use of media assets seem to have been drawn from the internal overthrow of the communist regimes of east Europe or the dissolution of the Soviet empire.

The Pentagon and the Media

While many writers have addressed media-military relations in the wake of the 1990-91 Gulf War, these analysts have not addressed the issues of CNN war. To date this commentary has emphasized the standoff between the press, demanding openness from the military authorities, and the Pentagon, requiring control over the press (and getting it to a great extent, along with public approval). Several observers have faulted the Pentagon's media strategy during the Gulf War. One writes that the White House and the Pentagon followed a deliberate policy of blocking negative and unflattering news from reaching the US public lest it weaken support for the war. This account notes that other observers argued that press restrictions went beyond security concerns and appeared to be aimed at preventing damaging disclosures by US soldiers, thus shielding the American public from the brutality of war.⁵⁸

Another commentator, discussing Pentagon-media relations at an October 1991 MIT symposium on "Reporting the Gulf War," noted the consistent bias of Army officers against the media. The speaker pointed out how Army censors delayed releasing news stories they feared would generate adverse publicity, which got the stories spiked by deadline-driven editors, but consequently generated bad feelings between the Army and press reporters. In so doing, the Army allegedly missed a tremendous opportunity to use the press to show the American public how well the Army performed in the desert war. In contrast, the speaker noted, Marines in the Gulf, headed by a former Public Affairs Officer, Lieutenant General Walter Boomer, went out of their way to be open and to assist the press, which contributed to extremely positive press coverage.⁵⁹ Further, the Marines seemed to have fully incorporated the press in their Gulf War campaign of information dominance.⁶⁰ A Marine Corps representative, speaking at the MIT Symposium, argued that the press coverage acted as a Marine Corps "force multiplier" by keeping Marines motivated and keeping US and world opinion firmly behind the Marines. As a result, noted MIT's Trevor Thrall: "The Marine Corps, and not the Army, received a disproportionate share of good PR from the war, even though it was the Army which was responsible for the bulk of the fighting, including the critical 'Hail Mary' [General Schwarzkopf's flanking of Iraqi forces in the western desert]."⁶¹

A recent Air University thesis argues that "media spin" has become a new principle of war.⁶² Media spin is defined as "paying close attention to public relations, recognizing that public support is an essential ingredient of combat success." The military must not take media coverage of combat operations for granted, and should avoid operations that will alienate public support, while ensuring maximum media coverage of success stories: "In an age where 24-hour instantaneous battlefield news coverage is a fact of life," the thesis argues, "paying attention to media spin is of paramount importance;

for a combat commander, anything less would be irresponsible." That writer, like many military observers, sees a clash between the media and the military as a zero-sum game, where the military wins by keeping secrets, and the media wins by revealing them. Public relations concerns do affect military decisions, but the "media spin" approach to the public and the press *defines* manipulative, adversarial relations.⁶³ Other military analysts see the military-media relationship in more cooperative and collaborative perspectives.

The US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute recently conducted an analysis of the effects of the media's technological advances on policymaking, military planning, and strategic decisions.⁶⁴ The study noted, "There is no longer a question of whether the news media will cover military operations; journalists will likely precede the force into the area of operation, and they will transmit images of events as they happen, perhaps from both sides of any conflict." The author of this study, in contrast to the "media spin" approach, saw the need for (and the benefits of) a proactive, "well resourced and responsive" military infrastructure to work with the media and assist their news-gathering, without impairing military operations.⁶⁵ This study clearly reflects the most serious consequences of CNN wars, when media coverage of military operations directly influences higher levels of policy and decisionmaking:

Under the scrutiny of a very responsive, high technology world news media, given the volatile, unstable, and ambiguous environment in which armed forces can find themselves, the actions of field forces have a greater chance than ever before of affecting subsequent strategic decisions made at higher levels. The pressure on field commanders to "get it right the first time" is demonstrably greater than ever.⁶⁶

Clearly, the military must help the political leadership by ensuring that the rationale and justification for military operations are completely consistent with policy objectives, and by helping policymakers explain to the public and press the connections between operations and policy.

To Win CNN Wars

Advice on CNN war has focused more on "coping" than on "winning" and tends to echo a warning by Winston Churchill: "Nothing is more dangerous in wartime than to live in the temperamental atmosphere of a Gallup Poll, always feeling one's pulse and taking one's temperature."⁶⁷ There is a growing chorus blaming bad US foreign policy on CNN images: when the images get to us emotionally (and through us, to our leaders), these critics argue, we make mistakes, intervening militarily where our vital national interests are not involved. Episodes like Somalia or the intervention in Lebanon, the chorus argues, occur because shocking images got under our skin and overruled rational national reasoning. "Foreign policy by CNN,"

***"The military must help policymakers explain
to the public and press the connections
between operations and policy."***

one critic warns, "may be psychologically satisfying, but it is very dangerous. Our record of interventions provoked by guilt-inducing pictures is an unhappy one."⁶⁸ "The eye, fastened to CNN," writes another:

makes a valuable witness. But it has a tendency to stir people to bursts of indignation that flare briefly, spectacularly and ineffectually, like a fire splashed with a cup of gasoline. An advertent and sustained foreign policy uses a different part of the brain from the one engaged by horrifying images.⁶⁹

Foreign policy success, these critics reason, occurs because our leaders make cold, dispassionate assessments of geopolitical national interests: "The Persian Gulf War was not provoked by pictures. . . . We were galvanized not by emotion but by cold calculation."⁷⁰ The solution these critics offer is to ignore the pictures and equate US vital interests with classic *realpolitik* realities: oil, military power balance, narrow economic and political self-interests. The "cold calculation" view seemingly rejects American causes based on law, justice, or humanitarianism. Historically, the critics' logic is wholly hindsightful. Sending Marines into Lebanon or Somalia, at the outset, rested on US influence and leadership, just as did sending the Marines into monsoon-ravaged Bangladesh (Operation Sea Angel), sending the Green Berets into Iraqi Kurdistan (Provide Comfort), or even sending forces to take back Kuwait. When body bags came back, however, some critics professed to see a lack of national interests, and feckless policies prompted by images.

The observation that focusing policy through the filter of the news sometimes courts disaster provides no fresh insight. Walter Lippmann, in his 1922 classic *Public Opinion*, wrote:

The press . . . is like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of darkness into vision. Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes, incidents, and eruptions. . . . News and truth are not the same. . . . The function of news is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them in relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men can act. When we expect [news] to supply . . . truth . . . we misunderstand the limited nature of news, the illimitable complexity of society; we overestimate our own endurance, public spirit, and all-round competence.⁷¹

Lippmann saw remedies in a social organization based on "analysis and record" (boring though it may be), decentralization of decisions, "abandonment of the theory of the omniscient," coordination among decisionmakers, and a "running audit" of situations to prevent governance by episode. He recognized that the resultant errors of setting policy on a news foundation, of acting "without a reliable picture of the world," could be offset only by "inventing, creating, and organizing a machinery of knowledge." A more contemporary critic believes the solution lies in "leadership and a strength of resolve that allows principle and conviction to ride over the often ill-formed media criticism and the snapshot reporting."⁷²

If the critics of CNN-driven policy sometimes have trouble recollecting the sources of national interests, they are right about the potentially dangerous consequences of policy development and military operations in reaction to images and snapshot reporting, without analysis, planning, or readiness. Among the dilemmas of CNN war is this: the government machinery (e.g., the intelligence and policy staffs) suggested by Lippmann's advice tends to be bypassed and ignored; we should not be surprised if this machinery fails to help leaders fight and win CNN wars. One approach taken by the managers of that government machinery has been to become more like CNN. The Central Intelligence Agency technical staff, under Director Robert Gates, was working on "advanced delivery systems" to get to policymakers DIA products "that combine . . . databased information, graphics, even video." Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Agency consulted with CNN on how to coordinate and integrate reports into coherent and interactive communications with their clients.⁷³

What these CNN imitators must remember is that simply knowing something, and helping policymakers and commanders to become aware, is not enough. Leadership needs more than advice and information. Providing leaders "a reliable picture of the world" helps only if they are able to use that picture persuasively to communicate their vision of outcomes. The "government knowledge machinery" that supports the leadership must be ready to prepare both information and compelling communications as quickly, readily, and flexibly as CNN provides news video and analysis. Providing this level of support to leaders presents significant organizational, technical, and intellectual challenges. The biggest obstacle, however, is philosophical: the sentiment that the solution to the problems of CNN wars is to "turn out the lights"; to get the CNN spotlights pointed elsewhere, dimmed, switched off. Or, if you are a policymaker, to turn your back on them.

The "cold calculation" critics, who argue that US foreign policy is too motivated by CNN, crassly imply that shocking images are the only motivations for "do-good" policies. "True national interests," according to the *realpolitik* perspective, reflect unemotional, geopolitical realities. If these critics are right, US national interests may be very difficult to defend in future CNN wars: they would reflect a cold, calculated, negative image of US

self-interest. As noted previously, the Bush Administration got it right when it emphasized "the quality of our ideas, values, and leadership" rather than our undoubtedly dominant military capabilities.⁷⁴ Future CNN wars, like the Persian Gulf War, will require US policymakers to see that the quality of our ideas and values is given proper weight in developing policy. Those wars will require military leaders to reflect the human ideas and values of our national interests in our operations. If our policies fail to reflect a human face, if the cold calculations of our leaders envision no compelling stories of human values, then in a world of CNN war the force of public support and the favor of public opinion for those policies will be questionable at best.⁷⁵ The human face of our policies becomes part of our arsenal, and the force of the stories of our ideas and values becomes the core of US power.⁷⁶

When political leaders have sent the military into harm's way, it does not matter to those in the conflict if our policies are rooted in the programmed political intentions of a cold calculus of *realpolitik*, or if they are compelled by humane values in response to CNN images. Once the commitment is made and the soldiers go, the minicams will be there, and we must prepare the troops for the roll (and the role) of the CNN video. If policymakers and military leaders hold no vision of the human face of our commitments, if they tell no stories from the heart of the how and why of our military actions, then others will do it for them, and the results may not be to their liking.

There is, however, one lesson at this early phase of discovery about CNN war that policymakers and military commanders, and those who would advise and inform them, should learn. They must communicate the goals of policies and the objectives of military operations clearly and simply enough so that the widest of audiences can envision the ways and the means being used to reach those goals. This understanding needs to extend from the President down to the average citizen and the most junior soldier. The operational ways and means must be clear and simple—how the operation is happening—so individuals can understand how they personally are being affected. The policy goals and motives for the operation need to be equally clear and simple, but also compelling, so that citizens and allies alike will want to be a part of these operations, while our adversaries will feel powerless to escape the inevitable outcome if they oppose our goals. If policymakers and military leaders draw these pictures and convey this strategic understanding, they should have little fear of video on the battlefields of future CNN wars. The operations, tactics, and images of future CNN wars will follow from these visions. Soldiers, civilians, even enemies, will know why and how we do what we must. We can let them tell the story. And that is how to win CNN wars.

NOTES

1. Recounted in Thomas J. McNulty, "Television's Impact on Executive Decisionmaking and Diplomacy," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 17 (Winter 1993), 81-82.

2. "CNN pushed the boundaries of world news: no longer did the network merely report events, but through its immediate reportage, CNN actually shaped the events and became part of them." Lewis Friedland, *Covering the World: International Television News Services* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1992), p. 2. CNN became the news source of choice among national elites; Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak told CNN interviewer Bernard Shaw: "I waited all the time, watching CNN. For five, six hours I didn't move," an apparent case of what doctors came to label "the CNN effect": interminable watching of the war; Bernard Shaw CNN interview, 10 January 1991, cited in Thomas B. Allen, F. Clinton Berry, and Norman Polmar, *CNN: War in the Gulf* (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1991).

3. McNulty, pp. 78, 82.

4. Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey Shaffer, and Benjamin Ederington use the term "CNN war" in *The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1993), p. 11, but the term had popular usage prior to this.

5. Marconi patented wireless telegraphy in 1897; voice wireless was available in 1907; commercial radio broadcasting began in 1920. Melvin L. DeFleur and Sandra J. Ball-Rokeach, *Theories of Mass Communication* (New York: Longman, 1989), ch. 4.

6. Television's role in changing weaponry has unfolded much like radio-based weaponry. The lags in militarization parallel the lags in commercialization and market saturation of both radio and TV technologies. By 1935 nearly every US household had a radio; by 1985 nearly every US household had a color TV. See DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach, also Howard A. Frederick, *Global Communication & International Relations* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1993), ch. 3. Today's military, however, has nothing to match the technology of CNN, which integrates mobile video, minicams, cellular communications, "fly-away" satellite datalinks, and network control systems to coordinate live video of events, expert analysis, and access to political and military leadership, delivered worldwide.

7. Bush quote in Friedland, pp. 7-8. Marlin Fitzwater's description of the interplay between Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's proposals for possible settlement of the Gulf War crisis and US President Bush's swift rejection two hours after Saddam's broadcast is from McNulty, p. 71. Similar dynamics have been reported during the Clinton presidency. See Eleanor Clift and Bob Cohn, "Seven Days," *Newsweek*, 12 July 1993, p. 18. "Particularly during crises," McNulty wrote (pp. 67, 71), "television images are deeply imprinted on White House decision-making; they permeate discussions from the earliest senior staff meeting and the president's intelligence briefing an hour later to those meetings conducted at the end of the day in the Oval Office or over drinks upstairs in the official residence. . . . The normal information flow into the Oval Office was vastly altered by live video images."

8. Theodore Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War: Experience with Patriot," *International Security*, 16 (Winter 1991-92), 119.

9. Quoted in David S. Broder, "Looking Ahead in '92," *Boston Globe* (6 April 1994), p. 15.

10. Carnes Lord, security advisor of former Vice President Dan Quayle, went on: "The more widespread information is about things like this, the more congressmen you have becoming secretaries of state." Quoted in McNulty, pp. 72, 81.

11. Quoted in Friedland, p. 7. Throughout the buildup to the Gulf War President Bush, Saddam Hussein, UN leaders, Soviet intermediaries, and other world leaders used CNN as what Friedland called a "diplomatic seismograph and party line," to signal intent and address messages to one another, bypassing formal diplomatic channels.

12. Quoted in *Dallas Morning News*, 18 July 1993, p. 1j. Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, in *News That Matters*, wrote that TV news offers simplified visions of events "priming certain aspects of national life while ignoring others," and thereby setting "the terms by which political judgments are rendered and political choices made" (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 4.

13. Former Secretary of State George Shultz observed that satellite TV news "puts everybody on real time, because everyone is seeing the same thing." Quoted in McNulty, p. 74.

14. Former FCC Chairman Newton Minnow, quoted in McNulty, p. 82. Walter B. Wriston, in *The Twilight of Sovereignty* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1992), argues that modern communications greatly reduce the traditional control and sovereignty of nation-states.

15. The news media, Michael Crichton wrote, "have treated information the way John D. Rockefeller treated oil—as a commodity, in which the distribution network, rather than product quality, is of primary importance." Michael Crichton, "The Mediasaurus," *Wired* (September-October 1993).

16. See, for example, Richard M. Perloff, *The Dynamics of Persuasion* (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993); or Anthony R. Pratkanis and Eliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1992).

17. See, for example, Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: Quill William Morrow, 1993).

18. In experiments during World War II a two-sided message (to continue the war against Japan) produced greater attitude change than a one-sided message, especially among those who originally opposed continuing the war. The one-sided message (to continue the war) brought about greater attitude change among those who initially supported that view. Better educated soldiers were more favorably affected by two-sided arguments, while poorly educated soldiers were more responsive to one-sided appeals. See Carl I. Hovland, A. A. Lumsdaine, and F. D. Sheffield, *Experiments on Mass Communication* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1949), p. 105; Pratkanis and Aronson, p. 165; Shelley E. Taylor and Suzanne C. Thompson, "Stalking the Elusive 'Vividness' Effect," *Psychological Review*, 89 (No. 2, 1982), 155-81; Perloff, pp. 139, 171.

19. Imagery and emotion figured prominently in President Clinton's 1992 speech accepting the Democratic nomination. Presidential candidate Bill Clinton reflected his deepest emotion when he derided his opponent, George Bush, for "the vision thing." That is, Clinton portrayed his opponent's lack of a vision where the country was going as his greatest flaw. Clinton told the delegates that the thing about Bush that really made him mad was this lack of a defining and guiding image for the country's future, a vision Clinton proposed to provide from the White House.

20. "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the continent," Churchill penned in the early morning hours as his train approached Westminster College in Missouri. During World War II Churchill's first speech as Prime Minister in the House of Commons began with emotional imagery: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat." On the Westminster speech and the rhetoric of Sir Winston Churchill, see James C. Humes, *The Sir Winston Method: The Five Secrets of Speaking the Language of Leadership* (New York: William Morrow, 1991), pp. 61-63.

21. Psychologically extemporaneous remarks seem to audiences more sincere and genuine than prepared remarks since they appear to be more characteristic of the individual's beliefs and emotions than of the social demands of the speech setting. See Edward E. Jones and Daniel McGillis, "Correspondent Inferences and the Attribution Cube," in *New Directions in Attribution Research, Volume 1*, ed. John H. Harvey, William J. Ickes, and Robert F. Kidd (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1976), pp. 389-420.

22. Coretta S. King, *My Life with Martin Luther King, Jr.* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1969), p. 238.

23. "They [moving pictures] come, we imagine, directly to us without human meddling, and they are the most effortless food for the mind conceivable. . . . On the screen the whole process of observing, describing, reporting, and then imagining, has been accomplished for you." Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Free Press, 1965, originally published 1922), p. 61.

24. Stephen Baker, *Visual Persuasion* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

25. Quoted in Todd Gitlin, "TV & American Culture: Flat and Happy," *The Wilson Quarterly*, 17 (Autumn 1993), 55.

26. The public's ideal construct of journalism equates news, objectivity, credibility, and reality. Social construction theory and media dependency theory address the question "Under what circumstances do we believe the political images we see on TV are real?" Social construction of reality theory is associated with Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), and Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Media dependency theory is associated with Hanna Adoni and Sherrill Mane, "Media and the Social Construction of Reality: Toward an Integration of Theory and Research," *Communications Research*, 11 (1984), 323-40; and Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, *Mediated Political Realities* (New York: Longman, 1990).

27. These subframes for news were defined by Philo C. Wasburn, *Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992).

28. Typically the actor frame ignores the more abstract, less telegraphic processes, forces, power relations, and economic factors that underlie events. We tend to attribute motives and causality to whatever actors we focus on. Darren Newton, "Foundations of Attribution: The Perception of Ongoing Behavior," in Harvey, Ickes, and Kidd, pp. 242-43.

29. Detractors from the dramatic evolution of the image story line are avoided in news production: the technical details; histories and legacies; interconnections with other events and stories; and any truly unknown factor, uncertainties, or complexities are eliminated to maintain a "clean story line."

30. Soldiers' war has been described as interminable periods of "sheer boredom punctuated by moments of stark terror." The soldier frame, however, creates too much media "dead air time;" so media images of war cut to the chase and highlight the action. Media war is motion- and action-filled; things must be happening to be seen. "Soldiers' war" quote attributed to Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy*, in Jay M. Shafritz, *Words on War: Military Quotations from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 458.

31. There may be a basic psychological tendency to focus on fewer relevant cues with greater intensity as emotional arousal increases, rather than looking for finer levels of analysis. Newton, p. 234.

32. Accepting the official sources frame limits alternative perspectives and polarizes viewpoints as either *pro* or *con*; whereas other, different, and distinct viewpoints create distracting and irrelevant images and are excluded from the frame.

33. Ted Koppel, ABC *Nightline* anchorman, quoted in Erika Fitzpatrick, "Media, Policy: Koppel Checks Links," *Boston Globe*, 27 April 1994, p. 8.

34. Both quotes in Michael Kramer, "The Political Interest: It's All Foreign to Clinton," *Time*, 18 October 1993, p. 75.

35. Chuck de Caro, "Sats, Lies, and Video-Rape: The Soft War Handbook" (Washington: Aerobureau Corporation, 1993), p. 24.

36. See Ambassador Robert B. Oakley's account, "What We Learned in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, 20 March 1994, p. C7, and Rick Atkinson's series on the Ranger and Delta Force operations published in *The Washington Post* in February 1994.

37. Months after the events in October the print media rediscovered the Mogadishu story and recast it. The revisionist versions became a tale of "amazing valor" by the American Rangers. See, for example, Kevin Fedarko, "Amid Disaster, Amazing Valor," *Time*, 28 February 1994, p. 46.

38. "The consensus that drove Congress and the administration to support the deployment of American forces into [Somalia] . . . evaporated when the body of a single American soldier was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. That image, broadcast and rebroadcast by all the media, produced a wave of revulsion across America." James Adams, "The Role of the Media," *Conference on Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability* (Cambridge, Mass.: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 17-18 November 1993), p. 4.

39. Commentators have suggested that "image wars" have become commonplace in politics. For example, besides de Caro and McNulty, see Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963); William Hachten, "The Triumph of Western News Communication," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 17 (Winter 1993); Patrick O'Heffernan, *Mass Media and American Foreign Policy: Insider Perspectives on Global Journalism and the Foreign Policy Process* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1991); and Michael J. O'Neill, *The Roar of the Crowd: How Television and People Power are Changing the World* (New York: Random House, 1994).

40. "The key to finding meaning in things," Arthur Asa Berger's introduction to semiotics suggests, "is to realize that we live in a world that is full of signs—a sign being something that stands for or represents something else." Arthur Asa Berger, *Signs in Contemporary Culture* (Salem, Wisc.: Sheffield, 1989), p. viii.

41. Related to the author by Professor Charles McClintock, at the time a teen-aged participant-observer of World War II map-tracking and fireside chats.

42. See James H. Doolittle, *I Could Never Be So Lucky Again* (New York: Bantam Books, 1991). The psychological utility of dramatic special operations in capturing public attention and support, above and beyond any military significance, was fully appreciated and exploited by both Roosevelt and Churchill. The principle they followed was defined by de Tocqueville: "No kind of greatness is more pleasing to the imagination of a democratic people than military greatness which is brilliant and sudden, won without hard work, by risking nothing but one's life." *Democracy in America* (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 657, quoted in Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard Univ., 1978), p. 50.

43. Roosevelt frequently conversed with his friend Jack Warner of Warner Brothers about Hollywood's treatment of war themes. *Casablanca* opened in Hollywood on Thanksgiving Day, only 18 days after the Allied landings in Casablanca. President Roosevelt saw the film on New Year's Eve, 31 December 1942. Soon after, Roosevelt severed relations with Vichy France. In January 1943, when the film was generally released, Roosevelt, linking fantasy to reality, traveled secretly to Casablanca to confer with Churchill and the new leader of the Free French, De Gaulle. The political fantasy of *Casablanca*, write Nimmo and Combs, "is one of individual commitments that add up to a national commitment against fascism. America must fight, however reluctantly. . . . *Casablanca* permitted wartime audiences to solidify their own commitment by identification with the character of Rick." See the analysis of the interaction of the film *Casablanca* and wartime public opinion in Nimmo and Combs, pp. 116-18. On the social context of *Casablanca*, see Clifford McCarty, *Bogey: The Films of Humphrey Bogart* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1965), and Aljean Harmetz, *Round Up the Usual Suspects: The Making of Casablanca—Bogart, Bergman, and World War II* (New York: Hyperion, 1992).

44. CNN and the networks went live to their reporters in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, depicting a bedlam of news persons, thinking they were being gassed, trying to don gas masks, insert ear pieces, and speak into their microphones at the same time, while images gyrated wildly as camera persons attempted the same juggling feats.

45. On the night of the first Scud attacks on Israel, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger "had just returned from a weekend mission to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, where the Israelis—reluctant to abandon their military self-sufficiency—had rejected an American offer of Patriot missiles. 'If they've been hit with

chemicals, Katie bar the door because they're going to do something,' Eagleberger predicted. 'I know these people. They're going to retaliate. If it's nerve gas, we'll never stop them.' Related in Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), p. 82.

46. Allen, Berry, and Polmar, p. 158.

47. NBC correspondent Arthur Kent (soon to become celebrated as "the Scud Stud") broadcasting from Dhahran rooftops, gas mask in hand, shouted his description of the mid-air engagement over the air raid sirens. There were striking parallels between the broadcasts of NBC's Kent and CNN's Charles Jaco in the coverage of the Scud-Patriot duels and Edward R. Morrow's graphic rooftop radio reporting of the fires and bombings during Hitler's Blitz of London. Both episodes set new standards for heroic war broadcasting, both used the advantages of the media to the fullest, both mobilized deeply emotional worldwide sympathy and support for stout-hearted and brave civilian defenders, facing up to a tyrant's terror attacks, and both provided extraordinarily captivating drama.

48. Rather than destroying the coalition against him by his attacks on Israel, Saddam consolidated the coalition by his ineffectual but no less insulting attacks on Saudi Arabia. Allen, Berry, and Polmar, p. 158.

49. When MIT Professor Theodore Postol, a critic of the Patriot's technical performance, assessed the Patriot's performance in the Persian Gulf conflict, he overlooked the missile's role in CNN war. "Most importantly, the serendipitous political and psychological contributions of Patriot in the specific circumstances of the Gulf War do not appear to offer a basis for further national security planning," Postol wrote in "Lessons of the Gulf War: Experience with Patriot," p. 119. The dominating *strategic perception* was of Patriots defeating Scuds, vividly and dramatically. This perception shaped and determined the strategic reality of Saddam's Scud offensive, regardless of the technical realities in the skies. The debate literature includes Richard Perle, "Savior from the Saddams," *Jerusalem Post*, 31 January 1994; Stephen Budiansky, "Playing Patriot Games," *U.S. News & World Report*, 22 November 1993; Tim Weiner, "Patriot Missile's Success a Myth, Israeli Aides Say," *The New York Times*, 21 November 1993; and Reuven Pedatzur and Theodore Postol, "The Patriot is No Success Story," *Defense News*, 2 December 1993. Three articles: Theodore Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War: Experience with Patriot;" Robert M. Stein, "Response to Postol: Patriot Experience in the Gulf War," and "Postol Replies," *International Security*, 17 (Summer 1992) carry the technical debates.

50. See Ernest G. Bormann, *The Force of Fantasy: Restoring the American Dream* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1985). World culture symbols are often easily leveraged for political effect. See also Frank J. Stech, "Upheaval in Europe: PSYOP Communications Lessons Learned," *Special Warfare*, 5 (October 1992), for an assessment of the role of symbolic communications in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

51. Alfred Mahan considered communications as dominating war, "the most important single element in strategy, political or military." For Mahan, the ability to insure one's own communications and to interrupt an adversary's is the root of national power. Mahan was thinking primarily about sea lines of communications, but he meant not just trade but communication of information and knowledge as well. Trevor Royle, *A Dictionary of Quotations* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1989), p. 123.

52. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, August 1991), p. 14.

53. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1993), p. 5.

54. Les Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and Congress* (Washington: Department of Defense, January 1994), p. 9.

55. Mazarr, Shaffer, and Ederington, p. 11. Emphasis added.

56. The military's view of the press as either enemy or public relations organ was recently expressed by Judson J. Conner: "The media represent a frustrating mixed bag of opportunity and grief. Ever ready to criticize, condemn, abuse, and send careers spiraling downward, these same organs of information can applaud, congratulate, sing praises, and carry careers onward and upward." *Meeting the Press: A Media Survival Guide for Defense Managers* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1993).

57. The Air Command and Staff College Air Campaign Course Research Project has produced several recent studies on "information dominance" (other slogans include "soft war," "soft kill," and "information warfare"). None of these studies mentions CNN war, reflects an appreciation of the role of real-time media coverage of military events, or assesses the effects of televised news images on military and political decisionmaking. They do, however, reflect an appreciation of the central role of information flows among military and policy users on the planning and conduct of military operations and the need to influence the flow of information in peacetime and to dominate it in war. See Gregory A. Biscione, James R. Hawkins, and Anthony M. Maurer, "Campaigning for Information Dominance;" Paul DiJulio, Bernie Kring, K. C. Schow, and Mark Williams, "Communications-Computer Systems: Critical Centers of Gravity;" and Alan L. Smith, "Infopower: Information Engineering Methodologies, Infowar, and Infopeace" (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Command and Staff College, 1993); also see Mazarr, Shaffer, and Ederington, p. 27.

58. William Hatchen, "The Triumph of Western News Communication," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 17 (Winter 1993), 32.

59. John Fialka, quoted in Trevor Thrall, "The Gulf in Reporting the Gulf War," *MIT-DACS Breakthroughs* (Spring 1992), pp. 10-11. The Marines even commercially marketed a CD-ROM disk of their performance in the Gulf War, with photos, reports, briefings, and other miscellany. The disk is "bundled" in many personal computer CD-ROM add-on kits.

60. Thrall. Scott Simon of National Public Radio reported (in an interview on NPR's *Talk of the Nation*, October 1993) that several members of the press were fully briefed before the ground offensive that the Marine amphibious landing was an allied deception. The Marines briefed the press to prevent them from inadvertently blowing the story by naively covering it. The witting members of the press, sworn to secrecy, maintained the security of the deception, and supported it with continued press coverage of the practice Marine landings.

61. Thrall, p. 11, quoting Marine Colonel John Shortwell.

62. Marc D. Felman, *The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War: Media Spin* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, June 1993).

63. Judson J. Connor rightly observes that manipulating the press, is "a crime which ranks, in the eyes of the media, right up there with murder and mayhem." *Meeting the Press: A Media Survival Guide for the Defense Manager*, p. xii. Politicians and military leaders have long understood that public support is essential for successful military operations, certainly since the rise of mass armies in Napoleon's day and the beginning of industrial warfare in the time of Lincoln and Grant. Public support is largely a strategic, not a tactical or operational responsibility. Commanders must conduct tactics and operations consistent with strategy. Considering the evening news "media spin" in campaign planning does not offer the most constructive basis for planning operations in the next CNN war, and puts strategic goals in the place of tactical and operational objectives.

64. See Colonel John Mountcastle, Director, Strategic Studies Institute, foreword to Charles W. Ricks, *The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1 December 1993), p. iii.

65. Ricks, p. vi. One hopes that this proposed military infrastructure will be well-schooled in the guidelines for creating compelling and persuasive visual images, in the requirements for framing credible news stories, and in the semiotic uses of signs and symbols—i.e., that they practice tactics and operational arts developed explicitly for CNN war-fighting needs.

66. Ricks, p. iii.

67. Speech in the House of Commons, 30 September 1941, in Shafritz, p. 338.

68. Charles Krauthammer, "Intervention Lite: Foreign Policy by CNN," *The Washington Post*, 18 February 1994, p. 25; see also Lance Morrow, "In Feeding Somalia and Backing Yeltsin, America Discovers the Limits of Idealism," *Time*, 18 October 1993, pp. 37ff. James Adams of *The Sunday Times* (London) lamented "with [a public] attention span so short and a world view so limited, it is difficult to conceive how consistent policy for crisis management can be developed by the world's leading democracies." Adams, p. 9.

69. Morrow, pp. 37ff.

70. Krauthammer's assessment of the origins of Persian Gulf War totally discounts the role of such images as the smuggled home videos of Iraqi tanks rolling through the streets of Kuwait City, Iraqi firing squads executing "looters" in the streets, a sanctimonious Saddam Hussein asking a terrified five-year old British hostage, Stuart Lockwood, "Are you getting your milk, Stuart, and corn flakes, too?" and related incidents. With all that has been written of the role of CNN before, during, and after the Persian Gulf War, one would think anyone who watched CNN might perceive the importance of pictures in leading the United States to that conflict.

71. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, pp. 226-29.

72. Adams, p. 9.

73. McNulty, p. 73.

74. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1993), p. 5.

75. Czech President Vaclav Havel's address to the US Congress in 1990 opened with this observation: "The human face of the world is changing so rapidly that none of the familiar political speedometers are adequate. We playwrights, who have to cram a whole human life or an entire historical era into a two-hour play, can scarcely understand this rapidity ourselves. And if it gives us trouble, think of the trouble it must give to political scientists who spend their whole life studying the realm of the probable and have even less experience with the realm of the improbable than the playwrights."

76. The late Joseph Campbell, professor of mythology at Sarah Lawrence, discussed the idea of "human face" and the compelling images in the *Star Wars* films of the "light side" and the "dark side" as symbols for good and evil. Joseph Campbell with Bill Moyers, *The Power of Myth* (New York: Doubleday, 1988), p. 144.

The Third Balkan War, and How It Will End

MICHAEL G. ROSKIN

The current fighting in ex-Yugoslavia gains clarity if we look at it as the Third Balkan War—a series of purposeful, planned moves to enlarge the power and territory of the Serbian state, rather than the chaotic “mess” depicted in the news media. The first two Balkan wars also offer some clues as to how the third might end.

The media focus us too narrowly on Bosnia, as if that were the only problem in the region. The Serb-Croat fight is deemed more or less settled; after all, UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force) is in place. This is seriously deceptive, for Croatia and Bosnia are simply different fronts of the same war, the Third Balkan War. The US Central Intelligence Agency and news media do not help matters when they publish maps showing the extent of Serbian conquests in Bosnia alone or (now rarely) in Croatia alone, and on two different maps, as if to imply they are two wars.

The First Balkan War concerned how big Ottoman Turkey's holdings in Europe should be and ended when a military coalition pushed Turkey back to its present corner of Europe. The Second Balkan War concerned how big Bulgaria should be and ended when a military coalition forced Bulgaria to give up its recent conquests. The Third Balkan War concerns how big Serbia should be and will likely end when a military coalition forces Serbia to give up some or all of its recent conquests.

The first two Balkan wars narrowly preceded World War I and were to some extent evidence of the breakdown of the great-power balance that had kept general peace in Europe, albeit with increasing difficulty, for a century. The Third Balkan War broke out in 1991 as Yugoslavia disintegrated, which to some degree reflected the end of the superpower duopoly that had kept Europe in peaceful though tense equilibrium for more than four decades.

The First Balkan War of 1912-13 was a multilateral (Montenegro, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria) effort to erase the remaining belt of Turkish territory that stretched across the peninsula from Albania on the Adriatic to Thrace on the Black Sea. Bulgaria gained Western Thrace (giving Bulgaria direct access to the Mediterranean Sea) and claimed Macedonia, both of which had been part of the medieval Bulgarian kingdom.

This claim led immediately to the Second Balkan War. Serbia and Greece refused to evacuate Macedonia, and in 1913 Bulgaria attacked its erstwhile allies. Meanwhile Romania struck Bulgaria from the north in order to obtain Southern Dobrudja (the wedge of land south of the mouth of the Danube). It is for such behavior that "Balkan war" connotes an opportunistic pile-on. Overextended Bulgaria lost, and Greece and Serbia divided Macedonia between them and ordered the local inhabitants to speak, respectively, only Greek and Serbian. (Not all complied.) Greece also took Western Thrace from Bulgaria. In World Wars I and II, Bulgaria, allied with Germany, again occupied Macedonia only to be thrown out as the wars neared their end.

The Third Balkan War

The present Balkan war began in 1991 when a conservative Serbian coalition in Belgrade, led by Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and including the commanders of the old Yugoslavian army, decided to use all means fair and foul to keep Yugoslavia together and under Belgrade's tutelage.¹ Serbia always had seen itself as the heroic molder and pillar of Yugoslavia, and most of Yugoslavia's civil and military officers were Serbs. Accordingly, a great many federal jobs were at stake. Events appeared to unroll spontaneously, but that is not quite true. Rather, with varying degrees of control and efficiency the general staff of the old *Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija* (JNA, Yugoslav Peoples Army) in Belgrade planned and executed the Third Balkan War.² Initially, the JNA tried to preserve Yugoslavia by force of arms, but this quickly became impossible, so the JNA lowered its aims to carving out a Greater Serbia. In this war local Serb militias would do much of the dirty work in "ethnically cleansing" all areas of Serbian settlement in Croatia and Bosnia. Amid totally unreal claims of impending genocide against the Serbian people, Serbs who did not like this policy were isolated as "enemies of Serbia."³

Although the JNA deliberately cloaks its actions in the fog of war, it appears that most lines of authority lead back to the general staff in Belgrade. With nothing more than a change in shoulder patches, Serbian

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Three Balkan Wars			
	Years	Question	Outcome
First	1912-13	How big Turkey?	Turkey loses
Second	1913	How big Bulgaria?	Bulgaria loses
Third	1991-	How big Serbia?	?

Figure 1. Comparison of Balkan Wars

officers, specialists (intelligence, communications, radar, artillery, and so on), and even ordinary soldiers rotate in and out of the Krajina (western Croatian) and Bosnian Serb armies. These armies try to preserve the fiction that they are purely local militias defending their respective Serbian communities. But weapons and ammunition flow from Serbia. Heavy equipment is returned to Serbia for repair. Seriously wounded are evacuated to Serbia. Military conscription continues in Serbia, although ostensibly "Serbia" is uninvolved in the fighting.

The first fighting flared in mid-1991 as Slovenia, the rich northwest corner of old Yugoslavia, declared its independence and moved to take over border posts. In a few days of fighting with a few dozen killed (only 14 of them Slovenes), the JNA decided to withdraw, at least for the moment. After they had taken care of Croatia, which separates Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia, they would have secure lines of communication by which to retake Slovenia.

But Croatia, which declared its independence at the same time, put up unexpected resistance. The Croats were terribly outgunned, relying on the meager arsenals of the territorial defense forces that had been set up in the old Yugoslavia. These resembled the US National Guard except they relied entirely on republic (i.e., state) funding with which to purchase weapons, mostly from the federal government in Belgrade. The richest republic, Slovenia, did buy arms, including non-Yugoslav weapons. Poorer republics, such as Macedonia in the extreme south of the country, could afford almost nothing, and that is the condition of its arsenal today. "When the war began, the Serbs had as many tanks as we had rifles," say Croatian officers, who also claim that a few hundred armed Croatian civilians held off a large JNA force attacking Vukovar for weeks.⁴ In the end, only 137 Croats surrendered, to the Serbs' amazement. "Vukovar is our Alamo," intone Croatian officers.

Nonetheless, with plentiful manpower and munitions, Serbian forces took from Croatia what Belgrade decided were areas of Serb settlement: Eastern Slavonia (including Vukovar), a spur of Western Slavonia, and the large bulge of Krajina that curves around Bosnia and pushes toward the coast.

Historical Background

Contrary to what the media tell us, the fighting in Yugoslavia does not trace back to ancient ethnic hatreds.⁵ The hatreds are relatively recent and hyped by manipulative politicians on all sides. Most of Krajina did have a Serbian majority stemming from at least the late 17th century, when Serbs fled Ottoman territory and received lands from the Habsburgs to serve as settler-soldiers on the military frontier (in Serbo-Croatian, *Vojna Krajina*) that separated the two warring empires for two centuries. Under the Austro-Hungarian empire, Serbs and Croats in this region lived together for centuries without violence. Ethnic relations in Titoist Yugoslavia were not bad. (To be sure, if you said otherwise, you could do jail time.) In areas of mixed Serb and Croat settlement, as in Krajina and Bosnia, the rate of intermarriage was quite high.

Serbs do have motivation for their territorial seizures in Krajina and Bosnia, for these were the regions of the worst massacres of Serbs by the fascist Croatian Ustasha during World War II. (Hitler gave the Croatian puppet state all of Bosnia.) The Ustasha killed an estimated 350,000 Serbs, although Croats say it was only 60,000, whereas Serbs claim 750,000 or more. Virtually every Serbian family from this region lives with the memory of relatives butchered. The Zagreb government that declared independence in 1991 ignored these memories. It demanded that Krajina Serbs take an oath of loyalty to Croatia and was vague about minority rights. (The new Croatian constitution now guarantees, on paper at least, ample minority rights, but it came much too late to assure the Krajina Serbs, many of whom would not have believed it anyway.)

Serbs accuse Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, a former partisan officer and later general in postwar Yugoslavia, of destroying a monument at the dread Jasenovac concentration camp, where the Ustasha killed tens of thousands of Serbs, Jews, and gypsies without benefit of gas. Croats dispute the accusation as utter nonsense: Jasenovac (near Croatia's border with Bosnia, in the Western Slavonian spur) has long been in Serbian hands, not Croatian.

The new Zagreb regime used some of the same symbols as the wartime Ustasha (coat of arms, police uniforms, and currency), convincing some Serbs they would be massacred again. Would they have been? It's very unlikely, but Croatian heavy-handedness played into the hands of local Serbian extremists, who were carrying out Belgrade's orders. Starting in 1990, the JNA formed, trained, and armed Serbian militias in Krajina.⁶ This region, under local leadership, then declared itself the independent "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (RSK) even before Zagreb declared Croatia independent in 1991 and drove out local Croats by brutal means. It was here that the expression "ethnic cleansing" was first overheard on Serbian military radio.

This ethnic cleansing was not a spontaneous outpouring of hatred but rather part of a carefully planned media campaign that has now produced




Figure 2. Factional Control in Bosnia (Source: GAO, April 1994)

a climate of extreme ethnic stereotyping on all sides. Serbs now regard Croats as natural-born fascists who strive pathetically to imitate Germans and Austrians. Serbs see themselves as the historically aggrieved party, as brave and sturdy defenders of an authentic Slavic culture against Turks and Teutons alike. Croats now regard Serbs as non-European barbarians who lived so long under the Turks they became like them. Croats regard themselves as Central European rather than Balkan and heirs to centuries of Habsburg high culture and civilization. Outsiders can't tell them apart.

Historically, Serbs considered Bosnia part of Serbia; this was the spark that ignited World War I. Serbs do not regard Bosnian Muslims as a separate nationality—indeed, designating them such was a fiction of the Tito regime—but as treasonous Serbs who “turned Turk” over the centuries for personal gain (for example, avoiding taxes). Serbs also claim to detect in the

earlier writings of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic an Islamic fundamentalism inimical to Bosnian Serbs. As in Krajina, Bosnian Serbs were taken over long in advance by local extremists for the purpose of building a "Serbian Republic" that now covers 70 percent of Bosnia and is being "cleansed" of non-Serbs.

All totaled, Croatia lost 30 percent of its territory to Serbs in 1991 and 1992. Always a curious shape, with its long, thin Dalmatian coast, it has now been hollowed out to resemble a horseshoe. As such, Croatia may not be economically viable. The major Croatian city of Karlovac is 12 miles from Serbian-held territory, within artillery range. Serbian lines neared the coast, but the Croats beat them back. Belgrade had its eye on the important port of Zadar; otherwise Serbia's only outlet to the sea is the port of Bar in Montenegro, which stayed with Serbia in the rump Yugoslavia.

The most serious loss to Croatia is the westernmost bulge of the Krajina republic, specifically the town of Knin, through which pass the only rail line and main highway from Zagreb to Split, chief city of the Dalmatian coast. With these cut, one must first go to Rijeka, tucked up under the Istrian peninsula, and then journey by road or boat down the coast. In effect, Dalmatia, home of an important regionalist movement in Croatian domestic politics, is semi-isolated from Zagreb. Croatia's big foreign-exchange earner, the tourists who used to flock to the Dalmatian Coast, haven't been coming in recent years. Recovery of Knin is thus an urgent political, economic, and military matter for Croatia.

At this writing, the Serb-Croat front is calm. A United Nations Protection Force patrols the 1992 lines, observed by both sides because both want a respite, unlike the war in Bosnia, which continues at a low level. This war, however, really should be considered of a piece with the Croatian war. It simply started a year later, in 1992, as Bosnian Serbs, armed and prepared well in advance by the JNA, declared their own Serbian Republic of Bosnia even before a Muslim-led (but multiethnic) Bosnian government declared its independence.

Current Instability

The present lull in the Third Balkan War is inherently unstable and may soon end. At least three (and maybe more) discontented elements profoundly want Serbian territory and power reduced. First, the Croats believe they must recover their lost territories, especially Knin. They swear they will not rest until all of Croatia is again under their control. If diplomacy does not work, they will do it by military means. There is no reason to doubt them. Virtually all Croats—even antiwar pacifists—agree the lost lands must be recovered; they are a vital national interest.

Croatian hatred for Serbs, if it was not before, has become virtually racist. Some Croatian officers now proudly identify themselves with the Ustasha, who, they say, also fought for Croatia. Croatia continues to mobilize and purchase equipment through the leaky arms embargo. Analysts claim that

large amounts of Soviet-type arms and munitions from the defunct East German *Volksarmee* reached Croatia via a sympathetic Hungary. Germany has clearly favored Croatia and pushed the rest of West Europe into diplomatic recognition of Zagreb in late 1991.

Second, the Bosnian Muslims desperately wish to overthrow Serbian power; otherwise the Muslims are trapped in a few towns surrounded by—and indiscriminately shelled by—Serbian artillery. The Muslims will either beat back the Serbs or suffer exile or death. For the better part of a year, however, Muslims and Croats fought each other, mostly in Herzegovina, the triangle-shaped southernmost fifth of Bosnia that is heavily Croatian in makeup. The Croats were perfectly willing to knife the Muslims in the back in order to secure Herzegovina for Croatia. Croats, however, claim that historically they have never been anti-Muslim the way Serbs are; the Ottomans occupied only about half of Croatia, and for not nearly as long as they occupied Serbia. There may be some truth to the assertion, but one would never know it from the ferocity of Croat-Muslim fighting in the museum-town of Mostar, famous for its graceful Turkish bridge, an arc of stone now destroyed.

Nonetheless, Bosnian Croats and Muslims claimed to have patched things up with the US-brokered agreement signed in Washington in March 1994. They agreed to form a Croat-Muslim federation within Bosnia and then confederate this with Croatia proper. This solidifies Croatian power in Herzegovina and provides Bosnian Muslims with much-improved access to arms and munitions. The improved relations mean that Croatian airfields and ports serve as conduits for war materiel from sympathetic Islamic states.⁷ In sum, Croat-Bosnian cooperation has become a much more serious military proposition for a Serbian war machine that is already stretched thin.

The third bitterly discontented element is the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, Serbia's southern province and, before the 1389 Turkish conquest, heartland of the Serbian kingdom and church. Now its population is some 90 percent Albanian *Kosovari*, but Serbs swear they will never relinquish it. It was in playing to Serbian anti-Albanian fears that Slobodan Milošević climbed to elected power in 1987. Under martial law, Kosovo is patrolled by Serbs much the way Israeli forces patrol the West Bank. Some Serbian extremists, such as the gangster Arkan, swear they will "cleanse" Kosovo after they are through with Bosnia.⁸ Albanian spokesmen in Tirana claim low-level ethnic cleansing and the creation of refugees has long been underway. Although the local (underground) Kosovar leadership urges self-restraint, the province could explode at any time.

In the meantime, Serbia may be weakening. Although it has one of the largest armies in Europe, morale problems have appeared, and many young Serbs emigrate to avoid conscription. Conspicuously weak is Serbian infantry (which obviously requires high morale); Serbs would rather lob artillery and mortar rounds into their opponents' positions. This helps to explain why the Serbs have

been unable to take all the Bosnian-Muslim enclaves that they surround.⁹ Under an admittedly leaky economic embargo, Serbian industry has all but collapsed. The economy depends on the remittances of Serbs working abroad, chiefly in Germany; indeed, the new Serbian currency is tied to the mark in the hope of limiting inflation. The unlimited printing of money to pay civil and military employees and to prop up industries produced the world's highest hyperinflation, worse than Weimar Germany's. Markets run by barter or deutsche marks. Fuel is hijacked at gunpoint from passing barges on the Danube. In a few years, Serbia could be economically lower than Albania.

Scenario for the Third Balkan War

The following scenario is thus not hard to imagine unfolding within the next few months.¹⁰ Fighting in Bosnia flares up as newly equipped Bosnian forces probe for areas where the Serbs are stretched thin and lack heavy weapons. Much of Serbia's reserve military forces are sent southward to deal with Bosnia. But Serbia has weakened while Croatia has strengthened. With classic Balkan opportunism, Croatia attacks in the north in an effort to regain its lost territories. If successful, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats settle accounts with local Serbs. One must expect renewed ethnic cleansing, this time with Serbs as victims.

Meanwhile, the underground ethnic-Albanian leadership of Kosovo, in consultation with Tirana, senses that this is their chance, and attempts to seize control of what it has already declared an independent state. Serbian resistance to this attempt is savage, and refugees and fighting spill over into neighboring Albania and Macedonia, thus internationalizing the war. One must include the possibility that Greece, a historic ally of Serbia, will move to secure its claims to southern Albania (Northern Epirus to the Greeks) and southern Macedonia, which, according to the Greeks, should not even exist. It is also conceivable that Hungary could take an interest in northern Vojvodina, where the 400,000 ethnic Magyars are virtual hostages under Serbian control and pressure. Hungary held this area during World War II. The Third Balkan War could be quite large. (Swiss-like Slovenia, shielded from Serbian wrath by Croatia, will do nothing in all of this.)

At this writing (summer 1994), we are likely between phases one and two of the Third Balkan War. The first phase was the fighting that accompanied the independence declarations of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. The second phase is likely to see the Croatian pushback of Serbian-held territories, as the Serbs become tied down in renewed fighting in Bosnia. This likely second phase, unfortunately, by itself will probably not bring an end to the Third Balkan War. Something more will be required.

How to End This War?

The Third Balkan War is likely to end only when Serbian power is insufficient to retain current Serbian territorial holdings, which are trimmed



Figure 3. Region of the Third Balkan War

back by force of arms, much like the First Balkan War ended with the military pushback of Turkish power and the Second Balkan War ended with the military pushback of Bulgarian power. The international community's efforts to impose a peace before Serbia has suffered one or more military reverses is a non-starter. Belgrade will take peace opportunities seriously only when it realizes that Serbia is overextended, its economy is ruined, its young men flee the draft, and it faces too many enemies at once. Serbia has actual or potential territorial claimants on four borders: Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, and Albania. Could we give these claims a boost? Would it hasten the coming of peace or provoke a wider war?

All scenarios, of course, are speculative, and the reader is entitled to be skeptical. To suppose the contrary, however, that the Third Balkan War is starting to wind down, requires a bit of speculation, too. It requires one to believe, namely, that the Croats are unserious about regaining the lost 30 percent of their country or that they will be able to do so by diplomatic means. This last point is not impossible, but neither is it very probable. On 30 March 1994 a delegation of Krajina Serbs signed a cease-fire with Croatian authorities in the Russian

Embassy in Zagreb.¹¹ The two sides see the cease-fire quite differently, though. Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic described the agreement with "Serb rebels" as part of "the overall process of the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia."¹² At the same time, the president of RSK (i.e., the "Serb rebels") Milan Martić pledged continued resistance to the "genocide" of the "new Ustasha state" and the unification of all Serbian lands.¹³ Martić was to have led the Krajina delegation to Zagreb but dropped out because he is wanted there as a war criminal.

Could Zagreb and the RSK finesse an arrangement that would return Krajina to Croatia but give the Krajina Serbs substantial autonomy (their own police, school system, use of Cyrillic, and so on)? If such an agreement—now an optimistic wish—were to work, it would have to include reopening the rail and highway corridor for Croatian traffic from Zagreb to Split through Knin. Meetings on the subject quickly broke down. With Serbia so far the victor, there is simply no pressure on the Krajina Serbs to settle for anything less than integration into a Greater Serbia.

Some hope that Milošević, under Russian pressure, could abandon the Krajina Serbs and let them reach the best deal they can with Zagreb. That, of course, would mean the end of the maximalist dream of Greater Serbia ("All Serbs in one country") and the abandonment of brother Serbs to reprisals by Croatian and Muslim fascists. As of this writing, no such movement is afoot in Belgrade. Instead, nationalist rhetoric flies high, and one hears of no Serbs who worry they could lose more by fighting than by compromising. Serbs have never been noted for a spirit of compromise, and there are no important Serbian opposition "peace parties" urging a settlement of the war. Only the very small Civil Alliance, composed of Belgrade intellectuals, opposes the war.¹⁴

If Serbia wished to, could it call off the war? Could it keep its present conquests in Croatia and Bosnia and say, "All right, we have enough. We are prepared to negotiate with Zagreb and Sarajevo to make our territorial holdings permanent"? Zagreb and Sarajevo would accept such an offer only if they felt they had more to lose by continued fighting, and they do not. For the war to end by negotiation that leaves a Greater Serbia along its present lines is out of the question. Croats and Bosnian Muslims will not ratify the existing status quo unless faced with imminent annihilation. And time may be on their side.¹⁵

There are few ways to turn this war off any time soon, and attempts to do so could make the war longer and more widespread. At present, no side is willing to admit defeat. Even the seemingly impossible position of the Bosnian Muslim government is buoyed by the prospect of Croatian and/or major-power help.¹⁶ The UN/NATO effort, muddled as it has been, has unwittingly evolved into a virtual guarantee that most of the remaining Muslim cities, including Sarajevo, will not be taken by the Serbs. Humani-

tarian concern has turned into a city-by-city defense of Muslims, one month Sarajevo, the next Tuzla, then Gorazde, and so on. A leopard-spot Muslim state, under UN protection, could survive for years.

Could outside powers—the United Nations, NATO, the United States, a consortium of major European powers—hasten the day when the Serbs and their adversaries think it is time to settle? The minimum precondition for Serbian willingness to compromise would be one or more serious Serbian military setbacks. Why compromise when you are far ahead and face no credible military challenges? Could—and should—outside powers issue such challenges?

For Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and even Albanians the dream solution is for one or more major outside powers to give the Serbs a real thrashing. Then they could move in for the kill. And kill it would be. Croats, Muslims, and Albanians would do to Serbs as Serbs have done to them. Those whose concerns are primarily humanitarian must be careful here, lest they tilt the playing field too suddenly against the Serbs and turn today's victims into tomorrow's avengers. The indiscriminate killing of Serbian civilians is no moral improvement over the indiscriminate killing of Bosnian civilians. Eventually, there may have to be a UN protection force to shield local Serbs from vengeful Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Albanians. Such a new UNPROFOR could be announced in advance as part of a peace package.

The key question is whether major intervention by outside powers would do more harm than good. Would it prevent the war from expanding or make sure that it expanded? Would it mean an end to war against civilians or worse civilian casualties? Would it push Russia into hostility with the West and increase the chances of an extreme nationalist taking over in Moscow?

Ring Around Serbia

Rather than a sudden reversal of fortune for the Serbs, peace would best be served by a re-equilibration that makes it clear to an exhausted Serbia that if it pushes the war any longer it could lose a great deal. How does one communicate this to people currently steaming with nationalism and in no mood to compromise? The answer may be simple but risky: outside powers side with Serbia's historical enemies and make it clear they are willing to support their territorial claims against Serbia. Then the best course for Belgrade would be to agree to a compromise settlement soon that retains some new territory plus rights and guarantees for Serbs outside of Serbia.

Specifically, suppose a group of Western countries, certainly under American leadership but perhaps under the cover of NATO or the Partnership for Peace, moves credible forces and materiel into Hungary and Albania. Politically, the Western group states that it "views with sympathy" both host nations' territorial claims. The favorable scenario at this point is that Serbia backs down from its maximalist position, relinquishes some of its territorial conquests, and negotiates for the rights of Serbs outside of Serbia in exchange for the rights of

Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo. (Unarmed Macedonia and historically friendly Romania have no claims on Serbia.)

There is no guarantee this would work. A worst-case scenario at this point would have the Serbs, now in a paranoid frenzy, attack all the new threats. Therefore the outside powers would have to be perfectly willing to capture Belgrade and destroy the current nationalist regime. The good news here is that from the Hungarian border south to Belgrade, 100 miles, the land is flat as a pancake, part of Hungary's great Pannonian Basin. Indeed, it was part of Hungary until World War I. Serbs joke: "In Vojvodina you can stand on a pumpkin and see Budapest." The only serious obstacles would be some river crossings, including the Danube, which Belgrade overlooks on high bluffs at the confluence of the Sava. For modern, mobile warfare, the terrain is vastly better than the mountains of Bosnia.

The direct engagement of outside powers in Bosnia must be avoided, for at least two reasons. First, the rugged terrain and frequent overcast in Bosnia make the effective application of air power difficult; an attack would have to be by ground forces, and this would mean considerable casualties. Why fight the Serbs where they wish to be fought? (Or, as some American soldiers wisecracked after the Gulf War: "We do deserts; we don't do mountains.")

Second, direct engagement of outside forces in Bosnia ignores where the orders, supplies, and key personnel come from: Belgrade. In Clausewitzian terms, the center of gravity is not the mini-governments of the Serbian Republics of Bosnia and Krajina but the real Serb government in Belgrade. Change the mind of Belgrade's leaders and you change minds in Pale and Knin, the respective capitals of the temporary Serbian ministates. Aim for the head, not the tail.

An indirect approach has never been tried against Serbia, partly because many "area experts" and journalists continue to look at the fighting as local outbursts and refuse to see them as one war directed by Belgrade. If successful, a "ring around Serbia" approach would force Serbia to reconsider and negotiate. If unsuccessful, it would entail further bloodshed and cost Serbia the northern Vojvodina (which Hungary seized in World War II) and Kosovo (which Albania seized in World War II), a tragedy for Serbia but a matter of supreme indifference to us.

The problems of such an indirect strategy are great. Balkan states have a historical tendency to go it alone rather than form alliances. To participate in a risky venture they would insist on elaborate guarantees and generous gifts of money and weapons. All states in the region wish for free security and think America should provide it. Greece likely would be furious and drop out of NATO. We must ask ourselves how great a loss this would be.

What are the alternatives to a strategy of "ring around Serbia"? One is to declare that we have no interests in the region and distance ourselves from it. Another is to declare that we have some interests in the region but will pursue them only by peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and a long-term eco-

conomic embargo of Serbia.¹⁷ This approximates the present approach, if the Administration should ever get around to defining it. This too is a dangerous strategy, for it could drag us into the conflict incrementally and without clear goals or sufficient buildup of armed strength. Congress has never voted on the question and would turn vengeful if the United States should stumble into a war in the disadvantageous terrain.

If we are going to participate in the Third Balkan War, let us control events rather than letting them control us. At the right time, immediately after the Serbs are sobered by military reverses, a US-led "ring around Serbia" policy might jolt them to the negotiating table. The time to start building such a ring is now.

NOTES

1. For a brilliant explanation of the internal Serbian politics and policies of this conservative coalition, see V. P. Gagnon, Jr., "Serbia's Road to War," *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (April 1994), 117-31.

2. For this insight I am especially thankful to Dr. Anton Zabkar of the Slovenian Defense Ministry, interviewed on 21 March 1994 in Ljubljana. He was kind enough to give me a copy of his unpublished paper, "A Third Yugoslavia: Reality or Utopia?" of July 1993.

3. Gagnon, p. 126.

4. From the author's discussions with Croatian officers at the Croatian Defense College, Zagreb, 18 March 1994.

5. For a fuller discussion of this question, see Michael G. Roskin, "The Bosnian-Serb Problem: What We Should and Should Not Do," *Parameters*, 22 (Winter 1992-93), 4, anthologized in Glenn Hastedt, ed., *American Foreign Policy 94/95* (Guilford, Conn.: Dushkin, 1994).

6. Sabrina P. Ramet, "The Breakup of Yugoslavia," *Global Affairs*, 6 (Spring 1991), 2; and Branka Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking Yugoslavia's Break-Up, 1980-1992* (New York: Verso, 1993), p. 311.

7. Quickly, outside support flowed into Bosnia via Croatia. The first week of May 1994, for example, an Iranian air force transport landed with 60 tons of explosives at Zagreb. See John Pomfret, "Iran Ships Material for Arms to Bosnians," *The Washington Post*, 13 May 1994, p. A1.

8. According to Tirana, Arkan already put at least some of his forces into Kosovo in early May 1994 and appeared there himself. *Daily Report*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service—East Europe (hereafter FBIS), Annex, 3 May 1994, pp. 13-14.

9. See the remarks of a French officer on the scene in Roger Cohen, "For the First Time, Bosnia Feels Time Is on Its Side," *The New York Times*, 13 May 1994, p. A10.

10. One Western diplomat noted the renewed Croat-Bosnian cooperation and said in late June 1994, "There are active preparations for a joint attack in the fall." Roger Cohen, "New Strife in Bosnia?" *The New York Times*, 28 June 1994, p. A9.

11. For the text, see FBIS, 31 March 1994, pp. 23-24. Original text was from TANJUG, Belgrade, 30 March 1994.

12. Granic's remarks were carried by Zagreb radio and reported in FBIS, 1 April 1994, p. 39.

13. Reported in *Vecernje Novosti* (Belgrade), 27 March 1994, and carried in FBIS, 31 March 1994, p. 25.

14. Veran Matic, editor of Belgrade's opposition radio station B92, interviewed by Ivo Skoric, "B92: Struggling for Air," *Uncaptive Minds*, 6 (Fall 1993), 97, 99.

15. Within two months of the Croat-Bosnian agreement, military observers detected a much-improved Bosnian military capability. See Cohen, *The New York Times*, 13 May 1994.

16. Some observers think that by early 1994 the balance of forces in Bosnia had already begun to shift in favor of the Muslims. See Patrick Moore, "A New State in the Bosnian Conflict," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 4 March 1994, pp. 33-36.

17. The latest war-without-gore approach argues for a Kennan-like long-term economic embargo plus informational penetration of Serbia until it collapses internally. This implies an indefinite continuation of the present lull, which the Croats and Bosnian Muslims will likely soon end. The Third Balkan War is not a replay of the Cold War; it is a hot one, and thus extremely fluid and explosive. See David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia," *Foreign Affairs*, 73 (July-August, 1994), 4.

US Strategy for Latin America

RUSSELL W. RAMSEY

My mission is to protect the innocent oppressed, to help the unfortunate, to restore their rights to the inhabitants of this region, and to promote their happiness," wrote General Jose Francisco de San Martin, the military architect of independence for southern South America, on 8 September 1820.¹ General Simon Bolivar, the emancipator of northern South America, opined in 1826, "The man of honor has no country save that in which the citizen's rights are protected and the sacred character of humanity is respected."² Colombia's first President, the lawyer-General Francisco de Paula Santander, stated repeatedly in the 1820s that "arms have given us independence; laws will give us freedom" as he established the principle of civilian control over the armed forces.³

Yet Bolivar himself expressed anguish over the apparent triumph of *caudillismo*—rule by para-military strongmen—that frustrated constitutional democracy in several Latin American countries for a century. The movement to professionalization of Latin America's small armed forces, after 1880, included a tendency during the Cold War years for military leaders in several countries to exert an extra-constitutional praetorian role.⁴ At various points in the Cold War, military and police forces in a dozen Latin American countries carried out human rights abuses under the guise of national security. Marxist-Leninist regimes in Nicaragua and Cuba engaged in massive increases in troops and armaments, achieving force levels not previously seen in the region.

Redeeming the Dream

Latin America's armed forces now emerge at the end of the Cold War as a positive force amid bold democratization and economic development within the world's oldest and largest homogeneous block of constitutional and independent nation-states. Measured since 1830 by percent of the gross domestic product spent on the armed forces, percent of the national manpower in military uniform, number of wars, relative levels of armaments, and percent

of citizens killed or displaced by war, Latin America is also the world's least bellicose and least militarized region.⁵

Military praetorianism under all banners is today in disrepute, and the posse comitatus principle is now the law throughout Latin America except in Haiti and Cuba.⁶ There are 12 Latin American military contingents serving in the 26 international peacekeeping forces operational in 1994.⁷ Shared linguistic, training, and operations experiences between US and Latin American military officers today contribute to democratically obedient armed forces relationships.⁸ Finally, a case can be made that Latin America's armed forces, since 1961, are among the world's regional leaders in low-cost civic action programs that improve the quality of life for remote populations and help the general public in times of civil disaster.⁹

The Core of a US Policy

US military policy for Latin America in the 1990s, and into the 21st century, calls for quiet, inexpensive steps through which to institutionalize and strengthen the functional linkage among the Western Hemisphere's military leaders. The strategic applications all flow from that policy, save in the cases of Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Panama, whose military and public security officers are estranged from their US counterparts for differing historical reasons. A renewal of the once cordial military-to-military relations with these four nations is attainable during the remaining years of the 1990s.

The possible strategies emanating from this *hermandad* (translated as "brotherhood" without gender, the name for a defensive municipal structure in medieval Spain) hold bright hopes for regional peace. With a tiny per capita regional investment of national security funds, this "brotherhood of the Americas" can be an exportable model by which to secure democratic liberties and open-market economic success in a climate free of international wars, unilateral military interventions, class revolutions, ethnic and religious conflict, and organized crime.

Much analytical literature on Latin America stresses the praetorian and abusive nature of its armed forces. US national security programs during the Cold War era often are blamed for having fostered both tendencies. Yet one analyst concluded in a multi-regional analysis that the United States had

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little leverage through which to force behavioral change. Careful analysis of these US programs in Latin America reveals that they rarely exceeded two percent of all security assistance allocations and four percent of authorized foreign military sales carried out worldwide during the period. The programs had little effect on armed revolutions led by the military.¹⁰

Current US security assistance programs in the region barely total one-half billion dollars annually, most of which is concentrated in closing out the Central American conflicts of the 1980s, and in the Andean counternarcotics campaign, two areas where the United States bears indisputable moral responsibility to assist.¹¹ The total cost of continuing the policy of cordial, constructive US-Latin American military-to-military relations would remain a tiny fraction of the US national defense budget. If this sum could be divided into the total strategic value of the region,¹² the ensuing ratio would reveal a highly cost-effective defense policy.

A Permanent Military Dialogue

The first item on the strategy agenda is to build an institutionalized future for the continued relationship. The Organization of American States is the world's oldest regional assembly. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), a military advisory body, has only a consultative relationship with the OAS. There is much preoccupation in Western Hemispheric political circles about militarism within Latin America and about armed interventionism by the United States in Latin America. While a factual case can be made that these concerns are outdated by events, the future of the IADB is under debate. Some see it as a positive vehicle for international peacekeeping operations, while to others it is warmed-over Cold War baggage.¹³

The United States is only one actor on the stage. Clearly, the era of gunboat diplomacy (1870-1933) and the era of Cold War preemptive interventionism (1947-1989) are over; Uncle Sam neither can nor should attempt to force a regional security regime upon nations which reject the structure. But to the extent that quiet diplomacy can prevail, the United States should work actively to preserve and enrich the existing Western Hemispheric security policy and structure.

Under the Carter-Torrijos Treaties ratified in 1979, US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Panama must depart or have its presence renegotiated prior to the last day of 1999. A useful US policy, therefore, would be to work for the creation of a regional structure that provides focused national security planning for the United States in a cooperative hemispheric security setting. A US Western Hemisphere Command (WHC) should be created to replace SOUTHCOM, and an OAS Security Commission, an enhanced version of the IADB, should be created by amending the OAS Charter. The WHC would be structurally located within the newly empowered OAS Security Commission, whose geographic headquarters should be in a conv neutral, and uncon-

Region	Members	Economic Parallel
North America	Canada, USA, Mexico	NAFTA
Caribbean	Caribbean Independent Nations	CARICOM/CAFTA
Central America	Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama	Central American Common Market
Andean Region	Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia	Andean Regional Free Trade Pact
Southern Cone	Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina	MERCOSUR

Figure 1. OAS Security Commission

tested location. Five sub-regional planning elements of this proposed OAS Security Commission would structurally parallel the current family of trade pacts organized under the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT).¹⁴

Thus, the North American Region would manage security planning for the North American Free Trade Alliance (NAFTA) countries (Canada, the United States, and Mexico); the Caribbean Region would do the same task for the Caribbean Common Market and Caribbean Free Trade Agreement countries (CARICOM/CAFTA); the Central American Region for the Central American Common Market nations; the Andean Region for the Andean Regional Free Trade Pact countries; and the Southern Cone Region for this sub-region's trade pact members (called MERCOSUR, by the Spanish acronym). The creation of a small, sub-regional headquarters for each of these elements would help to reduce fears of a "military monolith" on Latin American soil.

Any successful national security system depends upon the balanced triad of political, economic, and military objectives and policies. Discussions of future US-Latin American relations call for the fostering of cordial, consultative relationships in the political sphere, a goal quite achievable given the excellent quality of US State Department career service diplomats who worked in Latin America during the last decade of the Cold War. The economic dimension of the triad may be more difficult to achieve. Economic power is clustered in bewildering arrays of multinational corporations, governmental agencies, regional trade treaty boards, national companies with private and public ownership, and, to be sure, powerful extra-hemispheric interests which neither parallel nor owe allegiance to the political structures in the region.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the emergence of a subculture of economic superstars in a dozen Latin American countries in the past decade suggests that a consultative hemispheric network in the economic sphere is already taking form and will not lack for competent personnel.¹⁶

The Possible Strategy Agenda

With the political, economic, and military spheres of the Western Hemisphere moving toward structural collegiality, the military strategies for maintaining peace and defense at minimum cost are workable. The military and law enforcement strategy agenda for the remaining years of the 20th century and the early 21st century contains ten objectives. These are:

- maintain and improve the hemispheric national security framework, with seats at the roundtable for every country
- bolster military professionalism
- reduce the power of the region's drug cartels
- cope humanely with mass migration
- increase Latin American participation in protection of air and sea lanes of communication, with special emphasis on the Panama Canal
- foster the blue-helmet and civic action capabilities of Latin America's armed forces
- institutionalize the protection of human rights by the armed forces
- maintain a regional defense philosophy which opposes the use of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other inhumane weapons
- secure peace and democratic stability in Central America and the Caribbean
- develop military and police capabilities to protect both the natural environment and the use of financial resources.¹⁷

Political and economic policies must be congruent if the military and law enforcement systems of the hemisphere are to meet these objectives.

Hemispheric National Security Framework

Perfecting the hemispheric national security framework, and the US role in it, calls for a mix of political and military diplomacy. This topic is ranked first in priority because, while parts of the other nine agenda items are possible through bilateral and sub-regional accords and programs, the goal of a peaceful, democratic, and prospering Western Hemisphere requires a structure that no major sector of the world has ever had: a multinational security roundtable without a perceived immediate foreign military threat. Circumstances are right for creating this mechanism.

Foster Military Professionalism

The immediate concomitant to the structural imperative is the strategy of fostering military and law enforcement professionalism. The conceptual dimension is a continuing process of cognitive (dealing with facts) and affective (dealing with values) professional education. The delivery means have existed in part for half a century. These are the US Army School of the Americas at Ft. Benning, Georgia; the Inter-American Air Force Academy at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; and the Naval Small Craft Instruction and

Technical Training School at Rodman Navy Base in Panama. These three institutions all present, in Spanish, professional courses that use US curriculum models filtered through the platform delivery of a sophisticated inter-American faculty. Since the early 1960s the Inter-American Defense Board has operated the Inter-American Defense College (IADC), at Ft. McNair, in Washington, D.C. While not entirely analogous, the IADC in many ways resembles the NATO Defense College in Rome.¹⁸

Cognitive professional education is available to most Latin American military and police personnel through a wide spectrum of schools and foreign advisory mechanisms, both at home and abroad. What makes the IADC and the family of US-operated schools so valuable is the affective dimension of the education they provide. Students study military and police topics in Spanish, as the most universal of the region's native languages, sharing the experience with hemispheric classmates who face differing challenges but who share cultural bonds.¹⁹ An officer or a sergeant can memorize a tactical or technical procedure in the cognitive domain, but one converts those procedures into functional morality and professionalism via the affective learning channel.

The existing family of US-operated professional military education schools should be expanded to permit all participating nations, not just the United States, to serve as teachers and role models. The Colombian army, for example, is a world leader in humane peacekeeping operations, both at home and abroad, with a long record of public affirmation to prove it. The Costa Rican civil guard and the Barbadian defense force are world-reputed models for the national defense institution in a small, democratic country. The Brazilian navy is effective in both fluvial and blue-water regional security operations. Canada and Colombia are world leaders in blue-helmet operations. In an expanded learning environment, these countries would share their areas of military and law enforcement success with officers and noncommissioned officers of the hemisphere.

US strategy should include the expansion and inter-Americanization of the School of the Americas concept to embrace several campuses in a variety of host countries. One campus, with a heavily civilian faculty, should offer a one-year professional foundations course, "Military and Police Professionalism in the Americas," with a strong curriculum in history, law, ethics, human rights, democracy, economics, and the inter-American system. A subculture of civilians from the Latin American defense and law enforcement ministries should attend these schools regularly with their military counterparts, just as US civilian security careerists now attend the Department of Defense family of senior service colleges. The hemispheric nations should be encouraged to provide modest financial support plus administrative machinery to encourage attendance at the courses and career tracking of the graduates.

Marginalize the Narco-traffickers

Reducing the violent and inherently destabilizing effects of the narcotics empires is a task that cuts across political, economic, and military interests. US strategy should acknowledge that much of the problem begins in the United States, among the cocaine users who have the cash to buy the drug.²⁰ Any counternarcotics strategy must recognize that Mexico or the Andean Region is just one facet of the worldwide supply and distribution network, and that any solution must attack the challenge at every level from grower to consumer.

The narcotics kingpins operate bogus nation-states, heavily armed and ruthless beyond description. Colombia alone, for example, has lost more troops in fighting the narco-traffickers since 1983 than the United States lost in all foreign conflict during the same period. Each of the three Inter-American networks for dialogue—political, economic, and military—must work for a coordinated solution that matches resources to measured effectiveness. The roundtable principle means that within Latin America, at least, US views on how to conduct anti-drug operations within sovereign countries would rest upon the wishes of the host nation.²¹

The drug scourge can never be ended; it is a dimension of human vice that can be changed only in degree through applied public policy. But much of the military training and force configuration that has proved useful in fighting the drug war is also appropriate for other military and security scenarios such as border control, disaster relief, anti-terrorism efforts, regional and international peace operations, and small coalition force campaigns.

Humane Migration Control

Coping with migration as a national security problem translates into close dialogue between armed forces and police forces. Armed forces participation on this topic may include the occasional dedication of surveillance, communications, and transportation equipment to back up what is clearly a law enforcement challenge. Several Latin American countries have paramilitary forces, such as the Venezuelan national guard and the Argentine national gendarmerie, who do these tasks skillfully; the US role in the regional effort would be to serve as supporting logistics provider, not as primary operator. US law enforcement agencies, such as the Customs and Immigration Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and state and local police organizations across the sunbelt states, should be major participants in this effort. Clearly, long-term victory over this particular challenge would be enhanced by the success of the GATT family of trade accords, especially NAFTA, CARICOM, and the Central American Common Market. History suggests that there will always be problematic countries within a region, and therefore mass migration remains a mixture of humanitarian, legal, and national security challenges. The national security role in mass migration is profession-

ally underdeveloped and should become a curriculum initiative within the hemispheric system of schools for military and police leaders.²²

Sea Lanes, Air Lanes

The future strategic task on the seas adjacent to Latin America is to enhance the region's navies as they assume increased roles during an era of economic development and industrialization, without stimulating a costly and disruptive naval arms race. The blue-water navies of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have been influential in the region since the 1880s. US naval captains have played a quiet role in bilateral and multilateral maritime diplomacy with these three navies ever since that era.²³ Just prior to World War II, US Navy policy added the Andean Region navies in coastal and blue-water security missions, and, as Cuba became a mid-range military threat late in the Cold War, the Caribbean navies joined US naval security activities in that sub-region.²⁴

Latin America's air forces find their principal employment, at present, in logistical support of land forces. One of Latin America's most important decisions during the Cold War was not to emulate the airpower arms races in progress in the Middle East, much of Asia, parts of Africa, and all of Europe. The Andean Region air forces have roles in the anti-narcotics conflict, although the growth of national police forces in the region has brought about a proliferation of aviation assets among the national security forces, some of it duplicative and inefficient. While the role of the Latin American armed forces in developing a technical sector within the educational sphere is well known, a less known aspect is the role of the air forces in stimulating a multi-sectoral aviation industry.²⁵

Discussion of future seapower and airpower strategies within Latin America during a time of economic growth must address the issue of persuading the region to take on a sense of importance about protecting the neutrality of the Panama Canal. Uncle Sam's motives about defending the neutrality of the Panama Canal always have evoked mixed perceptions in both the United States and in Latin America.²⁶ The Carter-Torrijos Treaties and the Cold War's end now offer the perfect opportunity for Washington to divest itself of this chronic national security dilemma. A future strategy is for US diplomats, in coordination with US air and sea officers, to encourage the region's own air forces and navies to proclaim and maintain the neutrality of the Panama Canal. The locus of Panamanian foreign relations concerns then becomes the OAS.

Military Civic Action and Blue-Helmet Operations

Enhancing Latin America's blue-helmet and civic action roles is a strategy of value to the region and to the world. The effectiveness of Colombian soldiers in Korea (1952-1954, UN) and in the Sinai (1956-1958, UN; 1981-present, Multinational Force and Observers) has caused village mayors

in turbulent regions to ask for them by name.²⁷ Several measures would take advantage of the skills and experiences developed in those kinds of operations. First, curriculum units in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, taught by Colombians and Canadians with actual blue-helmet experience, should be added to the curriculum of the hemispheric professional military schools. Second, as other nations join in the teaching process, a pilot staff for an Inter-American Defense Force (IADF) should be set up within the OAS Security Council. Third, the hemisphere's political and economic structures should be provided with a statement of capabilities and control measures for this IADF in order to defuse concerns about the force becoming a new kind of gunboat diplomacy.²⁸

The civic action role for the Latin American military forces was well established, legally and morally, in the early 1960s.²⁹ Core curriculum programs at the hemisphere's professional military schools can highlight specific abuses that have occasionally tainted an otherwise excellent civic action record. Civic action programs should not compete with civilian economic activity, should only function where civilian government and the private sector cannot operate, and should not be used as a philosophical cover for military-operated arms factories. The maturation of democratic governmental institutions and free enterprise economic systems now alleviates many of these concerns in the region. The Colombian National Civic Action Council, where the Minister of Defense is the only voting military representative among 16 members, is the best functional model.³⁰ Civic action by military forces, done efficiently under civilian control, can be a vital contributor to Latin American regional economic and political development.

Guaranteeing Human Rights

The securing of human rights by the armed forces of the Americas is a universally attainable goal by the end of the 20th century. Human rights as an academic subject is taught at the School of the Americas. It is really a mixture of several international accords (Hague, 1907; Geneva, 1949), military and civil law of each country, and an expanding body of ideas based upon the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. Public knowledge about the subject comes from government sources of mixed accuracy, international humanitarian groups such as the Red Cross, nongovernmental organizations (called "NGOs" in the literature) dedicated to human rights advocacy, news media sources of widely varying credibility, political groups often having ideological agendas, and criminal organizations such as the Andean narcotraffickers. While controversy and emotion attend every facet of the process, Latin America has produced legitimate, battle-decorated human rights heroes like General Manuel Sanmiguel Buenaventura of Colombia and police General Antonio Ketín Vidal of Peru; unfortunately, the deeds of these men rarely appear in the news.³¹

Developing respect for human rights among uniformed personnel lies more in the affective psychological domain than in the cognitive domain. Further, the contextual authority setting, the state of troop training, and the level of the armed threat all play strong roles. It is one thing to posture for the concept of human rights from the safety of the podium and quite another to place one's life at risk among murderous drug cartel gunmen. Each country needs training initiatives such as the 1993 contract between the Ecuadorian armed forces and the Latin American Association for Human Rights.³² The hemisphere's armed forces could then share techniques for training troops in this matter, while their political counterparts ensure parallel commitment to human rights training by law enforcement agencies. The case for terminating US training assistance, currently called Enhanced International Military Education and Training (IMET), to punish Latin American human rights violators in uniform may be viewed as another example of the a priori assumption that all US military actions in the region are morally tainted, or are corrupted by exposure to the Latin American military profession.³³

Arms Limitations

Latin America is the world's only region having no inventory of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Despite some controversy in the 1980s about nuclear arms and nuclear power development in the Southern Cone, Latin America's governments without exception stand opposed to the existence of weapons of mass destruction in the region. Further, there is a strong initiative under way in Central America to remove the land mines implanted by several antagonists during the 1980s.³⁴ The US Army School of the Americas has trained packets of Latin American military and police to do some of this dangerous work. One of the strongest ways to build confidence in the region's armed forces and police is for all commanders to declare and show opposition to human rights violations and inhumane weapons.

Burying Hatchets

Putting to rest the earlier conflicts and repressions in Central America and the Caribbean is an agenda which cannot be avoided, if the proposed OAS Security Council is to be taken seriously. Burying old hatchets in Central America is not enough; new political and economic thinking, protected by a new breed of military and police personnel, is an urgent necessity. Those who work directly with Central America's younger generation of military officers see hopeful signs: armies are getting smaller, police forces are being created, and the rising junior officers in many forces now concern themselves with professionalism, not ideology. The hemispheric political community must give change a chance to occur. Demilitarization of former combatants in Nicaragua and El Salvador has been helpful and must continue; supervised electoral processes that seem to work must be affirmed by accompanying economic growth.³⁵

Two current problems threaten the impulse to move away from armed interventions—the situation in Haiti and the continuing deterioration of Cuba under Castro. The United States must restrain the understandable urge to employ its own military force unilaterally in Haiti. A combination of coercive diplomacy and negotiation must first restore a constitutional government, and peacekeeping commitments must come from the hemisphere at large.³⁶ Training of a new Haitian police force by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 1993 and 1994 is precisely the right kind of foundation step required for ultimate success.

With regard to Cuba, military invasion would be the one certain way to foster Cuban and hemispheric sympathy for Fidel Castro and thereby lengthen his faltering stay in power. Any national security measures attending the ultimate collapse of Castro's regime must be hemispheric.³⁷

In all these cases, the divisive leftist vs. rightist rhetoric pertaining to US policy in Latin America must be put aside if Uncle Sam is to retain post-Cold War leadership among equals in the region. Full but self-restrained participation in the triad of hemispheric political, economic, and military roundtables, however constituted, is in the US national interest. US leaders and Latin American interest lobbies within the United States can scarcely expect Latin Americans to end feuds if US policy toward the region is made with moralistic zealotry.³⁸

Environment and Resources

The Western Hemisphere's military leaders must become champions of the natural environment and of scarce economic resources within their countries. The dismal environmental record of the communist armed forces in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has sent the world a shocking message, one which probably helps nail down the coffin of Marxist ideology. Their unexploded shells, unregistered land mines, spilled toxic wastes, rusting junkyards, and crudely managed nuclear programs will cost the world countless casualties and billions of dollars in restoration. Similarly, the Western world's armed forces consume too much fuel, emit excess toxic wastes, and often fail to budget funds for cleaning up discarded military sites. Latin American militaries are not alone in having lessons to learn.

The Latin American armed forces already have done some good work in the environmental area. Brazilian troops have turned up in the frontier zones in recent years to confront environmental abusers who were laying waste the land and killing workers who dared to object. Colombian troops in the field have always been a model case for leaving their area of operations just a bit better than before they arrived.³⁹ Ecuadorian army troops were fighting fires in the Galapagos Islands in April 1994, rescuing one of the earth's most important natural habitats.

Resources management is another topic now taking root among the Western Hemisphere's armed forces and police. It is defined as the distribution

of scarce resources among abundant alternatives; scholastically, it embraces microeconomics, decision science, operations research, scientific management theory, and cyclical budgetary processes. Like human rights, resources management must penetrate the affective realm of the learner to have value. The military officer or police commander must learn to do the most with the least, and to do rational cost and benefit analysis as a matter of routine. For Latin America's small armed forces, this could mean comparing five different ways to interdict border smuggling, combining the measures with illegal immigration control and the anti-narcotics campaign, and then blending the resources of land, sea, air, and police forces in the most effective, and hopefully efficient, mix. By stretching scarce cash during an era of economic privatization, the Latin American militaries can set a good example and help their governments provide desperately needed social services with the money not spent on military things.⁴⁰

US Influence on the Region's Militaries

US land, sea, and air officers have done excellent work with Latin America. They have been perceived as helpful modernizers more than as invaders. Illustrious officers like Colonel George W. Goethals, General Leonard Wood, and General Matthew B. Ridgway served with distinction in Latin America long before the Cold War. General Ridgway figured prominently in the early days of the Inter-American Defense Board and the transition to Cold War policy era. General Vernon L. Walters was influential in linking Latin America's armed forces to appropriate Cold War roles. General John R. Galvin and General Frederick F. Woerner were senior Latin American experts during the height of the Cold War challenges: both officers served prominently in other theaters. General George A. Joulwan and General Barry R. McCaffrey combined military success in other world theaters with great knowledge of Latin America's changing security challenges at Cold War's end.

The US Navy and the US Marine Corps bore the brunt of US military policy in Latin America during the age of gunboat diplomacy (1870-1933). Both developed a cadre of senior officers who knew Latin America well, and who are remembered positively in the region despite the military interventionist roles they often played. The US Army was the major actor that linked Latin America to the Cold War challenges (1947-1989), mostly through countering armed subversion, and simultaneously served as role model and teacher for professionalization and acceptance of civilian authority. Those two missions were done with devotion and skill, and with limited resources, since neither had high priority for defense expenditures.

In the 1990s, the repository of US Army national security knowledge about Latin America must not be discarded for lack of a strategic initiative, nor lost through attrition of personnel. Working cooperatively with the other armed forces and federal law enforcement agencies, the US Army is the logical senior executive agent to carry out the ten strategic initiatives, to build

the military linkage (*hermandad*) that will make the Americas, once and for all, the bastion of freedom and opportunity that George Washington and Simon Bolivar both fought to achieve and labored to build.

NOTES

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3. David Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), pp. 55-56.
4. Russell W. Ramsey, "The Spanish Military Orders: Alcantara, Calatrava, and Santiago," *Army Quarterly & Defence Journal*, 113 (June 1983), 345-46.
5. Russell W. Ramsey, "A Military Turn of Mind: Educating Latin American Officers," *Military Review*, 73 (August 1993), 13.
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13. James R. Harding, "Security Challenges and Opportunities in the Americas," *North-South, the Magazine of the Americas*, 3 (February-March, 1994), 48-51.
14. Peter Hakim, "NAFTA . . . and After: A New Era for the US and Latin America?" *Current History*, 93 (March 1994), 97-102.
15. Robert Devlin, *Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The Supply Side of the Story* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992), 7-8, 253-56; and Sidney Weintraub, "The Economy on the Eve of Free Trade," *Current History*, 92 (February 1993), 72.
16. J. Benjamin Zapata, "The Honduran View," in Russell W. Ramsey, ed., *Proceedings, Eighth Latin America Symposium* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command & Staff College, 1991), pp. 19-21. Minister-Counselor Zapata's ability to explain national security in terms of the political economy is but one example of these economic "superstars" in action.
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Germany: The "Reluctant Power" Turns East

VICTOR GRAY

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"We must realize that the projection of stability to Central and Eastern Europe is the most important challenge facing the Euro-Atlantic community. We must develop a viable concept for meeting this strategic challenge."

— German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe

Germany was perhaps the chief beneficiary of "the revolution of 1989." It achieved, in the process, its unification, the withdrawal of foreign forces from its soil, and, concomitantly, the exercise of full sovereignty. Over the longer term, this achievement may loom as large as the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Together, these two events also ensure that relations between the new Germany and the new Russia will dominate the European security scene through the early part of the next century. The key issue for both countries—indeed, for all of Europe—will be the security vacuum in East Central Europe.

In order to understand better how this dynamic might play out, one must move beyond the current socioeconomic trauma of unification and heretofore uncontrolled immigration that has mired Germany in recession, xenophobia, and self-doubt. And one must move beyond the current alphabet soup of competing and overlapping European organizations that, willy-nilly, may take a form as yet unanticipated. Doing so forces us—Germans and non-Germans alike—to face the strategic reality that Germany is again a considerable economic power in the center of Europe and, having regained full sovereignty for the first time in half a century, again a potentially

assertive actor on the European and world stages. Like it or not, planned or unplanned, we must face a new iteration of the eternal "German Question."

While there is a certain timelessness to that question, the chief lessons to be learned from history are that history never repeats itself exactly and that great care must be used in drawing analogies from the past. It has been argued, for example, that the current situation in Europe bears similarities to 1914. To be sure, there is revolution in Russia, turmoil in the Balkans and a new central power in Germany. Unlike 1914, however, Franco-German enmity has been replaced by a firm German anchor in the West. And to those who fear a return to 1933, there is not only that anchor in the West but a half century of successful experience with democracy to provide assurance to the contrary. Simply put, Bonn is not Weimar, and the Berlin Republic that is now emerging is not Bonn.¹

The Berlin Republic will remain thoroughly democratic—the degree dependent on how it deals with its increasing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity. And while firmly anchored in the West through strong ties with France, it will have to pay considerable attention in the decade ahead to its security concerns in the East. A sober self-assessment of interests and threats will push the "traditional" issues of the country's ties to Russia and the security vacuum in East Central Europe to the forefront of the German security agenda. The German security perspective, therefore, will remain Eurocentric and become increasingly eastward-looking rather than global. While the Berlin Republic will make its weight felt in new ways on the global stage, especially through the United Nations, its concerns will differ from the other major powers, save perhaps Japan. Questions remain, moreover, about whether Germany can—or even wants to—translate its economic power into military power. In many ways, Germany remains the reluctant power because of its singularity.

The New Singularity

We are witnessing a return of Germany's traditional security problem—one dictated by its central position and its dynamic economy. Try as it

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might, Germany cannot escape the consequences of its geographic position, its history, or its economic prosperity. These factors contributed to German singularity, against which Helmut Schmidt and other Germans railed, within the Cold War alliance. They contribute, too, to a new singularity—shared to a degree with Japan—within the club of post-Cold War powers.

- Even more than Japan, Germany has had to deal with the lingering consequences of World War II. While it has perhaps dealt more directly than Japan with its wartime history, the uniqueness and magnitude of the Holocaust still cause Germany's neighbors to treat any semblance of German unilateralism in military matters with great suspicion. Then, too, the long period of division, occupation, and limited sovereignty accustomed German public and politicians alike to being security consumers. The Bonn Republic was not interested in military unilateralism.

- For a variety of reasons, its geographic centrality on the Continent included, Germany has few ambitions or concerns outside Europe. Save Hitler's short Reich and an equally short and unsuccessful pre-World War I foray into Africa and the Pacific, Germany did not share the colonial experience that broadened the horizons of the United States, Britain, and France. It therefore never developed the global interests or reach of those powers and, until just the past few years, was never asked to shoulder a share of their global burdens. The NATO Alliance and Bonn were content with Germany's preoccupation with defense of the homeland.

- Nationalism still has a bad name within Germany. A heavy strain of pacifism and a healthy skepticism of jingoistic patriotism translate into a reluctance to use politico-military power for the promotion of national interests other than physical survival. This is a strange phenomenon, indeed, in the birthplace of *Realpolitik*, and one that will be examined more closely below.

- Again with the exception of Japan, Germany lacks the attributes of a great power—nuclear weapons and a seat on the Security Council. Germany has begun an all-out effort to obtain the latter, as has Japan, but it is highly unlikely that it would ever unilaterally seek the former. Key in this regard, however, is German confidence in the American nuclear umbrella. Should that confidence fade, it is conceivable that Germany might seek a share of French nuclear power or the development of a European deterrent.

- Returning to geography, Germany seems cursed with being a front-line state. On both sides of the Cold War front line, it finds itself again on the edge of Western Europe's political stability and economic prosperity facing an East that lacks both. It is for this reason that Germany abhors the vacuum in East Central Europe far more than the United States or its partners in the European Union. More than the other Western powers, it faces specific and immediate threats to its east from nuclear proliferation and a potential flood of refugees.

***“Try as it might, Germany cannot escape
the consequences of its geographic position,
its history, or its economic prosperity.”***

As it faces these threats, Germany is very uncomfortable with its continued singularity. It appears determined to find strength and cover in a new alliance that will push “Western Europe” as far eastward as possible, thus moving Germany from the edge of a divided Continent to the center of a larger, more stable, and thus more comfortable Europe. To do this, it needs the cooperation of its European Union partners, the United States and, yes, Russia. To obtain that cooperation, it must convince those would-be partners in a larger Europe that it is itself a serious and worthy partner willing to share the burdens of power. But getting in the way of such respect is a continued German reluctance to take up the military tools of power—a reluctance that has its roots in post-World War II, Cold War pacifism.

The Roots of Modern German Pacifism

The roots of modern German pacifism can be found in the experience of World War II and Nazi rule, with “Never Again!” being the watchword of the 1950s anti-rearmament movement and, later, the anti-nuclear movement. This pacifism spread quickly, by the late 1960s pervading large segments of the German body politic, particularly young Germans. By that time, however, German pacifism had been transformed. It had become a cause, a movement that young Germans could relate to by their own personal experience—the day-to-day experience of living at ground zero of the Cold War. For much of the Cold War, it must have seemed to many Germans, including those in the West who were truly thankful for their freedom and prosperity, that their aspirations again were being sacrificed on the altar of a balance of power. This perception grew not only out of the physical division of the country but also out of the psychological pain of living on the front line. Imagine living in an Oregon-sized country with more than 300,000 friendly but foreign soldiers and several thousand nuclear weapons. Is it any wonder that Germans:

- Questioned the wisdom of some nuclear weapon systems, the range of which limited their use to German soil?
- Placed greater stock in detente than we did?
- Accepted pacifism as a political commonplace?

What is a wonder is that we, who now profess concern about German assertiveness, so recently viewed that pacifism as dangerous.

By the time of the NATO "Double-Track" decision in 1979 and the collapse of the Schmidt government in 1982, there had grown up in Germany a sizable body of opinion, not surprisingly strongest among young people, that professed dissatisfaction with the status quo as it related to the division of Germany and to NATO's strategy of Flexible Response. By 1982, for example, polls showed that a plurality of those under 30 preferred a neutral option. In essence, a new generation of Germans, feeling no guilt for the past but saddled with its consequences, had begun a struggle to redefine and rehabilitate the German nation. These young Germans were troubled not only by the past but by the seemingly intractable problems represented by a hostile Soviet army occupying a large part of their nation and a nuclear stalemate that seemingly froze the geopolitical status quo in Europe, threatening Germany with destruction to preserve the peace.

With reunification and removal of the threat of immediate destruction, however, there is little to suggest, a decade later, that the pacifism of the 1980s will survive the decade ahead. For it is a pacifism that is not religious or altruistic but rather self-interested and nationalistic. During the Cold War it sought to protect *Germans* from destruction and sought, at a political level, to keep open the option of unification through the practice of "divided detente."² Small wonder that both the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) campaigned in 1983 under the motto: "In the German Interest." It is entirely conceivable that the next generation of Germans, having achieved unification and having moved off nuclear ground zero, might redefine the "German interest" of survival as one no longer requiring pacifism as a means to that vital end. Should that happen Germany might no longer be the *reluctant* power.

Physical Constraints on German Power

In the meantime, Germany's power remains physically constrained by treaty-dictated limits on the Bundeswehr and still somewhat constrained on using the Bundeswehr in out-of-area operations, since the recent court decision denying that the constitution precluded such operations still requires a decision by the Bundestag for each proposed operation. The peacetime size of the Bundeswehr is limited to 370,000 by the Two-Plus-Four Treaty; its full integration into the NATO command structure and lack of a national centralized operational control structure greatly restrict its latitude and capability for independent action in less-than-war operations. There appears to be little desire and limited where-withal to move beyond the Bundeswehr's current size limits. The reasons are economic and demographic.

Economically, Germany is facing the same pressures the United States is to achieve savings in the defense budget—savings that can be

diverted to financing the rebuilding of eastern Germany. So far, the cuts in the defense budget have been modest, but they are expected to grow: estimates for medium-term defense expenditures once in the range of 48 billion DM, were, until recently reduced, at roughly the same level they were a decade ago and about 10 percent less than the 1990 high of 53.4 billion DM.³

Demographically, Germany's negative population growth, at least among ethnic German citizens, is contributing to a downsizing of the Bundeswehr in two ways. Not only is the size of the pool of eligible manpower declining, but the number of draft eligibles declaring themselves conscientious objectors has grown dramatically in recent years. These conditions could lead to a stretching-out of active-duty requirements (unlikely, since required time of service has recently been proposed as ten months rather than 12 months) or, despite protestations to the contrary by the country's political leaders, the dropping of conscription in favor of an all-volunteer army. For all these reasons, the size of the Bundeswehr could eventually drop below 300,000.⁴

Concerning the constitutional debate, it is hard to find anywhere in the German Constitution any explicit prohibition on so-called out-of-area actions. Article 26 of the Constitution or Basic Law outlaws preparations for aggressive war and acts that would "disturb the peaceful relations between nations," while Article 87 makes clear that German armed forces may only be used for defensive purposes or, "apart from defense . . . only to the extent explicitly permitted by the Basic Law." Article 24, however, allows Germany to enter "a system of mutual collective security" to ensure "the maintenance of peace" and to "bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world." In a long-running case before the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, the Kohl Government maintained that this article, adopted after the founding of the United Nations but before the founding of NATO, permits participation in UN-style peacekeeping operations outside the NATO area. Disagreeing, the opposition Social Democrats (SPD) contended that the Basic Law must be amended to allow operations "apart from defense." In a 12 July 1994 decision, the court sided with the government's position, thus clearing the way for out-of-area operations subject to a case-by-case majority vote in the Bundestag.

In the meantime, the CDU/CSU continues a nationwide educational effort designed to swing a still-reluctant public behind a more permissive stance with regard to such operations. It has had some success in this effort, and even the SPD has joined a consensus behind UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations. It remains to be seen, however, how far the CDU/CSU can press such efforts in the midst of an election campaign and in the face of continued strong public reluctance. It therefore appears likely that, in the near term, "Germany must face many of its current security challenges without military means."⁵ At the very least, it will face two nuclear-armed states to its east

without nuclear weapons of its own and with national conventional forces smaller than those of Russia or Ukraine. This is but a part of Germany's "Eastern Problem."

Germany's Eastern Problem and Ours

Before tackling out-of-area tasks further afield, Germany must first come to grips with its Eastern Problem—a problem precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the movement of Russian forces 800 miles eastward. These circumstances have created a security vacuum in East Central Europe, leaving a weak Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia between the still-limited power of Germany, with all the self-imposed and other constraints that attach to it, and nuclear-armed Russia and Ukraine, both of which also have sizable conventional forces. Complicating the problem is the contentious, unstable relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

This new situation creates a strategic dilemma for German planners who, in seeking to create stability and security on their eastern borders, must overcome not only the constraints that attach to German power but also the concerns of their Russian counterparts. For perhaps the first time in German history, however, they can approach this task with a high degree of confidence about stability and security on their western borders. Indeed, it is Germany's firm anchor in the West that gives it the prospect of success—again, perhaps for the first time in its history—in reaching a peaceful, lasting solution to its Eastern Problem. In their approach to this problem, German planners must start with a clear understanding of German interests.

German Interests

Increasingly, protection of interests—even in the eyes of realists—extends not only to the physical survival of a state's people and the control of its territory and economic wherewithal but also to the survival of its ideals or values. This, after all, is at the heart of the concept of the "polity." Therefore, the survival of Germany as a prosperous *democracy* must be posited as the *sine qua non* in any pantheon of German interests. Defense of this interest is bolstered immensely by Germany's membership in the strong community of shared values represented by the European Union and NATO. It would presumably be further strengthened by spreading that community eastward by opening up the membership of those two organizations or by strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Therefore, for its values alone, it would seem that Germany has a *vital* interest in a broadened European integration process.

But, when considering the physical *survival* of the people, one is immediately tossed back into that cauldron of German culture and myth that surrounds the "concept of the nation" and that can fly in the face of democratic

universalism and confound the attempt to define the territory to be defended. There are two main problems that arise from the German self-identity, tied up as it is with the racial and cultural criteria of *Jus Sanguinis* or "Law of the Blood" as opposed to the territorial-based criteria of *Jus Soli* or "Law of the Place." First is the problem of internal cohesion related to the inability or unwillingness of Germans to integrate the millions of newcomers who now consider Germany their ultimate home. Just how serious this problem can become in terms of threatening the values of the country is illustrated by the rise of xenophobia and right extremism over the past few years. Second is the international problem arising from the presence of large pockets of ethnic Germans in the East.

Particularly troubling with regard to Germany's relations with the East are the nearly two million Germans living in Russia, Poland, and Ukraine. For domestic political reasons, the German government has sought to encourage these ethnic Germans to stay where they are. The principal means to this end have been agreements with the several governments by which German economic aid is allowed to be targeted at the Germans within their borders. This already has caused a degree of resentment among the majority populations of these countries and creates a source of contention between Germany and its eastern neighbors. This could become a more acute problem if the ethnic Germans in the East become more assertive or if more nationalist governments arise there, leading in turn to possible persecution or expulsions. This is a touchy human rights issue with average Germans and is one that German governments could ignore only at great political risk.⁶

Before considering the remaining element in the triad of German *survival* interests, there are two lower-level interests worth mentioning. As a relatively small country, Germany is heavily dependent on exports for its domestic prosperity. It therefore has an abiding *major* interest in broadening its markets and maintaining its competitiveness within those markets. On this score, Germany appears fairly secure economically as the most powerful member of the European Union and given a certain leveling of the trade playing field with the Asian-Pacific area in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. But, again, we see here the needs and limitations created by transnationalism. Germany needs to be a member of these clubs and must submit to certain limitations on its freedom of action that grow out of that membership.

Paradoxically, Germany seeks to broaden its freedom of action by pursuing a nebulous interest that Hans J. Morgenthau would call "prestige." One contemporary observer puts it this way:

Today, important aspects of German security policy can be explained by its quest for equal status with the other international powers. This objective has two dimensions. First, Germany wants to eliminate the unique institutional and political restrictions made on its international role during the Cold War. Second, it wants a standing that is commensurate with its new political and economic power.⁷

With regard to the first objective, throwing off the "unique institutional and political restrictions" of the Cold War, the most important steps are the removal of the last Russian troops from eastern Germany in 1994 and playing a more assertive role in NATO, similar to the role Germany now plays in the European Union. The venue for the second aspect of this quest is the United Nations, where Germany now openly seeks Security Council membership. Certainly such membership would give Germany a greater say over actions and events in East Central Europe and elsewhere that affect German security. At question, however, is whether the German public is willing to accept the greater responsibilities, principally in the peacekeeping area, that go with such membership. By the year 2000, Germany will likely have achieved these "prestige" objectives and will, as a result, be a more "normal" country. Having achieved such status, Germany might redefine its interests in more "normal," more nationalist terms, and, in any event, will probably pursue its interests more assertively, less apologetically.

We can thus expect Germany to move more forcefully to protect the ultimate survival interest of any country, the third element of the triad noted earlier—its territorial integrity. And it is important to stress in this regard that Germans today mean the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic west of the Oder-Neisse. There are no expansionist claims that would be supported by any more than a tiny minority of right extremists within the country. That is not to say territorial issues might not come to the fore in the East *despite* the wishes of the German government and people. One such issue might arise as a result of German investment in and ethnic German immigration (from elsewhere in Russia) to Kaliningrad, the former East Prussian Koenigsberg, which now forms a heavily militarized Russian enclave on the southern Baltic.⁸

The Correlation of Forces

Such esoterica aside, German planners have to consider the unfavorable correlation of forces on their eastern borders in planning the defense of the homeland. That correlation is surely not in Germany's favor in terms of conventional ground forces. Nor is it in Germany's favor when one considers the sizable nuclear arsenal that Russia still possesses, not to mention the nuclear forces now at the command of Ukraine. To date, Germany has compensated for this imbalance through NATO and the extended nuclear deterrence of the United States. The credibility and value of both to Germany, however, could diminish rapidly. This has led some to speculate that Germany might at some point reconsider its unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons. This does not appear to be a real possibility, however, at least during the next decade. It would cause direct damage to Germany's other interests and intensify Germany's security problem by giving rise to a harsh Russian reaction and to a rapid and perhaps final unraveling of Germany's *Westpolitik*.

Far more likely and far wiser from a German point of view would be a redoubling of its efforts to keep the United States engaged in Europe and to square that engagement with France's desire to strengthen the Franco-German core of the nascent European security identity based on the Western European Union and European Union.⁹ Greater security in the defense of the homeland also will require getting the United States and Germany's other allies to acquiesce in expanding NATO and the European Union to East Central Europe and decreasing the sources of instability in the area. In this, Germany already has not only the acquiescence but the enthusiastic support of the Visegrad countries of East Central Europe.¹⁰

But what of Germany's West European partners? While they share the interest of the Germans in stability in the East, they do not share the intensity of that interest and therefore seem less inclined to invest in the East or to grant the countries there preferential treatment within the European Union.¹¹ But, in the end, they may have to give a little on this score to protect their far larger interest in keeping Germany a good team player in the European Union. They must realize that if the European Union cannot help Germany with its problem in East Central Europe, Germany, for its part, might lose interest in the union. If Germany were to go it alone, so, too, would the Bundesbank. Far better for France and the other Europeans to have a German-dominated Eurobank, over which they have some say, than a de facto Eurobank in the Bundesbank, over which they have no say.

On the security side of ledger, the French remain hesitant about a US-dominated NATO but increasingly inclined toward finding a better *modus vivendi* with NATO as other anchors on Germany seem to be losing their hold. Ironically, their preferred anchor—the Western European Union as the security arm of the European Union—probably offers the best hope of calming the security fears of the East Central Europeans and Germans without arousing concern in Russia. Much will depend on the attitudes of the Americans, attitudes that the Germans are probably best equipped to influence. Like the Germans, the French also realize that given the ever-present possibility events in Russia could turn sour on short notice, it would be prudent to ensure that the United States and NATO remain engaged until alternative arrangements can be created.

Toward a New European Balance

Achieving a new, more enduring balance of power in East Central Europe will require identifying and dealing with the commonalities and conflicts among the interests of the various players in the area and the relative strengths available to each to protect and promote those interests. Given its stake in the outcome, Germany will play a particularly important role in this process.

One common interest of all of Russia's western neighbors relates to ensuring that it develops along nonthreatening democratic lines conducive to

stability in the area and within Russia itself. To a large degree, this is an interest shared by Russia and one that in no way runs counter to its real national interests—i.e., the economic welfare of its people and the reduction of threats and instability on its borders. This entails greater Western economic assistance to Russia, Ukraine, and the countries of East Central Europe.

Stability in East Central Europe and Russia is an interest felt most directly and most deeply by Germany, which as a result is prone to move most forcefully to meet the economic and security needs of its eastern neighbors. Its survival interests are so closely tied up with meeting those needs that Germany will do so unilaterally, if necessary. But all of Germany's Western allies, especially France, share an interest with Germany in making such unilateralism unnecessary. This, in turn, entails a need to proceed with the development of a common European foreign and security policy and a more accepting attitude toward such a union.

The trade-offs involved are obvious. Not so obvious, however, is the popular will elsewhere—in the United States or France—needed to make those trade-offs. Much will depend on whether the American people can be brought to perceive a strong enough interest in East Central Europe to help Germany, Russia, and the countries of the area decrease the security uncertainties that abound there. That perception does not now exist. Creation of a stable European balance with regard to East Central Europe also will require changed attitudes and a degree of sacrifice on the part of the French. They will have to accept a more rapid widening, a less rapid deepening of the European Union to assuage the security anxieties of the Germans and East Central Europeans and must be prepared to work more closely with the United States and NATO. And Europeans and Americans alike will have to find a way to factor in legitimate Russian security concerns without giving Russia a veto over the pursuit of legitimate Western security objectives.

Russia is not currently in a position to oppose directly the extension of Western security guarantees to East Central Europe. It should benefit from decreased instability on its western borders and from moves to lock potentially volatile governments there into more stable, more calculable security arrangements such as NATO. Far more troublesome from a Russian point of view would be bilateral arrangements between Germany and the East Central European governments. Such an outcome would be new, less calculable, and historically troubling. For the same historical reasons as well as a desire to be a part of a "West" that includes Paris and Brussels, the former is also the choice of the East Central Europeans. From a raw power point of view, however, they have little to say about the outcome.

For their part, the Germans also would prefer the multilateral Western approach. From a military power point of view, they have neither the wherewithal nor the will to go it alone. To be militarily credible against the

Russians, they need the United States and their Western European allies. They realize, too, the political and economic costs that would be involved in any attempt to go it alone. Also, powerful as Germany might be economically, the economic price of going it alone would place intolerable burdens on German taxpayers and lead to unacceptable strains in the social fabric. Politically, the price might include the end of the European integration process and the more "European Germany" of Thomas Mann. Instead of leading to the integration of East Central Europe into Western Europe, such a course would leave Germany in the historically uncomfortable position of being the *primus inter parus* in Central Europe surrounded east and west by uneasy powers possessing nuclear weapons.

One such multilateral approach would be the Partnership for Peace, NATO's temporizing reply to the East Central Europeans' increasingly insistent demand to be folded into West Europe in a security sense. In many ways, it is but a warmed-over North Atlantic Cooperation Council (remember the NACC?), and East Central European leaders have not been shy in expressing their disappointment with the tentative nature of the Partnership and their unhappiness at the apparent deference being paid to Russia on this score. Recognizing that their leverage is weak, they are willing to accept the Partnership as a first step in an evolutionary process. They can be expected, however, to continue to press for a more binding commitment to full NATO membership, if the criteria set forth in the Partnership arrangement are met. As Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski put it: "We are being asked to talk like a duck and walk like a duck. When we finally convince NATO we are a duck, we do not want to be told that now they are looking for a goose."¹²

Conclusion

For a variety of reasons, however, NATO may not be the ideal or immediate means for pursuing such a multilateral approach. First, the Russians have made it clear that they still consider NATO to be an "enemy" alliance that they do not want extended to their doorstep. Second, France still considers NATO a tool for maintaining an American leadership role in Europe. Third, the United States appears reluctant to extend its nuclear deterrent to the countries of East Central Europe—an extension inherent in granting Article 5 NATO protection to those countries. One way around these NATO hang-ups would be to use the Western European Union as a means for proffering a security blanket to the East Central Europeans, a first, limited step being the 9 May 1994 granting of WEU "Associate Membership" to the countries of the area. The advantages mirror NATO's disadvantages. First, the WEU has neither the American nuclear arsenal nor the Cold War mantle of NATO and so should be less provocative to the Russians. Second, it is a European organization that should appeal more to France. Third, use of the

WEU, with its deepening links to the EU, would complement eventual EU membership for the East Central Europeans, thus meeting an important German policy objective. That leaves the Americans.

Such a course need not leave the Americans out—if the United States pursues a wise parallel course. First, prudence demands that NATO and American ties to Europe through it not be disturbed during this delicate period of reestablishing a balance in East Central Europe. Europeans should be the first to realize this, given the possibilities of the rise of communo-fascist nationalism in Russia or conflict between that country and Ukraine. Second, continued, increased American economic assistance is crucial to economic recovery and democratization in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Finally, however, Americans must realize that as much as the Germans continue to rely on us and, in particular, our nuclear weapons during this transitional phase toward a new order, a “special relationship” is in neither party’s interest. It would be far better for both to use our healthy bilateral relationship to carry the more necessary, more productive multilateral Euro-Atlantic relationship into the future.

Allowing our European allies the slack to proceed toward a European solution to the vacuum in East Central Europe may prove the ultimate test of American leadership over the next few years. It would buy us time to repair the economic and social fabric of our own country. It also would give us time to reconsider our interests vis-à-vis Europe and to reengage at some later point with renewed consensus and vigor. Finally, by forcing the Europeans to “do their own thing,” it could lead to the strengthening of a European pillar in an alliance in which burdens are more equitably shared and, eventually, perhaps even a pan-European collective security system¹³ that would involve both us and the Russians. Such a system—the ultimate balance—would not only fill the current vacuum in East Central Europe but end balance-of-power politics as we have known them on the Continent.

The achievement of such a European collective security system would contribute markedly to the possibility of a more meaningful global collective security system. It would enable a more secure Germany to contribute more equitably to the extra-European tasks inherent in the latter undertaking. It also would contribute to a solid building-block approach to global collective security, putting into place one of several regional components of an eventual global edifice. To the degree, moreover, that collective security can only work where—as in the Euro-Atlantic region—there are shared interests and understandings, it is the only way to proceed.

NOTES

1. With apologies to Daniel S. Hamilton, who apparently was the first to use the term “Berlin Republic” to mean post-unification Germany in his “Beyond Bonn: America and the Berlin Republic” (Report of the

Carnegie Endowment Study Group on Germany, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 1994). Labeling them by their respective capitals is probably as useful a way of delineating periods of German republican history as is the numbering of French republics for such French history.

2. "Divided detente" represented the German effort to insulate East-West German contacts from the ups and downs of US-Soviet relations. It was an effort that both the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) on the right and the Social Democrats (SPD) on the left supported with equal conviction. They both viewed it as being in the German interest.

3. Survey on the Bundeswehr in *Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 2 (1993), 172. These cuts are even more telling when one considers that a good portion of the current and upcoming budgets is expected to go for refurbishing some east German facilities and safely destroying other such facilities and vast stocks of equipment (see Wolfgang F. Schloer, "German Security Policy," *Adelphi Paper* 277 (1993), pp. 42 ff.).

4. The demographic pressures in this regard could be relieved somewhat by allowing in more ethnic Germans from Poland, Hungary, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. There are more than three million such people in the East.

5. Schloer, p. 52.

6. Of course, German politicians are not the only ones facing problems created by a large diaspora of ethnic kinsmen abroad. Russia also has a major and perhaps vital interest in the protection of more than 25 million ethnic Russians who found themselves stranded in Ukraine, the Baltic states, and elsewhere in the CIS after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The new foreign policy posits as one of six top priorities "protecting the rights, freedoms, dignity and welfare of Russians" in its "Near Abroad." (See "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document No. 1615/IS, 25 January 1993, FBIS-USR-93-037, 25 March 1993, pp. 3, 11, and 19.)

7. Schloer, p. 29.

8. Poles, in particular, are worried about the fate of Kaliningrad. They worry that a German reassertion of sovereignty there would put into question their sovereignty over the southern half of the former East Prussia. They worry, too, about Lithuanian claims to the enclave and the prospects for conflict raised by those claims. Finally, while the Polish government would prefer to see the status quo (i.e., Russian sovereignty) maintained, it is not at all happy about the size and composition of the buildup of Russian forces in Kaliningrad. For their part, the Russians contend that buildup represents only a temporary in-gathering of forces removed from bases in the Baltic states.

9. Making this task perhaps a little easier are recent signs of a less doctrinaire French attitude toward NATO and a concomitant willingness to engage in closer military cooperation with NATO.

10. The Visegrad countries are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

11. The result, *despite* the recession in Germany and a need to rebuild the eastern part of the country, is that the field is being left to Germany, which, given its proximity and earlier ties to East Central Europe, is quickly reestablishing its old market and its old banking dominance.

12. Stefan Olechowski, MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, WETA, 9 December 1993.

13. As Inis Claude has pointed out, "collective security is a term that easily lends itself to variant usages" ("Collective Security after the Cold War," in Inis Claude, Sheldon Simon, and Douglas Stuart, "Collective Security in Europe and Asia," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., 2 March 1992, p. 8).

I do not use the term here in the classic sense described by Claude and Morgenthau—i.e., an all-encompassing system of world order in which each and every member is automatically obligated to come unconditionally to the defense of any other member attacked by another renegade within the system. I have in mind, rather, a European regional security system so large as to encompass all meaningful powers with an overwhelming preponderance of power and a shared interest in enforcing a *Pax Europaea*. Obviously, going to war automatically against one's survival interest cannot be shared by anyone. Claude himself concludes that "the real choice [to act], however, is not between 'sometimes' and 'always' but between 'sometimes' and 'never.' Is there value in the possibility of collective measures under United Nations auspices in some cases, even if not in all? I believe that there is, and that the selective approach has merits." (Ibid., p. 24. Emphasis added.) For my part, I believe that the merits of collective security in this more limited sense were proven in Korea and in the Gulf War.

Collective security in this sense was also approached in the 19th century Concert of Europe, a balance of power writ large and with considerable staying power. While the achievement of such a state of affairs today would seem to fly in the face of Morgenthau's strongly worded contentions that "collective security cannot be made to work in the contemporary world as it must work according to its ideal assumptions" and that, under actual conditions, it "will not preserve peace, but will make war inevitable" (pp. 455-56), the "actual conditions" considered by Morgenthau—two alliances in a bipolar world—no longer exist.

US Military Ammunition Policy: Reliving the Mistakes of the Past?

JIM COURTER, L. STEVE DAVIS,
and LOREN B. THOMPSON

The current tensions in the Balkans, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Northeast Asia are a reminder that the threat of regional warfare is never far away. The Bottom-Up Review of US military strategy and requirements conducted by the Department of Defense in 1993 acknowledged this reality by making the ability to successfully wage two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs) a key measure for shaping the US force structure.¹ The possibility of having to prosecute two wars in rapid succession at widely separated locations also influences the Pentagon's plans for consolidating the defense industrial base.

In the case of Northeast Asia, the prospect of conflict between North Korea's atavistic communist dictatorship and the democratic Republic of Korea also should remind policymakers of a previous regional contingency, and of how poorly conceived US military and industrial plans for that war proved to be. The Korean War that took place from June 1950 until mid-1953 resulted in 33,652 American battle deaths, and produced some very important lessons about how not to prepare for military conflict. The purpose of this article is to focus on a single critical sector of the defense industrial base—the ammunition industry—and to consider present plans for its consolidation in light of the lessons of the Korean War.

The ammunition industry was selected because it is relatively small and unique, but also because its products are essential to the military effectiveness of systems manufactured by much bigger sectors of the defense industrial base. The Defense Department's total budget authority for conventional ammunition purchases in fiscal 1994 is \$1.36 billion,² meaning that the industry will eventually realize revenues from this year's budget equivalent to about three days of

business by the General Motors Corporation.³ Clearly, the ammunition industry is no behemoth. However, without its output, weapons such as the M-1 tank that cost billions of dollars to develop and produce would be useless.

The Korean War is considered here because it was the last "major regional contingency" in which the United States engaged that involved intense conventional warfare over a protracted period of time. Moreover, problems arose in the production and distribution of ammunition during the Korean War that illuminate the deficiencies in current munitions planning assumptions. Finally, there is a real danger that US forces may one day soon again find themselves at war on the Korean Peninsula. It is worth remembering the mistakes made during the last Korean conflict in order to avoid reliving them in a future one.

The Decline of the Ammunition Industry

The domestic ammunition industry consists of dozens of public and private facilities producing a vast array of end items, including small arms ammunition, cannon and artillery shells, bombs, grenades, rockets, mines, dispenser munitions, propellant charges, pyrotechnic devices, and explosives. The manufacture of most of these products is supervised by the Army's Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command, which is responsible for meeting the ammunition requirements of all the military services (except for a small portion of naval munitions). The command manages 246 ammunition end-items from its headquarters at Rock Island, Illinois. Impressive as this number is, it is less than half of the 590 end-items the Army's ammunition experts managed in the early 1990s, before drastic consolidation efforts were begun in response to shrinking budgets.⁴

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The pace of consolidation within the domestic ammunition base since 1992 has been so rapid that some observers have referred to it as a collapse. While it is true that procurement accounts in general have declined much faster than other categories of defense spending in recent years, few areas of procurement activity have been hit as hard as ammunition purchases. Between 1985 and 1994, the inflation-adjusted buying power of the Pentagon's procurement budgets fell by 64 percent, compared with a more moderate 34-percent decline for overall defense spending. During the same period, expenditures for ammunition declined 78 percent. As a result of this precipitous drop, 60 to 80 percent of all domestic ammunition workers have lost their jobs. Industry executives project that one quarter of the remaining workers will be laid off during 1994.⁵ By 1995, the government-owned portion of the ammunition base is expected to have fewer than 10,000 employees, compared to 26,000 in 1988.

A similar contraction has occurred in the number of plants producing military ammunition. The munitions industry contains three types of production facilities: government-owned, government-operated (GOGO); government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO); and contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO). GOGO and GOCO facilities generally produce propellants and explosives, and perform the final loading, assembly, and packaging of end-items. COCO facilities usually produce nonexplosive components such as metal shells and fuzes. About 70 percent of ammunition procurement budgets are spent on the latter activities.⁶

The number of both government-owned and contractor-owned facilities has shrunk considerably in recent years. In 1978 there were 286 privately owned plants involved in domestic ammunition production; that number fell to 88 in January 1994, and it is expected to decline to 52 in 1995. The 32 government-owned ammunition plants operating in 1978 were pared to 24 by January 1994 and will fall to 19 in 1995—only nine of which will be active. Thus, in 1995 the total number of operating production facilities in the ammunition industrial base will have dropped from 318 to 71—a 78-percent reduction in less than 20 years.⁷ Much of this contraction is due to necessary rationalization of an aging production base, but there is no question that the rapid consolidation of facilities in recent years is primarily a response to shrinking ammunition procurement budgets.

Despite the contraction in funding, facilities, and workforce, the ammunition industry retains a relatively large number of producers. A study prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in October 1993 counted 45 prime contractors and 132 key subcontractors still active in the business. This abundance of participants reflects the peculiar structure of the industry, which consists of scores of unique end-items manufactured in small quantities on dedicated production equipment for a wide range of applications. Because output is so diverse and production lots are so limited in size, there is seldom

more than one source for any given item. Further consolidation of the industry will be necessary to bring the number of producers into alignment with anticipated demand, but this process may well exacerbate the vulnerabilities inherent in having only one source—and in most cases only one production facility—for specific munitions.

Emerging Vulnerabilities in Ammunition

The expected contraction of the ammunition production base in response to shrinking procurement budgets has had some beneficial consequences. At the end of the Cold War, the munitions industry was burdened with a huge amount of excess capacity that clearly needed to be eliminated. Cutting the ammunition budget is one way to force government managers to think coherently about which production capabilities are essential and which are superfluous. Reduced demand also encourages marginal producers to abandon the business, so that only the most efficient suppliers remain.

The US Army went through just such a rationalization exercise in 1992. An internal study of the ammunition base concluded that it was “in critical condition and getting worse.”⁸ The study questioned whether, in its debilitated state, the base could meet the requirement to sustain US forces in two major regional contingencies. The Army subsequently decreased the number of end-items it was managing from 590 to 246, a 58-percent reduction designed to concentrate production efforts on those ammunition types truly relevant to future war requirements. A total of 198 production lines were declared excess, and 32,000 pieces of government-owned equipment were removed from the production base. New purchases of ammunition were restricted to established producers to encourage retention of a reasonably stable and competent supplier community.⁹ The rationalized ammunition base is much smaller, but also more sustainable given projected levels of demand for the remainder of the decade.

Unfortunately, ammunition budgets continued to decline after 1992 and are now so small that it is not certain an adequate base can be maintained for even the most essential munitions. As funding has diminished, Defense Department policies arguably have become less and less realistic about the requirements that the ammunition base might need to meet. The department no longer envisions the need to mobilize or surge ammunition production in response to a national emergency; instead it proposes to draw upon existing stockpiles of ammunition in the event of war, and then gradually replenish supplies once peace is restored. This approach will not work for at least two reasons: portions of the existing stockpile are poorly suited for fighting wars, and the production base is rapidly losing its capacity to replenish wartime consumption while keeping pace with peacetime needs.

The Elusive Stockpile. During the Cold War the US Army accumulated a huge stockpile of ammunition that is currently estimated to contain

“Ammunition budgets continued to decline after 1992 and are now so small that it is not certain an adequate base can be maintained for even the most essential munitions.”

two million tons of usable items. Present policy calls for the services to draw upon these supplies to prosecute the two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies described in the Bottom-Up Review. However, a careful analysis of the stockpile's contents reveals that most of these munitions could not reliably sustain US forces in wartime:¹⁰

- The largest category of stockpiled ammunition—nearly 30 percent of the total—is war reserve stocks for allies (WRSA) stored in Korea, Western Europe, and elsewhere. These munitions are set aside for use by allied forces in wartime and therefore probably would not be available to US forces; some of the WRSA munitions are no longer used in currently fielded US weapon systems.
- A second sizable component of the Army stockpile (about 25 percent of the total) is “applicable training” ammunition, meaning munitions that either were specifically designed for training or that have been in storage for so long that they are considered suitable only for training. Some of these munitions could be used to fight a war, but their reliability is so doubtful that they potentially could place US forces at risk.
- A third portion of the stockpile (also 25 percent) consists of so-called “discretionary” munitions which, while usable in wartime, are not as capable as the most modern ammunition types. Discretionary ammunition—also known as “substitute” ammunition—has less range and lethality than current-generation munitions, so it may require users to take greater risks in wartime; in addition, the reliability of discretionary rounds will become increasingly doubtful in the late 1990s due to their age.
- About 15 percent of the Army stockpile is made up of the most modern and capable munitions, which are known as “applicable go-to-war” munitions. These are the munitions that commanders would prefer to use in all combat engagements, because of their high performance and reliability.























































- The smallest category of stockpiled ammunition is "excess" supplies designated for demilitarization or transfer to friendly countries. None of the munitions in this category would be used in wartime by US forces.

Thus, it appears that only 40 percent of the Army's ammunition stockpile has any real relevance to war-fighting, and most of the munitions included in that smaller total are discretionary types that commanders would prefer not to use. But it is precisely that discretionary category of ammunition that constitutes the Defense Department's real reserve for fighting two nearly simultaneous contingencies. The 323,000 tons of munitions in the "applicable go-to-war" category represent less than the amount of ammunition sent to the Persian Gulf region in 1990-91 to prosecute Operation Desert Storm. Obviously, if a second Desert Storm-scale contingency occurred at the same time that US forces were at war elsewhere in the world, the Army would have no choice but to draw upon discretionary stocks.¹¹

That would not be a pleasant experience. In armored warfare, for example, it would require US forces to approach closer to enemy tanks before firing (due to the lesser range of discretionary ammunition), possibly putting US tanks within range of the enemy's guns. Many of the specific munitions types in the discretionary category lack the precision, penetration, and explosive power of advanced munitions, so the performance of US forces would almost certainly be degraded. What effect the awareness of these ammunition deficiencies might have on commanders' willingness to take risks is impossible to gauge, but the effect could hardly be positive.

It also should be kept in mind that each major category of munitions in the stockpile in turn consists of many subcategories and ammunition types. For some types of ammunition, the current stockpile is not adequate to support one major regional contingency, much less two. According to knowledgeable observers, the ammunition stockpiles of the other military services exhibit deficiencies similar to those of the Army.

The Eroding Production Base. Even if stockpiled munitions were fully sufficient to sustain two major regional contingencies—which they aren't—the ammunition industry still would be required to replenish munitions within a reasonable period of time after the cessation of hostilities. It can't. In 1992 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assessed the capacity of 35 industrial sectors to support recovery from a conflict. It rated the ammunition sector dead last in its ability to replace critical war supplies in an acceptable time frame and at an acceptable cost. Military ammunition budgets have declined steadily since FEMA conducted its assessment; since the productive capacity of the industry generally corresponds to budget levels (with a two-year time-lag from appropriations), it can be assumed that the production base has eroded further in the intervening years.¹²

Type	Desert Storm Performance	1992 Army Material Command Rating	Effect of 1994 Budget
Small Caliber			
20 mm			
25 mm			
50 cal			
30 mm			
40 mm			
Fuzes			
Mortars			
Tank			
Artillery			
Explosives			
Propellant			
Demo / Detonators			
Bombs			
Guided Missile Warheads			
Mines			
Ship Ammo			
Rockets			

Source: SAIC




 < 6 months
  6 - 12 months
  > 12 months

Figure 1. Lead-times to Fill Ammunition Requisitions

The rapid deterioration of the ammunition industrial base is reflected in a series of industry-funded studies prepared by the Science Applications International Corporation. One study tracked the increasing delays involved in filling requisitions for various types of essential ammunition by comparing the experience of Desert Storm in 1990-91 with the Army's ammunition base ratings in 1992 and the anticipated effect of the fiscal 1994 ammunition procurement budget. It found that whereas during Desert Storm requisitions in all categories of ammunition could be filled within a year, the effect of the 1994 budget would be to lengthen delivery times to more than a year for most ammunition types.¹³

A second study prepared by Science Applications International Corporation projected that the productive capacity of the ammunition industrial base would drop to \$3.6 billion in 1994 dollars by the turn of the century, less than a third of its \$11 billion capacity in the mid-1980s. It calculated that even if capacity normally used to meet civilian ammunition needs is included, total capacity will be considerably less than required to meet the consumption and replenishment demand generated by two major regional contingencies. In fact, shortages in certain categories of ammunition are likely if only one regional contingency occurs.¹⁴

All such projections are based upon problematical assumptions and are scenario-dependent. Nonetheless, pessimism about the capacity of the ammunition industrial base to meet future requirements is clearly warranted:

- Ammunition procurement budgets are not likely to rise above the current, very low amounts for the rest of the 1990s; the productive capacity of the ammunition industrial base therefore probably will stabilize at levels where there is little excess that can be applied to unanticipated needs.
- Most of the munitions that are essential to warfighting are unique to the military. The skills and equipment needed to produce them do not exist in readily transferable form in the commercial marketplace.
- The majority of military ammunition types are now manufactured by single sources at single sites; catastrophic accidents, explosions, or sabotage therefore could completely shut down the production of essential munitions for a significant period of time.
- Modern munitions are more complex than those used in the past; the demanding specifications, wide range of skills, advanced equipment, and extensive array of materials needed to manufacture them all increase the potential for delays in initiating or accelerating production.
- Laws regulating the handling of hazardous materials have proliferated in recent years; compliance with these laws would almost certainly slow efforts to increase ammunition production.

With all of these factors at work, it is possible to imagine circumstances in which the conduct of a future war could be disrupted by ammunition shortages. However, there is no need to be imaginative, because just such a problem nearly occurred during the Korean War. The Korean experience offers useful insights into the current dilemmas of ammunition planning and policy.

The Lessons of Korea

When North Korea invaded the South on 24 June 1950, it presented the United States with its first major regional military contingency of the postwar period. Although US military forces were poorly prepared to wage conventional warfare in Korea, President Truman decided not to use the atomic bomb, preferring instead to respond in a manner proportional to the scale of communist aggression. Fortunately, the unfolding conflict seemed to provide US and South Korean defenders with several advantages. North Korea's weapons generally were no match for those of the United States, and the configuration of the Korean peninsula made it readily accessible to US naval and air forces. Moreover, Korea was only a hundred miles from Japan, where General Douglas MacArthur commanded the largest concentration of US forces outside the continental United States, including four Army divisions.¹⁵

One issue that received relatively little attention initially was whether ammunition supplies would be adequate to prosecute the war. The United States had produced 20 million tons of ammunition during World War II, and a sizable portion of that output remained in military stockpiles in 1950. For example, the week that hostilities broke out in Korea, the US Army had on hand over six million rounds of its standard 155mm howitzer ammunition. In addition, it had retained an infrastructure for producing ammunition valued at over \$2 billion, including 14 loading plants, 12 powder and explosive works, and three shell factories. When combined with relevant private-sector facilities, this substantial production base seemed capable of meeting any demand generated by the Korean conflict once stocks were depleted.¹⁶

The stocks for many tactical rounds were so extensive that there was doubt about the need to gear up for production at all. In October 1950, when military planners were preparing a supplemental appropriation request to pay for the war effort, stockpile managers estimated that they had a four-year supply of 155mm rounds on hand and a three-year supply of 105mm rounds, based on past experience with wartime consumption rates. Since few planners expected the war to last that long, a paltry \$374 million was requested for ammunition—primarily to begin the process of mobilizing the production base.¹⁷

However, optimism about munitions reserves soon faded, and within a few months there was growing concern that units in Korea might face crippling shortages. The turning point came in November 1950, when Communist China entered the war. This widened the scope and intensity of the conflict, leading to a surge in demand for most ammunition types. Consumption of ammunition over the next two years far exceeded the rate planners had expected as outnumbered US and South Korean forces relied heavily on firepower to compensate for their numerical inferiority. For instance, during the battle of Soyang in mid-May 1951, 21 artillery battalions supporting the X Corps fired 309,958 rounds in seven days, well over a thousand tons of ammunition per day. In late August and early September of the same year, fighting near Inje resulted in the use of more than a million rounds of 105mm and 155mm ammunition in only 15 days.¹⁸

Even the vast stockpiles of ammunition left over from World War II would not sustain these consumption rates for very long. New production would be needed, and quickly. Unfortunately, the ammunition production base was in no condition to manufacture large quantities of munitions anytime soon. Although the government-owned portion of the base was worth more than \$2 billion, only one percent of that amount had been spent on maintaining it each year, and most plants were manned by skeleton crews that would need to be supplemented by newly trained workers. Appropriations for ammunition production during 1946-1950 had averaged less than \$30 million per year, hardly enough to maintain a warm industrial base. Production during 1949 and 1950

had been limited almost entirely to small quantities for new weapons, munitions that obviously were not available in the World War II reserves.¹⁹

When the danger of ammunition shortfalls became apparent, appropriations for new production were greatly increased. Total ammunition procurement funding in fiscal 1951 rose to \$2.1 billion, far above the \$36 million of the preceding year. A further \$1.1 billion was appropriated in 1952, and \$1.9 billion in 1953. But it took time for these large appropriations to translate into actual output. Not only was the production base cold but the civilian workforce was fully engaged in other pursuits. A major steel strike and lack of capacity in the machine tool industry combined with the government's lethargic contracting procedures to delay production by many months.²⁰

Colonel John B. Medaris of the Army's ordnance division shed some light on the cause of the delays in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 10 March 1953. Medaris explained that "in the establishment of new producers of major components we may properly anticipate that the time from appropriation to first production may be as much as eighteen months." This was bad enough, but Medaris went on to note that "contracts for the production of some such items may be placed, in some cases, almost a year after the appropriation became available." Medaris concluded that it could take "as much as two and a half years, or sometimes more, after the appropriation" before actual production occurred. This meant some munitions that Congress appropriated money for only weeks after North Korea invaded the South in the summer of 1950 might not find their way to front-line units until early 1953.²¹

Luckily, that was a worst-case scenario. New production of most ammunition types took less time, and shortages of munitions at the front were due more to imbalances in consumption and distribution than to a shortage of operational reserves. The few supply-driven shortfalls that did arise were confined primarily to new ammunition types, rather than the standard tactical rounds in the reserves.²² Thus it appears that there was no time during the conflict when the war effort was significantly impeded by shortages in the supply of ammunition. But it could have been:

- If the pace of hostilities witnessed in 1951 had continued into 1952 and 1953, ammunition shortages almost certainly would have resulted.
- If the military services had not inherited such a large reserve of ammunition from World War II, production delays would have caused shortages at the front.
- If the war had occurred in the mid-1950s rather than the early 1950s, the stockpile would have been less reliable, the production base more debilitated, and the availability of necessary skills doubtful.

- If a second major regional contingency had occurred at the same time Korea was being fought, or shortly thereafter, the military services probably would have lacked the ammunition needed to fight it effectively.

The latter point is particularly important in light of current ammunition policies. Many of the assumptions guiding ammunition procurement during the early stages of the Korean conflict proved to be wrong. What if these errors had been compounded by the outbreak of a second conflict elsewhere in the world? Secretary of the Army Frank Pace offered this opinion in an appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 7 May 1952: "If we are called upon to help counter one or more other limited communist aggressions elsewhere in the world while we are still engaged in Korea, or even shortly after the war there might end, we will not be able to bring immediate and effective military pressure to bear."²³ Awareness of this danger undoubtedly influenced US policymakers' perceptions of their options during the early years of the Eisenhower Administration. It may have made them less likely to engage in military activities—or more likely to use the atomic bomb.

It is not hard to see the implications of the Korea experience for modern ammunition planners. Clausewitz's concept of friction has as much relevance for logisticians and procurement managers as it does for operational military commanders. Wars seldom occur when and where they are expected. They seldom unfold as anticipated. They frequently make demands on the industrial base that are not reflected in war plans, and efforts to satisfy those demands are often disrupted by unforeseen budgetary, regulatory, technological, and managerial problems. Because so many things can go wrong, and usually do, it is essential that policymakers not engage in wishful thinking about what war will require. The more optimistic plans are, the more likely they are to go awry. Regrettably, the Defense Department's plans for providing US military forces with ammunition in two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies are beginning to look very optimistic indeed.

Conclusion: Avoiding the Mistakes of the Past

The Defense Department's present approach to ammunition planning and procurement is short-sighted and risks disaster in a future conflict. The existing ammunition stockpile is not adequate to sustain US forces in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, and the industrial base is being allowed to deteriorate to a point where it cannot cover shortages in a timely manner. Unanticipated problems that arose in the consumption and production of ammunition during the Korean War demonstrate the danger of relying too heavily on ammunition reserves or overestimating the responsiveness of the industrial base. To paraphrase philosopher George Santayana, these are mistakes that current US policymakers must either recognize or be doomed to repeat.

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to ammunition planning and procurement
is short-sighted and risks disaster
in a future conflict."***

The main reason that the ammunition industrial base has been allowed to deteriorate is to save money. Although many policymakers realize that ammunition accounts are not being adequately funded, they have accepted the current state of affairs because they have more pressing budgetary priorities and the threat to US national security is greatly diminished. However, the lesson of the Korean conflict is that threats can arise rapidly and unexpectedly, while the consequences of bad policies can take years to reverse. It therefore makes little sense to starve ammunition accounts in order to fund other activities; these accounts consume a very small share of total defense spending and yet they are essential to the wartime effectiveness of many of the nation's most costly weapon systems.

In order to prevent further erosion of US ammunition capabilities, three basic steps must be taken. First of all, more money must be spent on procuring modern munitions. Fiscal 1994 funding for all ammunition types for all three military services stands at about one-half of one percent of the defense budget. This amount is not enough to meet peacetime training requirements, much less bolster war reserves.²⁴ Depressed budget levels will inevitably lead to diminished surge and replenishment capability. Massive increases in ammunition spending are not necessary; but when expenditures for all ammunition procurement fall far below one percent of the defense budget, it is a likely sign that munitions are not receiving the level of resources that they require.

A second step that must be taken is for federal regulatory agencies to permit greater flexibility in the consolidation of the ammunition base. The ammunition sector currently contains too many producers to be supported by projected levels of demand, and further rationalization of excess capacity is therefore necessary. The Defense Science Board recently completed a review of antitrust policy that led it to recommend changes in the way the Defense Department interacts with the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission in considering corporate mergers and acquisitions.²⁵ If implemented, these changes should alleviate the problems that some ammunition producers have faced in trying to form more robust business combinations.

A final, truly essential step is for defense decisionmakers to be more realistic about the requirements that future conflicts might impose on the industrial base. The national military strategy and defense planning guidance must provide a sensible industrial base requirement for ammunition. The present approach of relying on reserves in wartime and replenishing after hostilities have ceased is typical of the flawed policymaking that occurs when threats are diminished and decisionmakers are not thinking clearly about future challenges to national security. New threats eventually will arise, and when they do the policy of not even trying to maintain an ammunition surge capability will have to be changed. It would make more sense to preserve an adequate ammunition base today, rather than having to undertake a costly reconstitution effort in the future.

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6. *Updated Ammunition Production Base Planning and Restructuring Study* (Rock Island, Ill.: US Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command, July 1993), p. 19.
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15. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 382-85.
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18. James A. Houston, *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Cranbury, N.J.: Associated Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 160-62.
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20. Ibid.
21. *Ammunition Supplies in the Far East*, pp. 104-05.
22. Houston, pp. 164-66.
23. See also *ibid.*, p. 165.
24. Warson, p. 8.
25. "DoD Announces The Release of The Defense Science Board Antitrust Task Force Report," Department of Defense news release 185-94 (Washington: Department of Defense, 12 April 1994).

Downfall: The Invasion that Never Was

WAYNE A. SILKETT

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It would have been the greatest amphibious invasion in history, followed potentially by the most gruesome land operations of all time. Fortunately for hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers and sailors and for millions of Japanese, atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 6 and 9 August 1945 convinced the Japanese government to surrender, and Strategic Plan Downfall passed mercifully into history without implementation.

The earliest high-level American mention of a conceivable invasion of Japan dates from May 1942.¹ Even then, however, some American planners seriously doubted that invasion would ever be necessary.

Long before the war, American naval strategists in general believed that should war come, Japan could be defeated by air and sea power alone. Among them were Admirals Ernest King, William Leahy, and Chester Nimitz.² Indeed, in the 1920s and 1930s in countless war games at the Naval War College, hypothetical war with Japan almost always resulted in Japan giving up without invasion: strangled by naval blockade.³

As Army Air Corps strategy gradually developed, focused by the airpower visions of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell, many air strategists, too, believed war with Japan could be won without an invasion. As war in the Pacific unfolded, more and more navy and air proponents concluded invasion might well be unnecessary.

But while most Army and Marine Corps strategists hoped invasion could be avoided, by 1944 and 1945 few had much faith it would be. For them, Japanese surrender would be forced only by massive amphibious invasion and consequent ground operations.

Basic service beliefs aside, in June 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) adopted the invasion of Japan as an American strategic goal. By spring 1945, most senior American planners were fundamentally opposed to any but American participation in any invasion of the Japanese home islands. The

most outspoken of these were General Douglas MacArthur, General "Hap" Arnold of the Army Air Forces, and Admiral Ernest King.⁴ Of the three, General MacArthur was most convinced of the surety of an invasion to compel Japan's surrender. Nevertheless, should one be necessary, there was very limited American military desire for a combined operation.

Gradually, however, political considerations prevailed and a summer 1945 British offer for a role in the anticipated invasion met with "agreement in principle" at Potsdam.⁵ Admiral King, however, remained steadfastly and unalterably opposed. The American Joint Chiefs were unenthusiastic about similar French and Dutch bids to participate and brushed them aside as impractical.⁶

Although the invasion was intended as the final significant military operation of World War II, the planning for Downfall would not include unity of command. That should not be surprising. Throughout the Pacific War, there had never been a single supreme commander. In fact, throughout the entire war Asia and the Pacific were divided into three distinct area commands: Southeast Asia Command (Admiral Louis Mountbatten, British Royal Navy), Southwest Pacific Area (General MacArthur), and Pacific Ocean Areas (Admiral Nimitz).

The "long-smoldering question of Pacific command" complicated Downfall planning from the beginning.⁷ On 17 December 1944, General MacArthur cautioned General Marshall that "Naval forces should serve under Naval Command and that the Army should serve under Army command."⁸ Fundamentally, while top Army and Navy commanders saw nothing amiss about exercising command over counterpart forces, none were willing to accept being commanded by the other. Accordingly, when the US Navy recommended that Fleet Admiral Nimitz be the overall commander, the Army strenuously objected.

By early 1945, the tug of war between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz over South Pacific service troop employment and misunderstandings over Philippine base development "seemed ample proof" to the Army that Army forces could not be most effectively used if *any* were under command other than MacArthur's.⁹ Shortly afterward, MacArthur criticized Nimitz's handling of the Okinawa Campaign and the "awful way" he had squandered thousands of American casualties to take the whole island when, in MacArthur's view, only the airfields were necessary.¹⁰

The Army alternative, eventually adopted, called for Nimitz to command naval forces and operations, MacArthur to command ground forces

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and operations, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the strategic bombing effort (Twentieth Air Force's B-29s). As General Arnold explained after the war, he could not give the B-29s to General MacArthur nor to Admiral Nimitz as this would give the recipient the capability to "be out in front of the other."¹¹ The JCS—if not the President—would resolve any conflicts among the services. Although overruled, Admiral King continued to insist on unified command—under Admiral Nimitz.

The Invasion Plan

In early April 1945 the JCS issued directives for an air and sea blockade to reduce Japanese air and naval strength prior to and in support of an invasion.¹² On 28 May 1945, General Headquarters, US Army Forces in the Pacific, circulated Strategic Plan Downfall to senior Army and Navy commanders. Downfall was not a lengthy document, only 13 pages without annexes. Its purpose was to serve "as a general guide covering the larger phases of allocation of means and of coordination in order to facilitate planning and implementation."¹³

Downfall was to incorporate two principal phases of operations. The first, Operation Olympic, envisioned the invasion of Kyushu, southernmost of Japan's four main islands. From there, land-based air forces would support the second phase, Operation Coronet, the knockout blow to the enemy heartland, the Tokyo area on Honshu. With major ground operations scheduled to begin on X-Day, 1 November 1945, Downfall was expected to last 18 months, or until May 1947. A few months later, at the Potsdam Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (the supreme Anglo-American military staff), approved 15 November 1946 as the anticipated date for the end of organized Japanese resistance.¹⁴

To carry out and support the invasion, planners foresaw the participation of 4.5 million Allied military personnel. Japanese defenders, some four million in number, would be spread throughout China and the last remnants of the empire, with just over half of them in the home islands.

Operation Downfall would involve four US field armies, the Sixth in Olympic and the Eighth, Tenth, and First in Coronet. The invasion of Japan would require all 21 US Army and six Marine Corps divisions in the Pacific, with no less than two to five armored and 13 infantry divisions to be transferred from Europe. By war's end, Coronet plans also included a British Commonwealth corps of three to five divisions, to operate under American command.

Operation Olympic would begin with the US Navy Fifth Fleet under Admiral Raymond Spruance launching a three-pronged attack on southern Kyushu. Preliminary assault lift for Olympic, sufficient "to float" 12 divisions—up from the original eight—configured at 33,000 personnel and 50,750 dead-weight tons each (figures included corps and army troops and equipment), ran to more than 1300 ships. Estimates called for 20 amphibious force flagships, 210 attack transports, 12 transports, 84 attack cargo ships, 92 high speed transports,




Figure 1. Concept for Operation Downfall

three transports configured for evacuation of wounded, 515 landing ships tank, 16 landing ships dock, 360 landing ships medium, and six landing ships vehicle.

Naval air support from more than 1900 planes would come from 22 US Navy fleet, large, and medium aircraft carriers plus ten carriers from the British Royal Navy. Included were eight escort carriers carrying Marine Corps ground support aircraft. General George Kenney's Far Eastern Air Force (5th, 7th, and 13th Air Forces plus the 2d Marine Air Wing), operating from the Ryukyus, would also support the landings and subsequent operations. His total of more than 2800 aircraft included 40 ground-based Army and Marine air groups. Naval gunfire ships were to be designated by CINCPAC,¹⁵ providing Spruance with amphibious and covering forces of more than 2700 vessels.

The B-29 strategic bomber force (20th Air Force, Lieutenant General Nathan Twining) would continue to bomb strategic targets but would be prepared to operate in direct support of Olympic if so ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Operation Olympic

Between X-75 and X-8, Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet, a powerful mobile striking force including 17 aircraft carriers, eight fast battle-

ships, 20 cruisers, and 75 destroyers, would hit Japanese targets throughout the home islands, then move away from the Kyushu area and continue against other Japanese targets.

On 27 and 28 October 1945, in a preliminary operation, the 40th Infantry Division would assault six islands west and southwest of Kyushu. Additionally, the 158th Regimental Combat Team (separate) would be prepared to land on the largest island off Kyushu, Tanega Shima, also on the 27th, if required. Seizure of these islands would clear sea lanes west of Kyushu and provide vital sites for early warning radars and fighter direction facilities for contending with anticipated kamikaze attacks.

Three days later, General Walter F. Krueger's Sixth Army would begin Operation Olympic by conducting amphibious landings on Kyushu proper, defended by the Japanese Sixteenth Army, which consisted of 14 infantry divisions and two armored brigades. It would have been the first time in the war that American forces faced a Japanese field army.

In addition to the Japanese Sixteenth Army, Olympic planners anticipated furious resistance by up to 9000 kamikazes, the suicide planes first encountered in the Philippines, which had figured so prominently in the Fifth Fleet's loss of 36 vessels sunk and 368 damaged at Okinawa. Naval planners also expected fierce assaults by midget submarines, suicide boats, and human torpedoes, plus suicidal attacks by the Imperial Japanese Navy's few remaining submarines and destroyers.

The X-Day (1 November 1945) and follow-on missions of the major elements of Krueger's Sixth Army are summarized below. The US V Marine Amphibious Corps, 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions under Major General Harry Schmidt, would assault the west side of Kyushu, south of Kushikino, to seize the port of Kagoshima and prevent enemy movement along the west coast. Intelligence estimated they would encounter two infantry divisions, possibly reinforced by two more.

East of V Marine Amphibious Corps, the XI Corps, 1st Cavalry, 43d Infantry, and the 23d (Americal) Divisions under Lieutenant General Charles P. Hall, would land at Ariake Bay, south of Shibushi, and seize an airfield. Intelligence estimated initial Japanese opposition at one infantry division. XI Corps would then advance inland to link up with I Corps, landed north of it.

I Corps, 25th, 33d, and 41st Infantry Divisions under Major General Innis P. Swift, would land near Miyazaki to seize airfields and block movement south along the east coast. Intelligence assessed they would encounter three infantry divisions and a tank brigade. Once linked with the XI Corps, both would advance north on the eastern side of Kyushu, with the V Marine Amphibious Corps advancing north on the western side.

The IX Corps, 77th, 81st, and 98th Infantry Divisions, would conduct feints towards Shikoku between 30 October and 1 November to divert

enemy attention, then revert to Sixth Army reserve. IX Corps was to be prepared for actual commitment to action on or about X+3.

Once initial objectives were taken and all corps were advancing northward, engineers from all services would work on airfields, ports, and other installations to support the second phase of Downfall, invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

Operation Coronet

Assuming satisfactory progress and establishment of air bases for support of subsequent operations, Operation Coronet would tentatively commence on Y-Day, 1 March 1946. Less fully developed than Olympic, plans for the Honshu operation nevertheless recognized the vital importance of the Tokyo Plain to the Japanese war effort.

Covering some 5500 square miles, the Tokyo Plain was the seat of the Japanese government and the communications center for the home islands, had the best port facilities in Japan, and contained half of Japan's defense industry. In addition, the area offered numerous suitable landing beaches and, for the first time in the Pacific War, afforded maneuver room for American mechanized and armored forces.

Coronet called for the US Eighth Army under Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger to attack through Sagami Bay. Eighth Army was to have X Corps (three infantry divisions), Major General Franklin C. Sibert; XIV Corps (three infantry divisions), Lieutenant General Oscar W. Griswold; and XIII Corps (13th and 20th Armored Divisions from Europe), Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem.

US Tenth Army under General Joseph W. Stilwell would simultaneously attack east of Tokyo Bay along the Boso Peninsula. Tenth Army would consist of III Marine Amphibious Corps (1st, 4th, and 6th Marine Divisions), Lieutenant General Roy Geiger and XXIV Corps (three infantry divisions), Lieutenant General J. R. Hodges.

Both field armies would concentrate on isolating and taking Tokyo. US First Army (one airborne and ten infantry divisions), General Courtney H. Hodges, would be in floating reserve. Additional American divisions were to be available and transported from the United States or Europe as needed, on the basis of four per month. Eventually, a Commonwealth Corps of at least one Canadian, one Indian, and one Australian division would be assigned to Tenth Army. Thus, no less than 28 allied divisions, including two armored, were earmarked for Coronet, along with 3500 warships, and 7000 land and carrier-based aircraft. Coronet would constitute the largest amphibious operation of all time.

Japanese defenders on Honshu were expected to include the Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Armies, totaling over 40 infantry and armored divisions plus naval and air personnel organized to fight as ground

forces. Intelligence analysts anticipated Japanese air assets, orthodox combat aircraft and kamikazes, would have been largely expended defending against Olympic, and for Coronet would probably not exceed 2000.

Senior US ground planners were confident that taking Tokyo would compel unconditional surrender. But in the event the Japanese continued to resist, the Joint Chiefs of Staff planned for up to 22 divisions to deal with defenders west and north of Tokyo, operations to begin on or about 1 July 1946.

Expectations of Fierce Fighting

Bitter as all fighting in the Pacific Theater had been, no one expected the tempo to diminish with the invasion of the home islands. Unlike the invasion of Germany, which had seen, at least in the West, tens of thousands of Germans surrender rather than fight to the last, American planners expected the invasion of Japan to result in desperate, unparalleled ferocity.

In November 1943, the Second Marine Division suffered 3381 casualties in 76 hours on Tarawa. Of the 4836-man Japanese garrison, all but 17 died.¹⁶ Ten months later, the First Marine Division suffered 6526 casualties and the Army's 81st Infantry Division another 1393 taking Peleliu. Except for 19 Japanese taken prisoner, all in the 10,900 man garrison were killed.¹⁷

In the Philippines, the US Sixth Army during the Luzon Campaign suffered almost 41,000 casualties; in the Visayan-Southern Islands Campaign, the US Eighth Army endured 12,000.¹⁸ At Iwo Jima, Fifth Amphibious Corps took 25,000 killed and wounded while Tenth Army on Okinawa suffered almost 40,000.¹⁹

Japanese losses were even more staggering: 242,000 killed in the Philippines; over 21,000 on Iwo Jima; over 110,000 on Okinawa. Although essentially a World War I army with medieval overtones, the Japanese again and again proved themselves capable of spellbinding resistance, the rank and file stubbornly, almost exclusively, preferring death to capture. Thus, prisoner counts in early operations were negligible, such as the 17 on Tarawa. By the end of 1943, Japanese prisoners of war in American control amounted to barely 600.

But by October 1944, American forces had accounted for 4435 Japanese prisoners.²⁰ Ten thousand more Japanese were captured in the Philippines (of 252,000); 212 on Iwo Jima (out of almost 22,000); and 7400 on Okinawa (out of 118,000).²¹ Despite this evidence of an apparent willingness of some Japanese to surrender, few American planners and no assault troops were optimistic that invasion of Japan would result in wholesale Japanese surrender.

In April 1945, basing their work on seven amphibious campaigns, Joint Chiefs of Staff planners calculated that the casualty rate in the Pacific Theater was 7.45 per thousand per day while in Europe it was 2.16. Optimists argued that the sheer size of the Japanese home islands compared with

the generally much smaller island objectives throughout the Pacific war would keep casualties down by permitting greater maneuver and the massing of artillery and air power to reduce the stiffest defenses.

Pessimists, however, simply pointed out that as the war had progressed, so had the ferocity of the Japanese defenders, despite ever-increasing numbers of Japanese who surrendered. Troops in assault units could expect only the worst. American casualties at Iwo Jima had been 30 percent, including 19 out of 27 infantry battalion commanders. But sound as the April 1945 JCS study was, it did not incorporate data from the 83-day Okinawa campaign.

Bitter as every Pacific battle had been, none was more fierce, and nowhere else were US losses as high, as on Okinawa. There casualties were 35 percent. The 29th Marine Regiment alone suffered 80 percent killed and wounded, the highest American regimental loss rate since the Civil War.²³ And Kyushu, planners soon learned, had terrain strikingly similar to that of Okinawa.

By far the most speculative feature of Downfall has always been the expected casualties. In June 1945, President Truman told the JCS he wanted to avoid another Okinawa "from one end of Japan to the other." Olympic planners initially estimated a minimum of 36,000 hospital beds would be needed in the objective area.²⁴ Admiral King confidently and optimistically predicted Olympic casualties would equate to those experienced on Luzon and Okinawa—about 40,000. Few ground force planners, however, shared King's faith. In July, General Marshall suggested that Allied losses could easily reach 500,000; after the war, Omar Bradley said as high as one million—more men than were earmarked for the invasion in the first place.

To be sure, the most hardened Japanese advocates of fighting to the last counted on the 2,350,000 Japanese forces in the home islands supplemented by 4,000,000 army and navy civilian employees, and a civilian militia of 28,000,000, to be armed with muzzle-loading rifles, bamboo spears, and bows and arrows, all to give good account of themselves.

Had Operation Downfall been implemented, Japan could have counted on no reinforcements from the Asian mainland. True to their Yalta Conference commitment to enter the war against Japan 90 days after Germany's surrender, Soviet forces smashed into the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria on 8 August. But even if they hadn't, US Navy submarines would have continued their inexorable pressure on the home islands through attacks on such shipping assets as the Japanese still possessed.

Then Came the Surrender

Until the first atomic bomb was tested, 16 July 1945, and the first one detonated over Hiroshima on 6 August, US planners could only draw up conventional operations and prepare accordingly. Thus, by the first week of

August, 28 American divisions—17 in the Philippines, five in the Ryukyus, three in the Marianas, and three in Hawaii—were staging for Downfall. Among their number was the 86th Infantry Division, the first of no less than 15 to 18 divisions scheduled to arrive from the European Theater.²⁵

But with the atomic bomb came hope that invasion might not be necessary. Nevertheless, there was no guarantee that even the atomic bomb would compel surrender. Although unimaginably destructive, atomic bombs were incredibly costly to make and available in very small numbers: only two for operations in August 1945. Had they failed to force Japanese surrender, General Marshall envisioned using up to nine more nuclear weapons, if they could be made available in time, to support Olympic.²⁶

Since Downfall was never implemented, comparisons with the reigning largest amphibious invasion—Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy in June 1944—while they may be invidious, are also inevitable. Downfall would have involved more men, ships, and aircraft than Overlord, all transported over vastly greater distances. Overlord's strategic surprise, magnified immeasurably by the Allied gamble in the face of dubious weather, would probably not have been repeated. Nor would Downfall have had Overlord's advantage of facing a determined foe in an operational environment that was at best friendly, at worst neutral.

The atomic bomb unquestionably nullified the need for Downfall by hastening Japan to unconditional surrender. As the historic record was later to demonstrate, the Japanese had amassed a formidable array of defenses. In addition, the devastating typhoon of October 1945 would have wrought havoc upon the Fifth and Third Fleets, certainly disrupting if not postponing Olympic. Five months later, heavy snowfall on Honshu would have slowed down Coronet, especially for troops unaccustomed to cold-weather operations.

Few things are more fascinating yet less satisfying than asking "what if?" and speculating about an invasion of Japan is no exception. However, it seems clear that without the atomic bomb and the Soviet Union in the war, nothing short of invasion would have compelled Japan to surrender.

On 2 September 1945, elements of the United States Navy sailed into Tokyo Harbor for the formal surrender ceremony. Although the US Army and Navy each wanted to take the Japanese surrender, true to the arrangement that would have carried out the invasion that never was, the surrender spectacle was a compromise: General MacArthur signed for the Allied Powers; Admiral Nimitz for the United States of America—aboard the United States Navy battleship *Missouri*.²⁷

The war had not been without serious miscalculations and botched operations; the invasion of Japan would not have been without such flaws either. To the hundreds of thousands of American troops who didn't have to endure that invasion, the way the war did end was the least of their worries.

William Manchester was in a San Diego naval hospital recovering from having been severely wounded on Okinawa when a nurse informed him of the Japanese surrender. "Thank you," he said. "I meant it. I was really very grateful, though why, and for what, I didn't tell."²⁸

NOTES

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11. Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1949), p. 348.
12. William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 245.
13. Cover letter from GHQ, US Army Forces in the Pacific, dated 28 May 1945, in "Downfall" Strategic Plan, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
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20. George G. Lewis and John Mewha, *History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1945* (Washington: US Army, 1982), p. 247.
21. *Ibid.* Distinctions, however, must be drawn between total prisoners and those who actually surrendered. Prisoner totals counted badly wounded as well as the normally small number who physically capitulated.
22. Hayes, p. 702.
23. Heinl, pp. 491-92. At Gettysburg, 2 July 1863, the 1st Minnesota Infantry took 82 percent casualties.
24. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, *Basic Plan for Olympic Operation*, no date, Annex 4, p. 9.
25. In July 1945, the 2d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 44th, 95th, and 104th Infantry Divisions deployed from Europe to the United States for transit to the Pacific. These were followed in August by the 28th Infantry and 20th Armored divisions. Although the end of the war altered subsequent arrangements, the 13th Armored and 35th, 83d, 87th, 91st, and 97th Infantry divisions were slated for Downfall action. The 97th Division did deploy to Japan in October for brief occupation duty, becoming only the second American division to see service in both major theaters of war. See Gordon R. Young, *The Army Almanac* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1959), pp. 651-690.
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Commentary & Reply

PEACEKEEPING BY CONTRACT?

To the Editor:

You have done a service by highlighting the work of peacekeeping with the collection of articles in the Spring 1994 issue of *Parameters*. Peacekeeping is one of many unglamorous but necessary missions that the Army and other services perform even while they train and prepare for the missions they perceive to be the most critical or favored.

In "UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half," John F. Hillen III has described the philosophical and practical problems that the Army has with the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The quote from Professor Charles Moskos at the beginning of the article, "Peacekeeping isn't a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it," sums up the situation succinctly.

Why should soldiers do the job? What have the Army and other services done with other missions that they really didn't care to perform but could not escape? What do other large organizations do when they can't avoid performing some task? The answer is that they hire someone else better suited to do the job. Contractors currently perform an increasing array of jobs for the Department of Defense for exactly that reason. With the current severe uniformed manpower ceilings and budget limitations, this practice is increasingly attractive. Why not contract out peacekeeping services at the DOD level?

One might object to contractors appearing to act as mercenaries or military representatives of a sovereign power. But if peacekeeping is truly not peacemaking, then diplomatic, civil affairs, and police skills will be most important. To the degree that a soldier's skills are necessary, the peacekeeping contractor can hire any of the half million Americans who left the service in the last five years.

Contractors performed numerous services in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, including important maintenance and repair work on technically sophisticated combat systems. There is no reason why contractors cannot serve as peacekeepers and thrive on the work, while permitting the Army and the other services to concentrate on their combat missions. The Army is a can-do organization, but it does not have to be a must-do-everything-conceivably-related-to-combat organization. This option should have been a part of Mr. Hillen's discussion.

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas O. Fleck, USA Ret.
Creve Coeur, Missouri

The Author Replies:

Colonel Fleck makes an interesting suggestion which stems from the fact that peacekeeping often involves individual duties more akin to police and diplomatic work than soldier skills. However, in the course of the 30 observation, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement operations conducted by the UN since 1948,

it has been almost impossible to clearly delineate peacekeeping duties by combat and non-combat. For instance, the UN missions conducted in the Congo, the Middle East, and more recently in Somalia and the Balkans, could have originally been conducted by aid agencies and civil servants with "rent-a-cop" protection. However, the unstable environment in these and other missions deteriorated quickly into situations where well-trained combat soldiers were needed and lives were lost.

Imagine the practical difficulties of a contractor attempting to coordinate close air support with NATO aircraft in Bosnia in the event of hostilities. Better that a soldier sit bored in the Sinai for eight months and be trained for a combat contingency than a contractor be caught unawares in these unstable environments. An important characteristic of the nation-state is that it has a monopoly on the use of armed forces. The service member's oath represents a contract which could include making the ultimate sacrifice in the recognized service of the state. To "contract out" peacekeeping duties that could turn into combat missions in a flash would not only deny an important covenant between state and armed forces, but be operationally impracticable as well.

John F. Hillen III

ON THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF LIC

To the Editor:

The book reviews in the Spring 1994 edition of *Parameters* present the argument that "low-intensity conflict" was only important during the Cold War and is irrelevant today. These erroneous assertions are drawn from the writings of retired Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch (in *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*, reviewed by Colonel Howard Barnard) and retired National Security Agency Director Lieutenant General William Odom (*America's Military Revolution: Strategy and Structure After the Cold War*, reviewed by General Donn Starry).

General Welch, writing in the days immediately following Desert Storm, makes the understandable mistake of seeing conflict only through the lens of conventional airpower. His blunt assertion that "the era of low-intensity warfare is a thing of the past and that mid-intensity conflicts . . . will become our most pressing challenges" is simply not borne out by today's headlines. Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia are all sites of confrontations meeting the long-standing definition of low-intensity conflict. This standard definition continues to be useful—so do the principles learned, often with great difficulty, as to how to deal with these conflicts.

Our victory in the Gulf War, while awe-inspiring, is not the single experience from which US military planning should stem. The impression left on the world by Desert Storm will not deter every other threat to US security interests. The US does possess and can further refine the skills needed to deal with low-intensity conflicts and other dangers not deterred by Desert Storm. The important step is to recognize that in certain situations constrained military force is required to support the other tools of national power in order to accomplish national objectives. The nature of this low-intensity conflict environment requires some military skills distinct from those required in conventional conflict.

Joint doctrine continues to reflect these distinctions, though this recognition may be hidden behind cosmetic changes. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, clearly delineates two categories of "operations other than war," those meant to "deter war and resolve conflict" and those meant to "promote peace." The first category, which according to 3-0 can include combat, encompasses every element formerly (and formally) defined in doctrine as low-intensity conflict. The evolution from "LIC" to "OOTW" must not be allowed to obfuscate the presence of low-intensity conflicts in the world or the relevance of these conflicts to US security policy. More important, the proclamations of LIC's death and changes in terminology cannot be permitted to diminish US capabilities to deal effectively with low-intensity conflict.

While the above might lead some to believe that Martin van Creveld's *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict* (reviewed by Colin Gray) would be received with applause by this office, the contrary is true. I can second Dr. Gray's negative analysis of this book (presented two years ago in a slightly different form to the Office of the Secretary of Defense). We, too, found this latest work a direct extension of *The Transformation of War*. Both works have three major points: (1) nuclear deterrence and defense are already irrelevant; (2) the accepted Western paradigm of conventional war is in the final stages of abolishing itself; and (3) future conflicts will be primarily low-intensity and will require unconventional responses. This third theme has some merit but is overstated throughout Van Creveld's two books. Low-intensity conflict is not the wave of the future; it is a time-honored way nations (and subnational groups) achieve important objectives when diplomatic demarche is insufficient and conventional war undesirable or untenable.

This office has long maintained that low-intensity conflict is different, difficult, and important. These points remain true—low-intensity conflict is not passé, irrelevant, or (as Van Creveld would have it) about to destroy the state-centric international system as we know it.

Brigadier General Wesley B. Taylor, Jr.
Washington, DC

The Reviewers Reply:

My review of Bill Odom's book offers no judgments on what he wrote about LIC as originally conceived, and as presently represented by the office in which Brigadier General Taylor serves. In my review, what General Odom wrote on the subject is just briefly paraphrased, with no reviewer commentary. So it may be that I failed to represent fully and accurately what Odom said—in which case the reviewer is at fault. However, the Odom arguments in regard to LIC are relevant, quite lucid, and reflect the judgments of many of us who were present when LIC was institutionalized by legislation. That being true it seemed to me unnecessary to further embellish on Bill Odom's quite appropriate judgment.

General Donn A. Starry, USA Ret.

While I certainly would not agree that General Welch made an "understandable mistake of seeing conflict through the lens of conventional airpower," I

do have problems with the standard definition of low-intensity conflict. The new FM 100-5, *Operations*, does not define or mention low-intensity conflict, nor does it define or mention mid-intensity conflict. While we might disagree on definitions, I would agree with General Welch that headlines aside, our most pressing challenges still remain mid-intensity conflicts. In a period of declining force structure and readiness they will become even more pressing.

Colonel Howard Barnard, USAF

BOUQUETS FOR FAOS

To the Editor:

Lieutenant Colonel Kent Butts' think piece on "The DOD Role In Africa" (*Parameters*, Winter 1993-1994) presented a balanced rendition on the current Administration's benevolent foreign policy objectives for the African continent. The new policy outlines broad goals and strategies to achieve those ends; yet something is missing. The interest is there, but the resources are not. The unfortunate truth is that if all recipient countries of US FY94 foreign assistance monies were ranked by dollar figure, Africa as a continent of 50-odd countries would rank third from the bottom. The loss of a bipolar geopolitical "bad guy" makes it difficult to prioritize main and supporting efforts in the emerging multipolar world. No longer can periphery states benefit from the trickle-down effect, as words substitute for action in this era of constructive disengagement.

I echo Lieutenant Colonel Butts' call for DOD to remain engaged and a full member of the foreign policy team around the globe. Access, and degree of access, with foreign governments has a price. DOD must determine the minimum level of resources it can allocate to each country, region, or continent to retain a desired degree of access. This is a low maintenance option to avoid or delay disengagement. Over the past decades DOD invested a great deal of effort and resources in African militaries. The existing equity has matured to the point of reaping mixed dividends. The new trend is for US emissaries to visit those African countries to gather the necessary forces for coalition warfare and peacekeeping operations around the world.

The "soft" skills of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) are not meaningless, and are often irreplaceable during a crisis. The FAO is an individual rich in military, technical, and political skills. The African FAO, for example, serves on a continent where half the countries record some form of low-intensity conflict; in six others, active peacekeeping operations are in progress. It is in this environment that the FAO hones his "warfighting skills" and matures through active contact with the opposition. A FAO's normal assignment:

- is forward deployed on the pointed end of the spear
- is an economy of force role as DOD's eyes and ears
- implements national and military goals and interests
- provides opportunities for sensitive dialogue or negotiations with presidents, defense ministers, and even bitter warlords
- entails peace accord enforcement, demobilization processes, and verification of international agreement compliance

- functions as the personal representative of the US Defense and service secretaries
- shapes DOD policies for a country, region, and continent
- builds coalition partners and deploys foreign soldiers to trouble spots around the globe
- promotes US military industrial interests
- secures basing and transit rights for military components
- involves daily use of antiterrorist and counterterrorist techniques, and counterintelligence activities
- plus a host of other necessary but mundane activities which ensure US access when it is needed

In the Army of tomorrow each of us will have a special, yet complementary role in the execution of the art of war. There are all types of conflict and conflict resolution operations. In most of these arenas the FAO is both a combat and a peace multiplier willing to remain engaged in this vital role for DOD. Next time a battalion commander or senior leader finds himself in a fluid environment like Somalia, make sure a FAO is nearby. He or she just might be able to provide the needed options or answers to successfully prosecute the deep battle.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel W. Pike
Gaborone, Botswana

The Author Replies:

In an era when many developing world governments are dominated by or influenced by the military to a significant degree, and primary Army missions are peace enforcement and peacemaking operations, ambassadors and task force commanders must not be without the sources of expertise necessary to prevent mistakes that may be costly to US foreign policy and to the lives of US forces. I hope that readers will not assume that Colonel Pike is writing from a parochial position and will give his argument the credibility it deserves. There are few specialties that are being overlooked in the service that could be as critical to the success of upcoming US Army operational missions as the Foreign Area Officer Program.

Lieutenant Colonel Kent H. Butts, USA Ret.

Book Reviews

Shadow On the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975. Edited by David L. Anderson. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 211 pages. \$35.00 (\$14.95 paper).

Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers. By David M. Barrett. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 194 pages. \$35.00.

Reviewed by Daniel H. Simpson, US Ambassador to Somalia and former Deputy Commandant for International Affairs, US Army War College.

These two books taken together consist of an overview of US involvement in Vietnam, from the end of World War II to "the end" with the Anderson book, and then a much more detailed "zoom" into the years when one President, Lyndon Johnson, wrestled with the problem, with a particular focus on the question of Johnson's consultation process and, thence, his decisionmaking process. Both books are useful, in their own way, particularly as the vines begin to grow over the Vietnam experience for Americans and we begin to accept one or another version of what actually happened, drawing correct—or incorrect—conclusions, conclusions that bear on present and future decisions.

Anderson's book contains chapters on the approach to the issue of Vietnam taken by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford. They are written by Anderson and six other historians, with fore and aft chapters and the ones on Eisenhower and Ford written by Dr. Anderson himself. Anderson lays down his cards in the first chapter by characterizing the war as "the nation's frustrating, tragic, and humiliating failure in Southeast Asia." He sets the book not so much as a chronicle of various Presidents' involvement in the issue, but also as a comparative analytical study of the presidency and the Vietnam issue. It serves as both.

Various chapters contain information new even to one who has lived through the period. Robert McMahon's chapter on Truman quite correctly loops the Vietnam issue back into the Franklin Delano Roosevelt presidencies, showing FDR reneging on his 1941 Atlantic Charter pledge of self-determination to colonial peoples by indicating late in World War II that the United States would not object to the reimposition of European control over colonial territories overrun by the Japanese. Our then-Eurocentric foreign policy—with its implications for our approach to the rest of the world—comes forth loud and clear, as does the quick segue into the Cold War mode that would prevail until the 1990s. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we did help the French in Indochina, in no small part because we didn't want that esteemed ally to go belly-up economically. In 1954, we provided 80 percent of France's military expenditures in Indochina.

If one looks for "where it went wrong" signs, they are strewn throughout the chronicle. The United States government and other, unofficial bodies, such as the

American Friends of Vietnam, were pulled inexorably into support of a Catholic minority regime in a predominantly Buddhist country. And the force levels went up, under President Kennedy from 700 to 16,000, including combat troops. The "This would never have happened if President Kennedy had lived" argument goes down in flames in Gary Hess's chapter. Kennedy saw what we were doing in Vietnam as fulfilling a commitment and characterized the nationalist-communist challenge to Diem's rule as "a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy." In the meantime, the Diem government used US-trained Special Forces to attack Buddhist pagodas. I found George Herring's chapter on the Johnson years superficial and condescending to Johnson, but that was perhaps by comparison to the Barrett book. Herring observes, for example, that, "To be fair, limited war is extraordinarily difficult to fight, especially within the US system," and Johnson was "innately suspicious of military men." Gosh. (Barrett's book shows Johnson systematically consulting "military men" in depth.) Herring does agree with Barrett on Johnson's hang-up on consensus—a consistent barrier to making clear decisions.

Melvin Small's and Jeffrey Kimball's Nixon chapters and Anderson's own Ford chapter take us to the end of the war. Both deal well with the interplay of the war and domestic political developments: Nixon's "Silent Majority" speech, the ending of the draft, the existence of a Nixon-Thieu "back channel" during the 1968 elections, the 1972 Christmas bombing after Nixon's electoral victory, and the 30 April 1975 fall of Saigon. As a chronicle with decent perspective overall, it is a useful book. As a comparative study of presidential leadership and management of perhaps the key issue in US foreign policy for a decade, the book probably stumbles on the inevitable lack of clear focus implicit in a seven-author enterprise.

David Barrett's book is less fun to read for the undisciplined reader, he or she who prefers short bites. On the other hand, *Uncertain Warriors* is definitely worthwhile if for nothing else than that it fairly and squarely demolishes some major myths about Lyndon Johnson, in particular the image of him as a heavyhanded Texas gunslinger-manqué, holed up in the White House, listening to no one except the ghost of Sam Houston, and particularly not listening to any critics of the war or any sensible military leaders. That simply is not true, as Barrett demonstrates through his presentation of the results of his thorough research into the available published and unpublished chronicles of the period by the players themselves. Barrett shows some 28 major figures of the time that Johnson consulted and listened to again and again on Vietnam during the five years of his presidency. On the military side, they included Generals Eisenhower, Taylor, Wheeler, Ridgway, and Westmoreland. They included Johnson's prominent critics—Senator Fulbright, George Ball, Dean Acheson, and Senator Gruening. He listened to Lady Bird, and to his daughters crying as their young husbands went off to fight the war.

Barrett keys in clearly on LBJ's main problem as a war leader. As a career politician, and particularly as the Fagan of the Senate as Majority Leader, Johnson believed in achieving consensus behind a policy that he was to choose and then implement. That was all well and good in situations where votes were the coin of the realm. It could lead to paralysis or insufficient, half-vast decisions by the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the United States government. They get called in the book, "tentative final decisions." Johnson took *votes* among his advisors.

The rest of the passel of problems Johnson automatically faced were classic, straightforward, and pertinent to our own times. He was bedeviled by the political costs of "calling up the Reserves." (Sound familiar?) How could he put into place the Great Society, fight the war, and balance the budget, without higher taxes and inflation? Did he—as the consummate legislator—listen to or manipulate the Congress—or both at the same time? How did he bring the press along without foreclosing options by seeing the options masticated or "gummed" by the then-less-bloodthirsty American media? Nonetheless, LBJ emerges clearly as "a rational seeker of advice."

Both books are definitely worth the time of a senior or less senior member of the defense community to read, particularly as the Vietnam War becomes history—no longer part of our leaders' living experience. In addition, we are definitely not finished with the lessons of Vietnam, as military leaders, as American leaders. Cold War domino theory and the outcome of its pursuit in action in southeast Asia still bears looking at closely. Vietnam "fell," the rest of Indochina (Laos and Cambodia) sort of "fell," but, contrary to what contemporary domino theory implied, the rest of Asia clearly did not fall. There were no subsequent Vietnams. The Asian tigers stalk the economic jungle, their fur shining. Vietnam now wishes to join the club. On the other hand, would this be the case if we hadn't poured our blood and money into Vietnam for more than a decade? Did our effort stiffen the resolve of un-communist governments in Asia to resist, when they saw what havoc the enraged American giant wreaked when engaged? We might not win, but you will surely wish we hadn't come. In that sense, was the Vietnam War an American failure? Or did containment work, even though Vietnam fell, piling another straw on the back of the Soviet Union—or world Communism—making its global "success" even more clearly improbable, leading to the developments of the 1990s? And doesn't the 1991 object lesson to Iraq—with the clear message for other such nuisance states—serve the same purpose? Good books. Books that make one think.

Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars.
Edited by Joseph G. Dawson III, with a Foreword by Raymond G. O'Conner. Lawrence: The Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 226 pages.
\$12.95 (paper). Reviewed by Lieutenant General Richard G. Tre-fry, USA Ret., Military Assistant to the President, 1992-93.

The role of the President as Commander in Chief has always been of great interest to historians, politicians, and constitutional scholars. Presidents since World War II have been observed closely in their role of Commander in Chief, primarily because of the advent of weapons of mass destruction, but also because of the Cold War and the involvement of the United States, primarily by presidential decision, in wars in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and the Gulf.

The expansion of mass communications (radio, TV, the printed word) might lead one to believe that presidential military leadership is a comparatively new phenomenon. That mistaken view may well be attributable to the surfeit of material on the topic made available over the past 50 years. Students of military history, the law, and politics, however, realize that the issue of presidential military leadership goes back to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Washington, Adams, Jefferson,

Madison, Polk, Lincoln, and Grant, to name a few, were early Presidents who filled the role of Commander in Chief.

This particular collection of historical profiles and vignettes of comparatively modern Presidents is preceded by a foreword by Raymond G. O'Conner, an experienced scholar and historian who has taught in both military and civilian schools. His opening words describe well the range of the subject matter:

The multiple dimensions of the President's role as Commander in Chief during war are easily demonstrated in this book. He has been given, and has taken, the responsibility and authority for waging war, maintaining support on the home front, and making peace. But his ability to conduct a successful military and domestic policy depends on a number of factors, some of which he can control, some of which he can influence, and some of which he can do nothing about.

One significant factor is the concept of the office held by the incumbent. Some Executives have believed that their powers were confined only to those prescribed in the US Constitution and the laws enacted by the Congress. Others have held that they could exercise any power not specifically prohibited or denied to the Executive. Another factor influencing the behavior of the President is precedent—what others have done under the same or similar circumstances. He can choose to emulate the strong, assertive leaders who dominated crises by displaying leadership and determination, or he can allow events to govern his actions. Inhibited or provoked by Congress, or by what he conceives to be public opinion, the Chief Executive can be either the mover or the moved. Essentially, the President can do whatever he can get away with.

Against that backdrop, consider the rich and fertile ground that these essays and vignettes provide involving the leadership of Presidents McKinley, Wilson, FDR, Truman, Johnson, and Nixon. There is thought-provoking material for any professional soldier in these experiences and events. Through such study, soldiers will be better able to articulate questions of state involving military power. The country and its Presidents have been served well by those who could do so. There is more to being a professional soldier than possessing a diploma from Leavenworth.

The first essay is entitled "The President As Commander In Chief: A Study In Power." Any military assignment in Washington will quickly demonstrate that the name of the game is who has power, who does not, whose exercise of it is worthy of emulation, and who are those who abuse power. The pursuit and exercise of power is what makes Washington a capitol rather than a county seat. That's not cynicism—the use of constitutional power, by whatever branch of the government, has made this country what it is today and will make it what it will become in the future. The use of military power by the President as Commander in Chief is instructive. Consider the following quote from this essay:

In the two centuries that followed George Washington's inauguration in 1789, American Presidents decreed the employment of the nation's armed forces more than 170 times; Congress declared war only 5 times. Since 1945, more than 100,000 American personnel have died in undeclared wars; more than 400,000 have suffered battle injuries. These presidential military ventures were not limited to the protection of the nation's citizens from direct assault by pirates or marauders; many engaged the country militarily against foreign states in Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. Only once in 1812 did

Congress actually debate the issue of war; in the other four cases, Congress, with limited discussion, agreed that a war situation actually existed. The careful division of power between the Executive and the Congress in matters of war and peace has been exceedingly ineffective. In practice, Presidents have often assumed the power to ignore Congress or override congressional sentiment with apparent impunity.

Such immense power did not derive from the Constitution. . . . Nothing in the Constitution discourages a President from acting directly and decisively as Commander in Chief. . . . Nor does the Constitution in any way limit the power of a President to place the armed forces of the United States wherever he chooses. But a President's real power to advance his foreign policy agenda always rested not on any exclusive constitutional mandate, but on his capacity to build and sustain, through qualities of leadership, the necessary base of congressional and popular support. Indeed the Constitution always permitted the Executive to do whatever the public would approve. When assured of strong public support in his clash with congressional critics, a President faced almost no limits to his control of external policy. In placing the country's armed forces where he believes they will best protect the interests and security of the American people, a President can create a situation that often leaves Congress only the choice to recognize it, if not with a declaration of war, at least with military appropriations.

In short, one thread that runs through all these essays is that presidential leadership is a personal thing; in the hands of a talented and capable leader, it represents an awesome power.

The selection of the six Presidents in this comparatively small book is not a matter of happenstance. Surely the decision to describe William McKinley's role as a Commander in Chief seems strange, and yet a persuasive case is made that McKinley was far more capable in that role than Woodrow Wilson, who comes close to being defined as an inept Commander in Chief. There is no doubt that the essay on FDR, while critical in some aspects, depicts a Commander in Chief on a par with Lincoln for political acumen in prosecuting a war. Truman gets full credit for making tough choices and appears to have relished the opportunity to do so. President Johnson appears as the "Reluctant Dragon" who really did not want to fight; despite his political abilities, he did not know how to bring the country along with him. This seeming paradox perhaps comes close to the mark in describing Johnson's frustration as he saw the Vietnam War defining his presidency. President Nixon, who generally gets good marks for his skill and prowess in foreign affairs, does appear favorably as Commander in Chief. By the time he arrived on the scene, however, the operative question was "When do we stop the war?"

This collection of essays by a group of distinguished historians provides interesting insights into the role that some consider to be paramount: the President as Commander in Chief. Perhaps the one lesson that can be drawn from studying this book is that the job of being President and Commander in Chief does not get easier. There is no preparatory phase for those who would lead this country. They have to learn the role of Commander in Chief the hard way. And therein lies a great lesson. Military personnel must be professional, articulate, and possess great integrity. But beyond this, they must be able to gain the trust and respect of the President they serve. If they do not, it is not just the reputation of the President that will suffer; young Americans will die while others learn their jobs.

Arms Control: What Next? Edited by Lewis A. Dunn and Sharon A. Squassoni. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993. 164 pages. \$38.50.

House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail. By Colin S. Gray. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1992. 235 pages. \$17.95.

It Takes One to Tango. By Edward L. Rowny. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1992. 264 pages. \$22.00.

Reviewed by Major General William F. Burns, USA Ret., former Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

What has happened to arms control in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1989? The destruction of the Soviet Empire has caused us to rethink our basic international political assumptions. We have been forced to consider where we have been and where we might be going over the next decades. Of particular interest are the authors who have attempted to shed light on the crafting and execution of arms control policy during the Nixon-to-Bush era. More important, perhaps, are those who are looking to the future.

This area of policy analysis is fraught with peril, however. Too much has been claimed for arms control in the past and perhaps too little is expected of it in the future. A dispassionate estimate of the true potential for arms control is sorely needed. What were the real arms control accomplishments of the past 30 years? What is there of arms control theory that is applicable after the Cold War? What additional analytic effort is needed to support policy for the new era? The three books examined here are examples of the wide range of information becoming available and the quality of the analysis being done.

Dunn and Squassoni, Gray, and Rowny have made different but useful contributions to a better understanding of arms control as policy and technique. Each approaches arms control from a different perspective. Colin Gray sees arms control as policy failure because, he argues, it is based on bad analysis. Ambassador Rowny views arms control as bad policy unless caution, a hard line, and common sense prevail. Lewis Dunn and Sharon Squassoni suggest that there is life after the intensive arms control efforts of the 1980s.

One might think that such disparate views suggest a lack of coherence in arms control theory and practice and a certain lack of utility for such tools in the future. This could be true. Those who write and think about arms control represent the entire range from true believer to agnostic and atheist on these matters. Whether one deals with weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons in Europe, or regional violence in the developing world, an understanding of what is possible and an appreciation of the limitations of arms control measures are essential.

Colin Gray expressively subtitles his work "Why Arms Control Must Fail." His skepticism of the arms control process is deep and abiding. Arms control, in his view, is not merely flawed theory but wrong theory. He cites what he describes as the paradoxes of arms control (and according to him they are many). He argues correctly that several arms control agreements, the SALT agreements come first to mind, merely sanctioned the growth of armaments in a more or less orderly manner. He concludes his argument with an assertion that arms control, like belief that the earth is flat, is

fundamentally wrong. As with belief in a flat earth, arms control theory cannot be improved by further study. It's just that way. Written in an earnest and often subtly amusing style, this book sets forth a plausible analytical argument against arms control as it has been practiced. Gray does not suggest alternatives, however, particularly alternatives applicable to the confusing international situation we now face.

His critique of the Reagan Administration's arms control policy grudgingly admits the success of the INF "double zero" outcome. Unlike Gray's characterization of US arms control policy execution, President Reagan demonstrated that Americans can be tough negotiators. The original Reagan nuclear arms control negotiators, Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny, may have differed from time to time on policy matters. But both showed a toughness and sense of purpose with which the Soviets found it extremely difficult to deal. In particular, Paul Nitze's toughness, logic, and firm grasp of the issues were the foundation of the Reagan Administration's ultimate success: the abolition of an entire class of nuclear delivery systems.

Ambassador Rowny has had a long and distinguished career as a soldier and a statesman. In recent decades, his field of activity has been arms control negotiations. An admitted skeptic concerning the utility of such negotiations, he was a principal architect of US strategic arms control policy. His book is about arms control as he saw it. Essentially autobiographical, it provides insightful glimpses into the workings of several administrations developing policy for arms control in particular and US-Soviet relations in general. In his introduction, he states clearly his purpose: to help future generations avoid the mistakes of the past. As the conscience for arms control, in a sense, of the Reagan and Bush administrations, he could be counted on to remain skeptical to the end of any new initiative. If it were adopted, often with only his grudging consent, one could be sure that the idea had been truly and comprehensively vetted. I owe a personal debt of gratitude to him for his wise counsel. We sometimes did not agree, but in our discussions, I was always certain of strong and well-argued positions. This book not only serves as a contribution to the history of the time but provides a cautionary message for arms control enthusiasts of the future.

In a different vein, Lewis Dunn and Sharon Squassoni present a workman-like approach to arms control and disarmament problems yet to come. With instructive lessons from the past, they have assembled an anthology of useful articles for today's policymakers. The authors they enlisted in this effort grew up in the arms control environment of the 1980s and were the desk officers, action officers, and policy analysts of that era. This background makes the authors sensitive to the limitations of arms control and the difficulties inherent in forming policy to implement arms control initiatives. They recognize that proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction may be the crucial arms control issue of the post-Cold War world. They understand that old methods (verification comes to mind, immediately) may not adequately meet the needs of this new era.

Particularly interesting are the policy prescriptions with which the book is laced. Concepts for monitoring the dismantlement and disposition of nuclear weapons, particularly their nuclear components, are timely and make good sense. Blair Murray's careful analysis in her article on the past, present, and possible future of verification of arms agreements makes a useful contribution to the policy debate. Dick Davis walks previously forbidden paths in his keen analysis of the possibilities for future arms control measures dealing with naval weapons.

One will not necessarily agree with all that is argued in the Dunn-Squassoni anthology any more than with much that is presented by Rowny or Gray. Taken together, however, the books are of value to the policymaker. General Rowny's historical approach through the eyes of a soldier is particularly useful for the officer headed for his first Washington staff assignment in this field. Colin Gray's cautionary message should serve as a check on overenthusiastic arms control advocates. A firm understanding of the arguments made in these books will fortify any budding policy analyst on the Joint Staff for his first briefing in the Tank on arms control subjects.

Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East. By Martin Navias. London: Brassey's (UK), 1993. 262 pages. \$45.00.

New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy. Edited by Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993. 272 pages. \$17.95 (paper).

Reviewed by Colonel Michael R. Boldrick, USAF Ret., who, while serving with Strategic Air Command, operated, targeted, developed, and tested ICBMs.

Following different trajectories, both of these books target what I believe is the most daunting challenge of the post-Cold War era: third-world nations armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

Its opening chapter reading more like a novel than an academic tome hatched at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, *New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy* begins with a gripping replay of the Gulf War, only this time Saddam has the bomb! In this scenario, coalition forces storm the Iraqi border, ignoring a threat delivered from Baghdad that a "nuclear device rests securely in our hands in a large American city." Two days later a primitive fission weapon kills 3000 Marines approaching the Al-Burqan oil field in Kuwait. After evacuating major cities, the US President addresses the nation as commander-in-chief, telling his fellow citizens, "I have decided to . . ."

Abruptly, the fast-paced Tom Clancy approach yields to scholarly discussions one would expect from a Council on Foreign Relations book. The reader never learns what US city was selected for Saddam Hussein's revenge or if the President singled out Baghdad for a model environmental restoration project, returning it to the desert from which it sprang. Instead, editors Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, along with eight other experts, identify nations most likely to cross the nuclear threshold, review diplomatic and arms control countermeasures, and conclude with a series of policy recommendations for coping with emerging nuclear threats to US national security.

Military options are discussed, but with little operational depth, perhaps because all ten contributors earned their credentials on campus or inside the Beltway rather than on fields of glory. In the chapter "Offensive Military Actions," we learn Israel bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 "because of its weakness, not because of its strength." The alleged weakness was in diplomacy, which from the sheltered citadels of learning is almost always preferable to military intervention. Of

course, the scenario that opened *New Nuclear Nations* could have been history, rather than speculation, had Israel sent diplomats rather than fighter pilots to Osirak.

Using a "just-the-facts" approach, British writer Martin Navias, in *Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East*, analyzes a weapon already in great supply in a region hostile to the West. As Navias observes, ballistic missiles probably will be the delivery vehicle of choice for the new nuclear nations.

Israel is the first Western-allied nation to directly face the threat of tactical missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. That confrontation promoted the first great military strategy debate caused by the twin proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons: what's the better deterrent, a near leak-proof defense or punishing retaliation? This question split the Israeli defense ministry between advocates of the Arrow ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missile) and the air force. The former, buoyed by the limited success of Patriot against the 40 Scuds Iraq fired at Tel Aviv and Haifa during the Gulf War, believe the more capable Arrow can protect Israeli citizens from Arab missiles. The air force, stung by the loss of funding to ATBM development, argues for massive retaliation as the only deterrent the likes of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Khaddafi understand. Showing the fighter pilot's contempt for missiles, the commander of Israel's air force touted the superiority of air power: "Surface-to-surface missiles are only good for people who are afraid to penetrate."

Unwittingly, the general made the strongest possible case for third world ballistic missiles. Macho or not, missiles do penetrate and, unlike highly educated pilots, can't change sides during wartime. Equally important, if deployed on mobile launchers, they are the only offensive weapon virtually immune to Western air power. During the Gulf War the great Scud hunt achieved exactly the same results as airpower deployed over Europe during World War II against German V-2 rockets then terrorizing London—all stationary V-2 and Scud pads destroyed, not one confirmed kill of a mobile launcher in either war! Navias does point out that missiles, despite their ability to avoid interdiction and to penetrate, have never been decisive in warfare, a situation that will change if nuclear technology continues to proliferate.

While both books agree that the coming marriage of third-world ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads won't immediately threaten US cities, that illegitimate union will ignite a chain reaction in foreign policy. The changing equation will come in the politics of intervention and power projection. In a future world where forward military bases are threatened with instant annihilation and allied populations are held hostage by weapons of mass destruction, how will the United States react to the first threat to national security posed by a renegade nation armed with medium-range missiles and nuclear weapons?

In considering that question, *Going Ballistic* presents a thorough analysis of the capabilities, tactics, and military utility of the only weapon capable of restricting Western military options in the oil-rich Middle East. Progressing further into a more, not less, menacing future, *New Nuclear Nations* suggests policies for containing nuclear proliferation, often by the same countries currently practiced in the art of missile warfare. Unfortunately, what begins as a balanced approach guiding the world's only superpower through the second nuclear quagmire fades into a one-world philosophy concluding with a thought most military professionals will disdain: "Might we agree to compromise further the principle of national sovereignty in the wake of nuclear weapons use?"

Readers who, like me, think the United States is making a grave error in folding the nuclear umbrella that shielded the Free World during the Cold War, should include both books on their reading list. In the dangerous new world envisioned by Navias, Blackwill, and Carnesale, the United States may soon find itself as outgunned as a modern police force in an urban riot. That prospect puts a new spin on a fading bumper sticker I recently saw on a battered Volkswagen bus: "One nuclear bomb can ruin your whole day."

Real Reciprocity: Balancing U.S. Economic and Security Policy in the Pacific Basin. By David B. H. Denoon. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. 125 pages. \$14.95 (paper).

Japan's Military Renaissance? Edited by Ron Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama. New York: St. Martin's, 1993. 269 pages. \$65.00.

The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures. By Joseph P. Keddell, Jr. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharp, 1993. 256 pages. \$47.50.

Reviewed by Colonel Donald W. Boose, Jr., USA Ret., who served from 1987 to 1990 as Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) for Headquarters, US Forces, Japan.

A US staff officer serving in Japan in the mid-1980s wrote that "Japan is the linchpin of the US strategic position in Asia." In one formulation or another that statement has reflected a fundamental tenet of US strategy from the day in August 1945 when troopers of the 11th Airborne Division touched down at Atsugi Air Base. But while Japanese and American policymakers tend to agree about the value of political and military cooperation, the people of the two nations often have viewed each other through prisms of cultural differences, economic rivalry, and the lingering images of a bitter but long-since-ended war. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought new questions about the nature, role, and future of the Japanese defense establishment. The three books examine these issues and, in varying degrees, provide useful information to the military professional and concerned citizen trying to understand and assess the important and frequently troubled Japan-US relationship.

David B. H. Denoon, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, sees the United States as having struck a grand bargain during the Cold War—an "implicit understanding" that the United States would provide security, assistance, and access to its markets if the non-communist Asian countries would resist Soviet and Chinese expansion. Denoon believes that with the end of the Cold War the extreme trade imbalances resulting from that approach are no longer sustainable and that the bargain must be renegotiated, with security explicitly linked to economics. In the course of making that argument, he provides an overview of East Asian security issues, some useful tabular data (although a typographical error on page 20 credits Japan with a military force of 234 million, about twice the total population of the country), and a number of thought-provoking scenarios.

There are a few problems in the work. Denoon's subject is very large and his book is very small, and so his treatment is inevitably broad and his policy

recommendations general—on the order of the classic admonition to “Go forth and do good.” Denoon’s description of the “grand bargain” tends to underplay both the self-defense contributions of America’s East Asian allies and the value to the United States of being able freely to base and deploy forces in those countries. Furthermore, Denoon’s fundamental economic assumption, while no doubt widely shared by fellow Americans—including the President and his advisors—should not be accepted without reservation. Many economists argue that trade imbalances derive primarily from macroeconomic factors, such as imbalances in savings and consumption and divergences in economic growth cycles. Some, notably Paul Krugman, have questioned the usefulness of the very concept of economic competitiveness between nations. A trade deficit, in and of itself, is not necessarily a sign of weakness, nor is a trade surplus always a sign of strength. Indeed, a major factor contributing to the current deficit is the demand for imports in a strengthening US economy while a continuing recession has reduced the Japanese propensity to import. In any event, trade deficits seem to be more a reflection than a determinant of a nation’s economic well-being, and whether or not specific trade deficits are “sustainable” seems more a political and emotional than an economic phenomenon.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, *Real Reciprocity* is a handy introductory overview—an appetizer for the more substantial fare provided by the other two books.

Japan’s Military Renaissance? is an excellent primer on the history, current issues, and future prospects of the Japanese defense establishment. In an introductory essay, Ron Matthews introduces the body of knowledge which is essential to any examination of Japan’s defense: the Japanese Constitution; the concept of “comprehensive security”; the laws governing the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and Self Defense Forces (JSDF); key policies on defense spending and procurement, arms export control, and nuclear weapons; and the major players, institutions, and processes that shape and constrain the Japanese force structure.

British, Japanese, Australian, and North American scholars then delve more deeply into each of these issues. Akio Watanabe and Ian Gow examine Article 9—the “anti-war” clause—of Japan’s Constitution, which from the beginning has been subject to a flexible interpretation based on the concept of the nation’s inherent right of self-defense. Japan thus finds itself with a constitution stating that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained,” while fielding a 13-division army, a surface navy larger than that of the United Kingdom, and more F-15 fighters than the US Pacific Air Force. Watanabe and Gow help to explain how this can be so while providing useful historical background and a discussion of the dynamics of Japanese civil-military relations.

Tomohisa Sakanaka, S. Javed Maswood, and Gerald Segal then examine Japan’s response to the changing post-Cold War security environment. Their views differ, but all see Japan becoming involved in more multilateral approaches to security in the future while continuing to find utility in its bilateral relationship with the United States.

Only readers with a significant expertise in mathematics and theoretical economics (a group to which this reviewer does *not* belong) will be able to deal with Keisuke Matsuyama, Mitsuhiro Kojima, and Yutaka Fukuda’s pages of mathematics. Others will nonetheless find interspersed among the formulae some thought-provoking

hypotheses on the relationship between Japan's military expenditure and economic growth.

The next three essays examine various aspects of the Japanese defense industry. Alistair D. Edgar and David G. Hagland argue that Japan, while producing a substantial proportion of its own weaponry, does not actually have a true "arms industry" as understood in Europe or North America, but seems to have taken an alternative path to defense industrialization focused largely on dual-use technologies. Keith Hartley and Stephen Martin see the possibility of Japanese-European cooperation in aerospace programs, and Michael W. Chinworth provides a well-documented and level-headed discussion of technology transfer and technological "leakage" in Japan-US bilateral programs.

Trevor Taylor traces the history of Japanese arms export control policy, and John E. Endicott provides an upbeat conclusion, consistent with the rest of the book, that any future "renaissance" of Japan's military will be in terms of its quality and ability to contribute to regional and international security rather than any threatening return to the right-wing militarization of the past.

While the point is not made explicitly, the picture that emerges from a close reading of *Japan's Military Renaissance* is one of a nation in which programs and budgets substitute for strategy and policy. Joseph P. Keddell reinforces this view in his thoroughly researched examination of the interaction of Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, and industrialists, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*. In spite of a somewhat didactic style and frequent repetition of key data, Keddell's prose is readable, and the depth of his research instills confidence in his conclusions.

He argues that Japan has no strategic doctrine, except for a general sense that Japan's security depends on the bilateral relationship with the United States and the possession of sufficient military forces for self-defense. In the absence of a military strategy, Japanese defense decisions tend to be made incrementally and are influenced primarily by non-defense factors such as intra-bureaucratic rivalries, opposition party pressures, budget considerations, and the need to maintain an affable relationship with the United States. Much of Japan's defense "policy" consists of constraints designed to reassure the public and neutralize the political opposition, actions taken to insure continued US support, and acquisition programs which become an end in themselves rather than a means to achieve strategic objectives. Such behavior is by no means unique to Japan, but it is more dominant in that country due to the fragmented political power structure, cultural factors (including what Keddell sees as a "Japanese bias against strong initiatives"), the nature of the Japanese bureaucracy, and the long-time domination of the formerly ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

Keddell examines in fascinating detail the history of Japanese defense debates and policy decisions from the ideological polarization of the 1950s until the 1992 passage of legislation authorizing the dispatch of Japanese forces to participate (under very controlled and limiting conditions) in international peacekeeping operations—the so-called "PKO Bill." His discussion of the relative roles, influence, and ability to compel action of the Japanese uniformed military, the Japan Defense Agency, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and International Commerce and Industry brings to mind the words of a US staff officer: "The Joint Staff Office has no teeth; it can only gum the issues. [The Japan Defense Agency] has little teeth; it can nibble on the issues. Only [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] can bite down and chew."

A reader who establishes a foundation by reading the first two books under consideration here, and then stays with Keddell to the end, will come away with useful and substantial information about the real world of Japanese defense politics. These books are by no means a complete course on Japanese security and defense issues. Indeed, in the fast-moving post-Cold War era, they already have become somewhat dated. But one seeking to learn about the Japanese defense establishment, its players, and its processes could do far worse than to begin with this trio.

Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics & Strategy. By Michael W. Chinworth. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1993. 245 pages. \$26.00. Reviewed by Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

North Korea's threats to the Republic of Korea and the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime are at the center of near-term security concerns in Northeast Asia. But ask any observer from the region what he or she sees as the *long-term* security challenge, and most often the reply will be: US disengagement and Japan's remilitarization. Because of that widespread perception, this carefully documented and well-written book is essential reading not only for students of Japanese policymaking and defense, but for all those interested in the security of Northeast Asia.

Chinworth organizes his analysis in three parts. The first 66 pages contain a catalogue of the many actors involved in the defense procurement process in Japan and the factors that appear to motivate them, plus a careful analysis of the research, development, procurement, and production processes through which these participants interact. This section is an excellent primer on Japan's defense process, showing how major Japanese agencies use the weapon acquisition process to advance causes that may be only indirectly related to the defense of Japan. For example, the Japan Defense Agency may place a higher priority on enhancing its relatively low status in the powerful Japanese bureaucracy than in increasing the military capability of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and the Ministry of Industry and International Trade (MITI) seeks to have defense procurement funds used to improve selected civilian sectors of the economy rather than necessarily enhance defense industrial capacity.

The second part of the book consists of careful case studies of three major procurement decisions—the Patriot missile system, the F-15 Eagle, and the FSX fighter support aircraft—all involving the United States. These accounts illustrate and clarify the data in the first section and provide the basis for the last section. The final section, a single chapter, contains a useful summary and the author's conclusions.

For an observer more interested in the broader aspects of defense policy and its implications for regional security, the most significant conclusion may be that Japan has never developed a coherent national security policy or strategy to guide defense procurement—or any other defense activity. Procurement decisions have resulted from the interplay of a diverse collection of actors, most of whom were pursuing institutional goals unrelated or only indirectly related to defense.

Another important conclusion, growing directly out of the intricacies of the procurement process, is that Japan can maintain its weapon acquisition program only with rising defense budgets. The deferred payment process that Japan uses to purchase

weapon systems and equipment has resulted in the government assuming future obligations which equal the total defense budget for about three years. Since only 25 to 27 percent of Japan's defense budgets are normally dedicated to equipment and weapon systems, it will be extremely difficult if not impossible to reduce the defense budget for the foreseeable future, and modest increases will not necessarily indicate increases in capacity. Indeed, to the contrary, modest increases or a flat defense budget would suggest a significant retrenchment of Japan's modernization program.

This book has little to say about the broader aspects of defense policy, except to note the absence of a coherent national strategy. Chinworth cannot be faulted for this—although including strategy in the subtitle of the volume does create unfulfilled expectations—because his purpose was to analyze only the procurement process. He does help illuminate the broader aspects of defense policy formulation by pointing out how politicians, Dietmen, and prime ministers are chosen primarily because they satisfy the demands of their constituents, few of whom have any interest in the military. If the reader combines this excellent work with *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*, by Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., he will gain a comprehensive view of the entire process.

Published in early 1993, *Inside Japan's Defense* could not have considered recent events, particularly last year's elections and the current recession, which have altered Japanese politics in fundamental ways. In that sense, the book already is out-of-date. On the other hand, in its detailed analysis of how the Japanese system of defense procurement has actually worked, it highlights cultural and managerial behavior which probably will persist even if the more overt policies of government are altered, and therefore will be valuable for years to come.

The Draft, 1940-1973. By George Q. Flynn. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 376 pages. \$45.00. Reviewed by Colonel John B. B. Trussell, USA Ret., former Chief of the History Division, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

Two decades have passed since the last American soldier was drafted. Military threats demanding large-scale mobilization seem inconceivable. Euphoria over the success of the all-volunteer forces in the Persian Gulf prevails. The Army in particular, already sharply reduced, is in the process of substantial further reduction. Under these circumstances, an analytic history of the nation's most recent and prolonged experience with conscription might seem to be chiefly of academic interest.

Yet it is also true that the social, economic, and political character of American life was profoundly influenced by the military conscription system adopted in preparation for World War II and continued almost without interruption for more than 30 years. In tracing the nature of that influence, together with the factors that caused its progressive evolution and led to its eventual abolition, this book provides insights valuable to anyone concerned with planning for American national security.

The author's basic themes are that to meet the manpower requirements of a world power, the United States has had to try to balance conflicting principles in an environment of competing special interests; that the Selective Service System achieved that balance to an acceptable degree, although not without sometimes violent opposition;

and that this system was discredited and abandoned largely on the basis of what were perceived as defects and failures but which did not actually exist.

Obviously, as Professor Flynn points out, the democratic ideal of maintaining an equally shared obligation for military service is incompatible with the necessity to maintain a viable national economy and, for that matter, the requirement of the armed forces to accept only those capable of effective military performance. In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting demands, the system created was one of *selective* service, intended to meet both civilian and military manpower needs through a rational process. The Selective Service System's inability to ensure universally equitable treatment, the author contends, was due less to the pressure of special-interest groups than to the fact that in the absence of obligatory but politically unacceptable *national* service to meet *civilian* needs as well as military, genuine egalitarianism was inherently unattainable. He cites polls and policy statements showing that any possibility of conscripting manpower for industry during World War II—the only period during which production for military purposes was seriously strained—was considered unthinkable. Suggestions made from time to time merely to use the threat of induction to prevent strikes by workers in war industries were not only protested by organized labor but were promptly rejected by Administration officials.

Entirely apart from acknowledging the economy's manpower needs, Americans broadly supported draft deferments in general. The post-World War II proposal to meet national security requirements by substituting a Universal Military Training program for the draft was rejected in large part because it would exempt no one but the physically handicapped. The proposal was unpopular although the program would have entailed only short tours to fill the reserves, not the active forces, and would have included physical rehabilitation (shockingly, half the young men examined for service during the war had been found physically unqualified) as well as training. While the public recognized that the draft could not be truly egalitarian, it was viewed as being "fair." If it aroused little enthusiasm, until well into the Vietnam War its "selective" features allowed it to be tolerated as a necessity.

In fact, from the modern draft's very beginning the American people showed themselves more willing to accept conscription than many government leaders were ready to credit. Professor Flynn reveals that, conspicuously, both President Roosevelt and General Marshall initially resisted proposals to enact a conscription law on grounds that the public would not tolerate a peacetime draft. As Selective Service swung into operation, however, it aroused minimal protest. In another revelation, the author explodes as myth the often-cited claim that the early draft was so unpopular that only one vote in Congress saved it from being abolished just two months before Pearl Harbor; the fact is that the vote in question had nothing to do with the survival of the draft, but merely concerned an increase in the length of the tour from 12 months to 18.

In setting the historical record straight in such instances, many of them more substantive, this book provides valuable clarifications, replacing numerous prevailing fictions with thoroughly documented facts. This is particularly important with regard to the uninformed misconceptions and deliberate misrepresentations which gained currency during the Vietnam War and, regrettably, persist to this day. Selected at random from among the many that are conclusively dealt with are the fallacy of the "right" of "selective" conscientious objection to service in a particular war rather than to war in general (rejected by the Supreme Court), the claim that Selective Service

deferment policies were widely condemned (polls and studies show indisputably that even the blanket deferments for fathers, farm workers, and college students in non-scientific as well as scientific fields enjoyed strong and lasting popular support), and the canard that African-Americans were drafted in disproportionate numbers (their induction rates actually were lower than those for whites).

Professor Flynn concedes that African-Americans in particular and draftees in general accounted for a disproportionate share of Vietnam casualties. He points out, however, that the responsibility did not lie with the Selective Service System. Rather, he states, it is largely attributable to military assignment policies dictated by the fact that training men for specialties more technical (and less hazardous) than infantry rifleman was not generally feasible within the draftee's two-year active-duty tour.

The author is possibly less convincing in his argument that the Vietnam War era's anti-draft protests actually represented opposition to the war, the draft serving merely as a symbol. He does show that many of the students protesting the draft were young men who, thanks to deferments, were not in fact vulnerable to induction. On the other hand, he fails to account for the significant decline in anti-war protests as soon as adoption of the lottery system sharply reduced the prospects of being drafted.

Nevertheless, whether it was broad disillusionment with the war or with the draft, national sentiment demanded and achieved an end to both. Many military readers may not share Professor Quinn's belief that the All-Volunteer Force is not an acceptable replacement for conscription. However, he is persuasive in arguing that Selective Service was abolished chiefly because of public misunderstanding and misconception that resulted from responsible authorities' failures in communication. Political truth is too often determined not by facts but by perceptions. For any effort to achieve general acceptance of a controversial and potentially unpopular policy, no matter how vital it may be to the national security, the lesson is unmistakable.

Hitler's Mountain Troops. By James Lucas. London: Arms and Armour (Dist. in US by Sterling Publishing Co.), 1992. 224 pp. \$27.50. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Mark F. Cancian, USMCR, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, author of "The Wehrmacht in Yugoslavia: Lessons of the Past," *Parameters*, Autumn 1993.

This is the latest in a long series of books historian James Lucas has written on the Third Reich. Others include *Das Reich: The History of the 2nd SS Division*; *Storming Eagles: German Airborne Forces in World War II*; and *World War Two Through German Eyes*. This is Lucas's second book on German mountain troops, following his 1980 work *Alpine Elite*.

This book looks at the experiences of the *Gebirgsjaeger*, the mountain troops of the German army and Waffen SS, during the Second World War. Drawn from the inhabitants of the alpine regions of Austria and south Germany, these mountain units had distinguished histories in both world wars. In World War II Germany raised 13 *Gebirgs* divisions. Lucas first met the *Gebirgsjaeger* on the battlefield as a member of the British army in Africa and Italy. Later, with the occupation forces in Austria, he met many veterans and became interested in their story.

Lucas begins by briefly describing the prewar reestablishment of the mountain units with the creation of the 1st Mountain Division in 1937 and later with the incorporation of mountain units of the Austrian army after the Anschluss (1938). He goes on to give a short description of how the mountain divisions differed from regular infantry: two regiments vs. three, pack animals vs. trucks, light artillery, few antitank or antiaircraft weapons. Most of the book, however, is a collection of unit campaign histories. He examines the experiences of the mountain divisions in Poland, Norway, France, Greece, Russia, and Yugoslavia.

From the beginning, the problem of using these specialized units in their designated role was apparent: While Germany herself had a large alpine region, many of her prospective battlefields did not. Western Poland, Belgium, northeast France, and the western Soviet Union are all extremely flat. Yet no high command can allow highly trained divisions to remain idle awaiting the right environment to open up (Marines take note). The mountain troops therefore performed mostly as general purpose light infantry.

In Poland, for instance, the (then) three mountain divisions crossed the mountains unopposed, then became involved in bitter urban fighting in the city of Lvov. In Norway a reinforced mountain regiment made an amphibious assault on Narvik and then, isolated, held the city for two months against British, French, and Norwegian attacks.

Perhaps the most interesting use of the mountain troops was in the airborne invasion of Crete in May 1941. In that battle the original plan had been for the parachute division to secure landing sites so that the 22d Air Landing Division—which had been designed for the purpose—could land by glider. The Air Landing Division was unavailable, however, so the 5th Mountain Division substituted. One element tried to land by sea but was turned back with heavy losses. The remainder landed by glider and fought bravely in the bitter battle for the island.

Of special interest currently is the campaign in Yugoslavia. Mountain troops played a modest part in the brief (11-day) initial campaign with the 4th *Gebirgs* Division attacking Yugoslavia over the mountains from Bulgaria. However, it was in the antiguerrilla campaign that the mountain units played a central role. First on the scene was the 7th SS Division (*Prinz Eugen*), raised locally in 1942 from *Volksdeutsche* in Yugoslavia. Then came the 1st *Gebirgs* Division, transferred from the Eastern Front, and finally the unreliable 13th SS *Gebirgs* Division (*Handschar*), a division raised from Bosnian Moslems. These units provided the mobile striking force for the Axis occupation army.

Lucas's new book does have two important shortcomings which need to be noted. The first is that it is straight history. There is little description of anything other than events. Training, equipment, organization, and especially mountain fighting techniques are all virtually ignored. (Lucas's earlier book *Alpine Elite* had significant discussions of just such topics.) Readers looking for campaign histories will not find this a problem. However, readers looking for insights to apply to contemporary operations in the mountains will be disappointed.

The second shortcoming is the totally unsatisfactory collection of maps in the book. This reviewer pleads for "Cancian's Rule": Every location named in the text should appear on a map.

Cold War Casualty: The Court-Martial of Major General Robert W. Grow. By George F. Hofmann. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 1993. 251 pages. \$26.00. Reviewed by Colonel Paul Brickner, USAR, whose reserve assignment is Appellate Judge with the US Army Court of Military Review.

Cold War Casualty is an outstanding study of the 1952 court-martial of Major General Robert W. Grow. It is a book that will disturb many, because it challenges the integrity of prominent military figures and because it questions, in this case, the performance of the military justice system.

The book reads like an international spy thriller, is filled with excitement, and deserves to be a best-seller. While telling a fascinating story, it asks fundamental questions about justice in America and delivers important messages. Major General Grow, a highly respected and worldly-wise soldier, learned one message too late: justice does not always prevail in American courts, civilian or military.

The General, senior military attaché in Moscow, kept a diary during those turbulent times of the Cold War in the West, the Korean conflict in the East, and the suspicions of McCarthyism in the United States Senate. Excerpts from his diary were published in East Germany, with the communist claim that they constituted proof of American warmongering. Some excerpts were accurate, others were taken out of context, and still others were total fabrications—creations of the communist East German propaganda machine.

Should Major General Grow have been prosecuted for recording "secret" information in his diary and then failing to safeguard and secure the diary? One answer was no. The "secrets" recorded in the diary were so inconsequential that the diary was returned to Grow several years after his conviction. Central Intelligence Agency and State Department officials recommended against court-martial. The author makes a powerful case, using research materials obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, to support his thesis that Lieutenant General Maxwell B. Taylor and other senior officers used command influence to have Grow prosecuted to prevent potential damage to their own careers. According to this thesis, Grow became a sacrificial lamb to protect the careers of high-ranking Army officers.

With great drama, the author, a lecturer in history at the University of Cincinnati, unravels the mystery of when and how Major General Grow's diary was compromised. The alleged culprit was an employee of the Victory Guest House located in a suburb of Frankfurt. The Guest House was a facility kept under requisition by the Army and maintained as a billet for visiting dignitaries, including Major General Grow. A thorough investigation conducted in Germany not only identified the culprit with near certainty but also revealed lapses of security and intelligence respecting the Victory Guest House.

With the support of General Taylor, that investigation was kept separate from the charges brought against Grow and deliberately withheld from the court-martial proceedings in Washington. Indeed, Grow did not learn of the investigative report until many years later, in 1978. Disclosure of the findings of the investigation might have shifted attention away from the question of whether Major General Grow was at fault for "allowing" the communists to gain access to the "secrets" contained in his diary and toward the question of who was responsible for the lapses of security and intelligence

procedures that had permitted espionage to take place at an Army billet. The latter question might have presented itself at the doors of two of the Army's top officers, Lieutenant General Maxwell B. Taylor, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, and Major General Alexander R. Bolling, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

The author supports his command-influence thesis by showing that a translation of the East German publication of Grow's diary was provided to *The Washington Post*, but that no description of the fabrications contained in the publication was provided to the press until after Major General Grow had been convicted. The banner newspaper headline, "Red Agents Reveal U.S. General's Diary: Secret Writings of Moscow Attaché Tell of Search for Bomb Targets," was published on 6 March 1952. Grow was convicted on 29 July 1952. Two days later, the *Post* reported "Army Says Reds Fabricated 'Quotes' from Grow's Diary." The author also points out that Grow's attorneys had been unable to secure the attendance of Taylor and Bolling as witnesses at the court-martial.

Major General Grow, who had commanded the 6th Armored Division during World War II and who had played a major role in keeping the Soviets out of Iran after the war, "sincerely believed in the honor and justice of the military legal system." He chose to withdraw his request for retirement, believing that he would be cleared by the pretrial investigation. The author believes, however, that the pretrial investigation was not fair and impartial.

The thesis of the book is built around the idea that top Pentagon staff chose to prosecute Grow rather than refute the charges that his diary contained top secret information, and that they did so to protect and advance their own careers. The author describes Maxwell B. Taylor, who went on to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to South Vietnam, as "an opportunist" who "was able to master political intrigues necessary to enhance his ambitions," and as a man with a strong and powerful ego.

Major General Grow was brought up in the old school, believing that personal ambitions were to be subordinated to the good of the service. The system in which he believed and in which he placed his trust and faith let him down.

Grow withdrew his request for retirement, was prosecuted and convicted, and then, in bitter irony, virtually all of the trial documents were returned to Grow—all declassified. In fact, the diary itself had never been classified.

This carefully researched book speaks with a great deal of authority. It tells of the misuse of the military justice system, which in this case was used as the unfortunate tool of command influence. The general court martial of Major General Grow presents an important case study to senior members of the defense community, both military and civilian. It contains many messages and lessons, not the least of which is that history sometimes has the ability to address wrongs and correct an unfortunate record. In this case, the actions of top staff officers at the Pentagon played into the hands of the communist propagandists. Had the effort devoted to the court-martial of Grow been devoted to refuting the communist propaganda, both the nation and the military would have been the beneficiaries.

Both George F. Hofmann and the Kent State University Press deserve high praise for this volume. The university press seems to have devoted an extra measure of dedication to insure that this book, beautifully printed and handsomely bound, will be an important addition to the bookshelves of many readers.

Joint Military Operations: A Short History. By Roger A. Beaumont. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993. 245 pages. \$55.00. Reviewed by James J. Cooke, Professor of History at the University of Mississippi and author of *100 Miles From Baghdad: With the French in Desert Storm*.

On 11 November 1991, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces* (Joint Pub 1) was published with an objective of giving this short document the widest possible distribution. The preface stated that "Joint warfare is essential to victory." The thrust of the document simply was to reach every American military leader and make each of them aware of the value, the necessity, of joint warfighting. As Roger A. Beaumont makes clear in his *Joint Military Operations: A Short History*, joint warfighting, or jointness, is easier to explain and to espouse as a doctrine than it is to actually practice in war planning and combat. Beaumont, a Professor of History at Texas A&M University, gives the reader a historic overview of joint operations, including failures and successes. The author's work is not a polemic for jointness—it is a balanced exploration. Beaumont does not limit his work to current joint ventures. He begins with the Greeks and progresses to Desert Storm. His emphasis, however, is wisely in the modern period.

Beaumont points out that it is better to study jointness in the context of war than in the atmosphere of doctrine writers and interservice panels in peacetime. The author defines joint operations in American terms, stating that his interests are in the American models. He fully discusses joint and combined operations with foreign powers, especially in World War II. In dealing with this multinational aspect of jointness, Beaumont points out that he now understands why Carl von Clausewitz "saw tact as the crucial but all-too-scarce antidote to friction in war." Jointness, as Beaumont found out, a delicate subject which can bring aggravation on one hand or an edifying source of lessons-learned on the other.

While jointness can produce anger and interservice bloodletting, the concept of joint operations is often best understood and practiced at the lower levels of command. There, Beaumont states, "those in battle find it easier to transcend the parochial concerns so salient in peacetime bureaucratic infighting." The author cites numerous examples in history of this cooperation at the operational and tactical levels of war. His discussion of joint Army-Navy operations in the western theater during the American Civil War is a prime example of this fusion of land and water forces. Beaumont describes the excellent relationship of U.S. Grant with Andrew Foote and Dixon Porter in the Tennessee and then the Vicksburg campaigns.

Beaumont would have been well served by exploring in detail Grant's operations against Vicksburg. So much of Grant's success, not only in keeping Confederate John C. Pemberton confused as to Federal intentions but also in safeguarding Union supply lines once he was on the east bank of the Mississippi River, depended in great measure on the efforts of the Navy to keep men and, especially, supplies flowing to Union ground forces moving deep into Mississippi. Beaumont points out that the Vicksburg campaign (including operations against Port Hudson) was the most extended exercise in jointness prior to World War II.

Of particular importance is Chapter 5, titled "Fitful Ebb and Flow: Jointness from 1943 to 1991." In this lengthy and well-researched chapter Beaumont traces the

ups and downs of joint operations with an eye toward interservice rivalry, which he names "the battle of the Potomac." The author points out that no less a person than General Eisenhower argued for jointness and service unification, which he believed would result in a 25-percent reduction in the superstructure of the services. President Harry S. Truman, a World War I National Guard artillery battery commander who brought to the White House a distinct dislike for the Regular Army, tried in 1945 to achieve service unification. The debates of the 1940s brought into focus a new aspect in the search for jointness—the establishment of the US Air Force, with its own set of priorities which grew out of its immediate post-World War I frustrations at being subordinated to the ground-oriented Army.

After exploring jointness over a rather long period of history, Beaumont concludes with a chapter titled "Patterns and Paradoxes: The Central Problem of Friction." In this chapter the author writes, "A central paradox of jointness is the hostility that it has often generated." This appears to be strange in a culture which prizes unit cohesion and esprit de corps, but as Beaumont points out, on the battlefield coordination and contact between units on the left and right are extremely difficult to establish and maintain. Bolstering this tendency to turn inward and instinctively reject jointness is the fact that armies, navies, and air forces have very different operating environments. Technology also dictates that these groups have different functions, which must be somehow welded together into a coherent program beneficial to all concerned.

Beaumont warns that with the retrenchment that has followed the end of the Cold War, jointness could lose some of its intensity as a matter of contention. While the author is a believer in jointness, he does make the case that to study a history of jointness is to look at what might have been rather than what was. As with any book on a current policy concern, Beaumont might have succumbed to the temptation to prognosticate. But he is too good a scholar, too thoughtful an observer, to enter into speculative future scenario writing.

Joint Military Operations is a book that should be welcomed by the military professional, the policymaker, and the student of military affairs. Well researched and well written, this book illuminates. It does not speculate. What Beaumont has done is to tell his readers that joint operations are not new, nor are the problems associated with trying to achieve jointness. As such this book makes a serious contribution to the growing body of thoughtful literature on the topic.

Church Lands and Peasant Unrest in the Philippines: Agrarian Conflict in 20th-Century Luzon. By Michael J. Connolly, S. J. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Univ. Press, 1992. 232 pages. \$17.00. Reviewed by Dr. James C. Bledzynski, adjunct professor of American history at Kean College, in Union, N.J.

Philippine land reform is a perennial topic with many theories but few solutions. Michael J. Connolly's *Church Lands and Peasant Unrest in the Philippines* is another attempt to examine this central issue in Filipino life. Connolly, a Jesuit political scientist, examines four church-owned estates on Luzon between 1903 and 1954 to ascertain what their collective experience can tell us about the dynamics (or

lack of them) of Philippine land reform. Connolly presents his readers with a somewhat rambling but not entirely predictable saga of land issues.

It is customary for most Philippine scholars to sympathize with the landless masses and in many instances to criticize the landed elite. Connolly criticizes both groups. He faults the church for relying too much on the estates for revenues, thereby harming the living standards of their tenants. He also faults some of the tenants' leaders, most notably Juan Rustia, the perennial peasant organizing attorney. Rustia's dishonesty and unethical tactics on the peasants' behalf are chronicled in great detail. It might seem strange to see the masses' champions critiqued in this manner, but it is an analysis which is needed in writing on the contemporary Philippines.

Connolly's study is marred by poor organization and a somewhat uneven writing style. He shifts from estate to estate with inadequate transition. At the same time, his narrative has a tendency to descend into endless detail. Thus the reader sometimes enters an intricate maze of information pertaining to each estate's affairs. This sort of presentation can alienate the reader, particularly one who is unfamiliar with the Philippines. Yet historical events pertaining to the archipelago generally and the estates in particular are given insufficient detail. In order to understand Connolly's work fully, one must thus have some prior knowledge of Philippine conditions.

Connolly briefly attempts to connect the early 20th century with current Philippine conditions and asks if there is any hope for Philippine land problems. While his book provides no answers to current problems, it does shed light on the Philippine Catholic Church's finances during earlier decades as well as tenant leadership. One hopes that a subsequent work with greater background information will build on *Church Lands and Peasant Unrest*.

Crossed Currents: Navy Women from WWI to Tailhook. By Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall. Washington: Brassey's (US), 1993. 321 pp. \$25.00.

Now Hear This: The Story of American Sailors in World War II. By Edwin P. Hoyt. New York: Paragon House, 1993. 298 pp. \$24.95.

Reviewed by Lawrence Carroll Allin, who formerly taught at the University of Maine and has written and reviewed widely in the field of maritime history.

"Tailhook" in *Crossed Currents*' title was apparently put there to help sales. But, happily, the two sections of the volume which deal with the 1991 Tailhook convention and resultant difficulties for the US Navy are devoid of tantalizing sensationalism and written in a factual manner by two experienced authors who are married to retired Navy captains.

In writing the most complete history of women in the Navy, Ebbert and Hall have divided their work into 14 chapters gathered into four parts which tell of the steadily increasing and expanding roles women have played as members of the Navy: "Yeomen (F) in World War I," "WAVES of World War II," "Women in the Regular Navy," and "Modern Navy Women." In these four parts, the authors have written about Navy women other than nurses, making it clear that women were accepted into Navy ranks only reluctantly because they were needed to sustain the Fleet's capabilities.

Every military person should read this book along with *Women in the Military*, by USAF Major General Jeanne Holm. Both books give an understanding of the social, technological, and legal forces afoot which have changed women from the excluded "weaker sex" to almost full partners in the military enterprise, and which may put them directly into combat and the highest levels of command, including Chairwoman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Ebbert and Hall address the realities of the physiological differences between male and female sailors and explain how the Navy has dealt with those differences in the day-to-day adjustments it has had to make while giving women more responsibility and opportunity. This story of female service in the Navy covers three-quarters of a century. That means there are no members of the military now serving who served when the military was an all-male organization. The book gives all military personnel, most junior to most senior, additional context in which they can consider their responsibilities to the members of their own organizations, male and female.

Senior military personnel can read this work and look back over their own careers to recall the progress women have made into and through "A" schools, OCS, NROTC, NAVCADS, increasing responsibilities in rate and rank, and command ashore and afloat. Using this book as a benchmark against which to measure their own careers, seniors will discover how they have participated in expanding the roles women play in the nation's defense.

Another reason for members of all services and both genders to read this work is the extensive research done by the authors, which is reflected in their bibliography. They used the conventional variety of sources, numerous interviews, and the Oral History Collection of the United States Naval Institute.

Where Ebbert and Hall's publisher may have erred with the word "Tailhook," Hoyt's publisher damaged his house's reputation with a jacket blurb that says prior to World War II the US Navy "had not fought a war since 1812."

Following Hoyt's *The Airmen* and *The GI's War*, this is the third in his trilogy recounting the personal experiences of military men, mostly enlisted, during World War II. While Hoyt wished to capture the sights, sounds, and feel of the war, women and minorities do not grace his account of life in the Fleet because, he asserts, they were unwilling to communicate with him. Nonetheless, he has produced 48 vignettes, one a mere two-thirds of a page long, and arranged them in chronological order to explain experiences ranging from doing the ship's laundry to suffering under shore bombardment, to producing hydrographic charts, to dying in combat.

Hoyt's publisher and editor did not serve him well. They allowed numerous typographical errors to appear in the text, failed to assure the precision of its vocabulary, and permitted incorrect assertions to creep into the work as facts. They allowed Hoyt to mention officers by rank and last name without the courtesy of using their full names or at least initials. Also, they let Hoyt call the enlisted men "Sailor," as in "Sailor Jones" and "Sailor Smith."

Hoyt can write well. This reviewer has several of his books. But Hoyt has no recurring, uniting themes to give his vignettes coherence and motion. Put differently, this book is dull. Unlike Ebbert and Hall's work, it cannot be recommended to those who have limited time for reading.

Off the Press . . .

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From the Archives

The Peace of Westphalia

The treaties of Westphalia (1648), often remarked but now seldom read, signaled a historic turn in the evolution of human governance. The immediate purpose of the treaties was to end the Thirty Years' War in Europe. The longer-term significance of the treaties, however, lay in their portents for the creation of the state. They explicitly validated a European society of secular, sovereign, equal, independent states whose status and rights were underwritten by the force of mutually acknowledged law.

The tenor of the 128 articles comprising the treaties can be gleaned from the following excerpt (Article 65):

[The states] shall enjoy without contradiction the right of suffrage in all deliberations touching the affairs of the Empire; but above all, when the business in hand shall be the making or interpreting of laws, the declaring of wars, imposing of taxes, levying or quartering of soldiers, erecting new fortifications in the territories of the states, or reinforcing the old garrisons; as also when a peace or alliance is to be concluded and treated about, or the like, none of these or the like things shall be acted for the future without the suffrage and consent of the free assembly of all the states of the Empire: above all, it shall be free perpetually to each of the states of the Empire to make alliances with strangers for their preservation and safety. . . .¹

Though wars of territorial aggrandizement against neighbor states would of course persist, there was now in place a sanctioned normative principle of statecraft to oppose the might-makes-right dogma of feudally-disposed monarchs. Cardinal Richelieu, chief minister of the French crown until his death on the eve of Westphalia, was distinctly modern in his view that the state was now an entity unto itself, "greater than the sum of the provinces and populations that comprised it, possessing interests that outlived its individual rulers and transcended the immediate desires of their subjects."²

NOTES

1. Fred L. Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967* (New York: Chelsea House, 1967), I, 27-28 [spelling and punctuation here modernized].

2. As characterized by Geoffrey Symcox in *War, Diplomacy and Imperialism, 1618-1783*, ed. Geoffrey Symcox (New York: Walker, 1974), p. 4.

— Contributed by Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, USA Ret.